Dist. 42, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/42/q/bon-sent-II-d42-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *Whether the sin of deed adds anything beyond the sin of will.*

Secondly it is asked whether the sin of deed adds beyond the sin of will. And that it does seems so.

1. Upon that of the Psalm: *Add iniquity upon iniquity*; the Gloss: "He who adds the deed to the will adds iniquity to iniquity"; but he who does this either commits a new sin, or a greater one; but not a new one: therefore a greater one.

2. Likewise, Augustine: "Each one is made wretched by an evil *will*, but more wretched by *power*, when the desire of the evil will is fulfilled"; but a man is not made more wretched by a sin unless the sin be aggravated: therefore the sin of will is aggravated by the addition of the deed.

3. Likewise, it seems so by *reason*. In human justice he is more gravely punished who sins in deed than he who sins by will alone, or by will and word than by will only: therefore if human justice is derived from eternal justice and is conformed to it and is praiseworthy in its working; it seems that he is worthy of a greater punishment who sins by will and deed than he who sins by will only. But no one is worthy of a greater punishment except on account of a greater fault: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, he sins more gravely who sins against God and against neighbor than he who sins against God only; but he who sins by interior will alone sins only against God; whereas he who sins outwardly in deed often sins against his neighbor, as is plain in adultery and homicide: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the more a man *glorifies himself and is in delights*, so much the more is he worthy of punishment; but he who sins by will and deed has glorified himself more and has taken more delight than he who sinned by will alone: therefore he is worthy of a greater punishment; and if this, he perpetrates a greater fault.

**On the contrary:**
1. Upon that of the Psalm: *For in your heart you work iniquities*; the Gloss: "If you will and cannot, God reckons it as done"; therefore if the will is reckoned for the deed, it seems that the deed adds nothing beyond the will as regards the formal character of sin.

2. Likewise, Augustine: "If it should happen that someone does not lie with another's wife, but it is plain that he desires her, and that, were the power given, he would do it; he is no less guilty than if he were caught in the very act": therefore if he is no less guilty, he does not sin more when he consummates it in deed than when he wills it fully in the will.

3. Likewise, the gravity and magnitude of a sin consists in the quantity of contempt; but when the will consents entirely, then the aversion and contempt are full: therefore the sin is equal, whether the deed be present or absent.

4. Likewise, the outward deed is not culpable except on account of the interior will: therefore if the whole ground of culpability takes its origin from the will itself, it seems that, with the sin existing in will alone, a man is as culpable as if he sinned in deed.

5. Likewise, spiritual sins, which are consummated by the will alone, are graver than carnal sins, whose consummation takes place in the flesh. If, then, the former, which consist in the will alone, are graver than the latter, which consist in will and deed; it seems that the deed adds nothing to the malice of the will.

### Conclusion

> If on both sides the will is full, the sin of deed adds—not by reason of a greater contempt of God, but by reason of delight, or of harm done.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that, when it is asked whether the deed adds anything to the malice of the will, this can be understood in two ways: in one way with respect to a will that can proceed into deed, but nevertheless does not proceed, because it does not will fully and entirely; and with respect to such a will the malice of the deed without doubt adds. For when the sin is consummated in deed, then the consent is fuller, and not only is the woman said to eat, but also the man; and therefore the sin is then greater and graver by reason of the greater turning-toward and also the turning-away. — In another way it can be understood with respect to a will that indeed does not proceed into deed, not because it does not will, but because it cannot. And then this question is raised, when on both sides there is a full will, whether he sins more gravely who wills and cannot, or he who wills and does, granted that each is moved by an equal love.

This question therefore being understood in this way, it must be answered that one sin is said to be greater than another in three ways: either by reason of a greater contempt of God, or by reason of a greater *lust* or delight, or by reason of a greater *harm done*. Speaking in the first way, the deed does not add to the iniquity of the will, because the full will is turned away from God of itself, just as when it is joined to the deed. But as regards delight or lust it adds and aggravates, especially as regards the kind of carnal sin by which a man sins against himself; likewise as regards harm done it adds, and this especially as regards the kind of sin by which one sins against neighbor. For however much anyone may will to fornicate, he is never delighted as when the will is joined to the act. Likewise, however much anyone may will to kill another, he does not do as much harm as if he actually killed. And since God, the just judge, in punishing considers in a sin not only the magnitude of *contempt*, but also the magnitude of *delight* and the magnitude of *harm done*; hence it is that in some way the deed adds to the wickedness of the will. — Whence also the reasons that show this are to be conceded, although not all of them are conclusive, especially the one that is drawn from the likeness of divine and human justice. For it is not alike, because *men consider what is outwardly evident* and public justice; *but God beholds the heart* and considers not only public justice, but also private.

**To the arguments for the contrary part:**
*To 1 and 2.* As to what is objected on the contrary from that Gloss and from the authority of Augustine—of which the one says that the will is reckoned for the deed, and the other says that he is no less guilty who wills and does not do than he who wills and does; it must be said that both proceed according to the quantity of sin, which is measured according to the fullness of consent and according to the magnitude of contempt; and so it is rightly conceded that the deed does not add to such a will.

*To 3.* As to what is objected, that the quantity of sin is considered according to the quantity of contempt; it must be said that it is true, yet not true *precisely*. For God considers not only the contempt of himself, but rather also the harm to the neighbor and the delight of the sinner; whence he also exacts vengeance for the neighbor suffering injury, and exacts a greater vengeance for one suffering a greater injury; so too he afflicts him who has taken delight, and afflicts more him who has taken more delight. And therefore that argument proceeds from an insufficient ground.

*To 4.* As to what is objected, that the whole ground of sin is from the will; it must be said that it is not true, because some sins are not only from the wickedness of the will of the one acting, but also from the kind of deed, because they are against the prohibition of God and against the dictate of natural law. It is true nevertheless that nothing which is done on the part of the deed by itself suffices to make a sin, unless a voluntary motion be present; and therefore from this it does not follow that, although this cannot be a sin without that, that this adds nothing to that. And

it is alike, because iron does not burn without fire; yet fire with iron burns more and penetrates more than it would do by itself; and so it is found in many other cases.

*To 5.* As to what is objected concerning spiritual sins, it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that spiritual sins have a spiritual delight, which in its own kind has a greater adherence and a greater wickedness than even some delight of carnal sin does. But carnal sins never delight as much, when they are in will alone, as when they are in will and deed, nor do they likewise do as much harm. Therefore it does not follow that in such cases the deed does not add to the malice of the will.

---