Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/42/q/bon-sent-II-d42-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the comparison of the sin of deed to the sin of will.*
### Question I. *Whether the sin of will and the sin of deed are two sins, or one.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the sin of will and the sin of deed are two sins, or one. And that they are several, it seems.

1. On that text of Romans, chapter one: *Filled with murders*: the Gloss: « It says *murders* in the plural, because the murder of will is one thing, and the murder of deed another ». If it is so in murder, then by parity of reasoning so also in other sins.

2. Likewise, when the lower is multiplied, the higher is multiplied; but exterior fornication is a special sin, and the will to fornicate is also a special sin; but the will to fornicate is other than the very act of fornication: therefore if these are diverse and are sins, speaking formally: therefore they are diverse sins.

3. Likewise, when the subject is multiplied, the accident is multiplied which subsists through that subject; but deformity is compared to the action as an accident to a subject: therefore where there are many deformed actions, there are many deformities, and where there are many deformities, there are many sins; and the interior action and the exterior are diverse: therefore there are in them diverse deformities: therefore also diverse sins.

4. Likewise, when one of two opposites is multiplied, the other too is multiplied, because « only one is opposed to one »; but sin is repugnant to a precept: since therefore there is one precept by which the interior act is prohibited, and another by which the exterior act is prohibited, because one command is: *Thou shalt not covet*, and another: *Thou shalt not commit adultery*: therefore it seems that, just as those are two precepts, so the interior action and the exterior are two sins.

5. Likewise, the interior will agrees more with an interior will than the interior will with an exterior act; but the interior will with another will makes two diverse sins: therefore much more are the interior will with an exterior act diverse sins.

**On the contrary:**
1. The *per se* and the *per accidens* do not constitute a number, just as when I love wine because it is sweet, I am not said to love two things, but one; but the exterior action is not a sin except on account of the interior will: therefore the interior will with the exterior act does not constitute a number: therefore they are not two sins but one.

2. Likewise, an action begun does not constitute a number with the same action completed; but sin is begun in the will and completed in the deed, according to what is said in James, chapter one: *Concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; but sin, when it has been completed, begets death*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a good work does not constitute a number with a good will in the account of merit — hence when someone voluntarily acts well, there is not there a double merit, but one — therefore by parity of reasoning, neither will the interior will with the exterior work constitute a number in the account of demerit or sin.

4. Likewise, the formal element in sin, insofar as it is sin, is inordinate desire, or rather contempt of God or aversion; but when someone voluntarily perpetrates a wicked deed, there are not two contempts, but one, nor two aversions, but one: therefore the interior will and the exterior act are not two sins, but one.

5. Likewise, for many sins a manifold penalty ought to be inflicted, whether remunerative or satisfactory; but for a sin completed exteriorly no manifold penalty is owed to anyone, nor are diverse satisfactions imposed, but one: therefore the interior will and the exterior action are not diverse sins.

> **Conclusion.** The will to sin and the exterior act, if they are ordered to one another, are one sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that the sin of the exterior deed and the sin of the interior will can be compared in two ways: in one way, insofar as these two are conjoined and ordered, such that one is from the other; and thus the interior will with the exterior act does not make diverse sins, because there is there one contempt and one aversion and one conversion. For the will is that which by contemning turns away, while it turns toward a changeable good, not only as to its proper act, but also as to the act of the lower power which is subject to it. Since therefore sin, as such, denotes a disorder through contempt and aversion from God and conversion toward the creature; hence it is that, since there is there one first disorder, the sin of will and of deed is one, speaking formally, insofar as they are conjoined. But although there is there one *account of disordering*, yet there are several *things disordered*; and therefore, although that sin is one *formally*, yet there are several *materially*.

But if we compare the interior will to the exterior work insofar as they are separated, such that one person sins by will only, another sins by will and deed; thus the sin of will and the sin of deed are diverse sins not only *materially*, but also *formally*, because the act of will, in which the first account of disordering consists, is counted and is distinct one from the other. — In this way, however, the Master does not ask in the text whether the interior will and the exterior action are diverse sins — for this is not in doubt, that one sins by diverse sins if on one occasion one merely wills evil, and on another occasion wills and accomplishes it — but he asks about this: whether the interior will and the exterior action are diverse sins, according as the one proceeds from the other, and the one is conjoined to the other. And to this it must be answered that, although there are *several culpable works* and *several things disordered*, yet because there is *one account of disordering* and *one act of will* there, and the other is not culpable except on account of it; there is one sin there. And the Master in the text agrees more with this manner of speaking, when he answers the objections which are made for the other part, which said that those are diverse sins. And he does rightly in this, that although something can be said to be *counted* — by a certain impropriety — solely from the side of the *material principle*; nevertheless, properly speaking, something is not counted from the side of the *material principle*, except because together with the numbering from the side of the *material principle* there concurs a numbering from the side of the *formal principle*, just as whiteness is counted in two white men. — But it is not so in the case at hand; and therefore the reasons which show this, namely that the interior will and the exterior action are one sin, are to be conceded.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

*To 1.* As to what is objected from the Gloss, it must be said that the Gloss either speaks materially, or speaks of the interior and exterior murder insofar as they are disjoined, such that one is not continued to the other.

*To 2.* As to what is objected, that when the lower is multiplied its higher is multiplied; it must be said that this is true of that lower to which its higher is essential, or to which its higher is essentially compared. But it is not so in the case at hand, because sin, even though it is predicated of will and of action, is not predicated by an essential predication, but rather by an accidental one.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that when the subject is multiplied the accident is multiplied; it must be said that this is true if the subject is multiplied *per se* and that in which the accident *primarily* is. But the deformity of sinning is not regarded *primarily* and *principally* with respect to the exterior action, nor is it there as in a subject *per se*, but it is there by reason of the interior will conjoined; which is clear, because, if that action proceeded from another principle than from the will, it would no longer be culpable. — It can also be said otherwise, that this is understood when the subject is multiplied both according to the *thing* and according to that *account* by which it is called a subject, such that there are not only several *things*, but also several *subjects*. But although the interior and exterior action are diverse *things*, yet they are not diverse *subjects* of deformity, but one, because, just as order can be in several things, of which one is from the other, as in one subject; so too disorder. Since therefore the deformity of sin denotes a disorder from the end, hence it is that with respect to the interior and exterior action it subsists as with respect to *one subject*, although there are *diverse actions* and *things*. — One could also press the objection against that statement, that this is understood of an *absolute accident*, not of a *related accident*. For such a one can be in several things, provided that they are related and ordered to one another; and in this way the interior and exterior action are disposed, because the one proceeds from the other.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that when one of two opposites is multiplied, the other too is multiplied; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is opposed to it. But the precept by which the exterior act and the interior will are prohibited is not distinct except from this, that in the one the will together with the work is prohibited, in the other the will is prohibited even apart from the work; and in this way I readily concede that the interior will and the exterior action, insofar as they are disjoined, are several sins. But it is not in this way that the present inquiry proceeds, nor the inquiry of the Master.

*To 5.* As to what is objected, that the interior will agrees more with the will than with the exterior act; it must be said that there is an agreement of *form*, and an agreement of *order*. When therefore it is said that the interior will agrees more with the will than with the exterior action; it must be said that this is true of agreement of *form*, but not of agreement of *order*; because the will is not from the will in the way that the exterior operation is from the interior will; and therefore, since there are two wills, there are two principal disorders, and on account of this there are two sins. But when the exterior work is joined to the interior will from which it proceeds, there is there one disorder and one actual principle of disorder; and therefore there is one sin on this side, and on that side several.