Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/42/q/bon-sent-II-d42-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the comparison of venial sin to mortal sin.*

Consequently, inquiry is made concerning the second point, namely concerning the comparison of venial to mortal sin. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion.

Second it is asked whether they agree in guilt, or in obligation to the eternity of punishment.

### Question I. *Whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether venial and mortal sin agree in aversion. And that they do seems to be the case.

1. Augustine, in defining sin, says that « sin is not the appetite for evil things, but the desertion of better things ». If therefore venial sin is sin, then in it there is desertion of the highest good; but where there is desertion of the highest good, there is aversion: therefore, etc. If you should say that this argument applies to mortal sin only, then *I ask:* in what do venial and mortal sin agree, by reason of which each is called sin? If you should say, in the *conversion* to a changeable good, this does not seem so, because to turn to a changeable good is not a sin, unless through it a man recedes from the unchangeable good; for sin is privation, not position. If therefore venial sin, insofar as it is sin, agrees with mortal, and that in which it agrees is not conversion, then it is aversion.

2. Likewise, everything that is contrary to a divine precept turns away from God; but venial sin is of this kind: therefore, etc. The *major* is manifest of itself; the *minor* is proved. To the Romans, chapter seven, on that text: *Thou shalt not covet;* the Gloss: « Good is the law, which, while it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evils »: therefore, if venial sin is an evil, then by that precept *Thou shalt not covet* it is forbidden.

3. Likewise, everything that deforms the image turns away from God; venial sin is of this kind: therefore, etc. The *minor* is proved by what is said in the sixth book of *On Music*: « Love of an inferior beauty pollutes the soul »; but venial sin is the love of an inferior beauty: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, a simple thing, in respect to that to which it turns, turns wholly; but both the intellect and the affection are simple: therefore, when it turns to something, it turns wholly. But what turns wholly to something is turned away from its opposite or its disparate: therefore, when our affection turns to a creature under the aspect of a creature, it is necessary that it be turned away from God. But this is the case in venial sin: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, it is impossible for anything to be moved to the term *to which* without being in some way separated from the term *from which;* but conversion bespeaks a motion of the mind in respect to the term *to which,* and aversion in respect to the term *from which:* therefore, if conversion is in venial sin, it is necessary that there likewise be aversion.

6. Likewise, all love of a creature is either by way of *use* or by way of *enjoyment,* as Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*; but in venial sin there is love of a creature: therefore either by way of *use* or of *enjoyment.* Not by way of *use,* for then it would no longer be a fault; therefore it is the love of *enjoyment.* But *to enjoy a creature* is to place one's end in a creature; and this is nothing other than to be turned away from God: therefore all love of venial sin causes a turning away from God.

**On the contrary:**
1. No one turned away from God is just; but one who sins venially remains in justice: therefore one who sins venially is not turned away from God. The *major* is manifest; the *minor* is proved by that text of Proverbs, chapter twenty-four: *Seven times a day the just man falls and rises again.*

2. Likewise, no one is separated from God except willingly; but everyone who is turned away is separated from God: therefore no one is separated from God except in an act which he does by sheer will. But we commit many venial sins by a certain necessity, as is said to the Romans, chapter seven: *The evil that I would not, that I do:* therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, no one is turned away from God without contempt of God himself and offense; but no one contemns and offends God without grave fault; but venial sin is reckoned among the light sins: therefore by venial sin a man is not turned away from God.

4. Likewise, nothing that stands together with charity turns away from God; but venial sin stands together with charity: therefore, etc. The *major* is manifest; the *minor* is proved: because, if venial sin expelled charity, then it would take from a man the life of grace. But a sin that takes from a man the life of grace inflicts death and is called mortal: therefore venial sin would be mortal.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** Venial sin does not agree with mortal sin in aversion, according as aversion is taken properly.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, venial sin does not agree with mortal sin in aversion, according as aversion is taken properly. For it implies contempt of God, and contempt of God merits wrath and death; but a sin by which one merits wrath and death ought not to be called *venial,* but rather *mortal.* And therefore it is commonly held that aversion, properly speaking, is found in *mortal* sin, not in *venial.*

And this appears better if we attend to the manner by which a man is said to be turned away from God and to contemn God, by committing some sin in which he thinks nothing of God. For either a man is turned away from God because he acts *against a divine command;* or because he sets up a created good for himself as his *ultimate end.* For in this, that he acts *against a divine command,* he is rightly turned away from God; because the command is the way of rightly arriving at God and tending toward God. He therefore who acts against the command proceeds straight along the contrary way; and so, as it were turning his face backward, he turns his back upon him toward whom he ought to have tended by the command. — Likewise, when he sets up a creature for himself as his *ultimate end,* he is rightly said to be turned away from God. For the soul is midway between the creature and God, inasmuch as it is the image of God. When therefore it turns to a creature as to its end, it bends downward its face, which ought to have been turned upward, and therefore it turns itself away from God. — And in both of the said modes there is no aversion without contempt. For he who transgresses God's command contemns the commander. Likewise, he who sets up a creature for himself as his principal end values the creature more than God; and this cannot be without contempt of God.

*Venial* sin, however, is neither directly *against* God's *command,* nor does it set up a creature as its *ultimate end;* and therefore there is in it neither aversion nor contempt. But because venial sin is committed *beside* God's *command,* in venial sin too a creature is not referred to God; hence it is that through venial sin a man in some way *recedes* from the *way of the command,* and in some way also *lingers slothfully* upon that by which he ought to pass through. Hence in venial sin too there is a certain *elongation* and a certain *retardation.* — Hence it is conceded that venial sin does not turn away from God but *elongates,* does not separate from God but *retards.* And if the name *aversion* were taken broadly, so that it extended to elongation and retardation, in venial sin there would be a certain *aversion.* Yet because the name *aversion* sounds toward contempt, therefore it must be held that to turn away from God belongs properly to mortal sin. — Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that sin is a desertion; it must be said that, if this definition is given for mortal sin, *desertion* there stands for *aversion.* But if it is given for any sin whatever, *desertion* bespeaks a certain *elongation* and *retardation*. — Yet it could be said that sin is not there called desertion of God, but desertion of any good whatsoever which pertains to rectitude. Therefore although in venial sin there is no desertion of God, there is nonetheless desertion of some *good circumstance* about the act, from the defect of which venial sin arises. And in this both venial and mortal sin agree, because each deprives of some good. But in this they differ, that mortal sin deprives of some act or circumstance necessary for salvation, but venial does not.

2. To that which is objected, that venial sin is *against God's prohibition;* it must be said that that is *properly* said to be *against God's prohibition* to whose opposite the prohibition obliges; but venial sin is not of this kind, and therefore it is not directly *prohibited.* It is, however, attached to the prohibition itself, and more properly ought to be called *restrained* than *prohibited.* And this is plain, because, when God forbids concupiscence saying: *Thou shalt not covet;* he does not forbid the first motion of concupiscence, but the progress of concupiscence, according to that text of Ecclesiasticus, chapter eighteen: *Son, go not after thy lusts;* but while he forbids a man to go after the motion of concupiscence, by this very fact he makes manifest that the motion of concupiscence is not good nor pleasing to God.

3. To that which is objected, that the love of an inferior beauty pollutes the soul; it must be said that the soul can be polluted in two ways: either by the stain of *mortal* sin, which indeed *expels* the splendor of grace; or by the stain of *venial* sin, which in some way *retards* the act of gratuitous love. And the first pollution is by mortal sin and tends toward the deformation of the image, because it takes from it its form, namely the image of re-creation. But the second is a venial pollution, which, although it pollutes in some way, nonetheless does not deform the soul, because it stands together with grace, which informs the soul.

4. To that which is objected, that a simple thing, in respect to that to which it turns, turns wholly; it must be said that this can be understood in three ways: for "wholly" can bespeak totality with respect to the *act* of turning, or with respect to the *habit,* or with respect to the *power* of turning. If it is understood with respect to the *act,* then it is true, at least according to the state of the wayfarer, because we do not understand more than one thing at once; or if we understand and will many things at once, this is insofar as they are one. — But if it bespeaks totality of *habit* or of *virtue,* then the statement is false. For it is not necessary that, when a soul or some simple thing turns to something, it turn according to its whole *habit* and according to its whole *power,* because it can turn more intensely and more remissly. — When therefore it is said that, when the affection turns to one thing wholly, it is turned away from its opposite or its disparate; if it is understood in the first way, it is false, because it can turn to one thing in act and to another in habit; if it is understood in the second or third way, then it holds true. But the *major proposition* was false, and on this account, because *to turn wholly* is taken in one sense in the *major proposition* and in another in the *minor;* therefore that consequence does not hold. And *if you object* that one cannot be affected at one and the same time toward God and toward a creature which one inordinately loves, whence, when one turns to the one, one turns away from the other; it must be said that it does not follow, because *to be turned away* says more than *not to turn actually;* for it implies the contrary of conversion, namely a certain spurning of God or contempt.

5. To that which is objected, that motion separates from the term *from which;* it must be said that this is true of that motion *properly so called,* which involves two terms, one from which it begins and another to which it tends. It is not so in the act of venial sin. For the soul, when it sins venially, is not *moved* from God into the creature, but rather is *affected* about the creature itself. Hence venial sin is rather an *affection* of the mind, or act, than a *motion.*

6. To that which is objected, that the love of venial sin is the love of enjoyment; it must be said that this is false, according as *to enjoy* is taken *properly,* namely to rest in something as in an ultimate end; for thus *to enjoy* is by mortal sin, not by venial. — If therefore one should ask whether it be *use* or *enjoyment;* it must be said that it is neither use nor enjoyment, but *abuse,* unless perhaps "use" be taken broadly for all love by which one loves something, not resting in it but referring it to another in act or in habit, whether one refers it rightly or less rightly. And that one must say this is manifest. For when someone loves some creature, referring it to another, yet not to that to which he ought, by that love he sins; nor yet is that enjoyment or use *properly so called,* but more properly ought to be called *abuse.* Hence Augustine, when he says: *Everyone who loves something either loves using or loves enjoying,* takes *use* and *enjoyment* broadly: *use* for every referred love, whether directly or indirectly; *enjoyment* for every unreferred love, whether he sets his principal end there or not. And so in that division the love of venial sin is comprehended, unless perhaps one wishes to say that Augustine is there speaking of ordered love. And thus all things are clear.