Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/42/q/bon-sent-II-d42-a2-q2
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### Article II. *On the comparison of venial sin to mortal sin.*
### Question II. *Whether the venial sin agrees with the mortal in the liability to eternal punishment.*

Secondly it is asked whether the venial sin agrees with the mortal in the liability to eternal punishment. And that it does so, seems to follow.

1. The punishment assigned for the mortal sin is proportionable to the punishment assigned for the venial, both as to severity and as to duration: therefore if arbitrary punishments are weighed according to the magnitude of the guilt of the sin, it seems that the guilt of the venial and of the mortal are proportionable in both ways. But an eternal punishment is not proportionable except to what is eternal: if therefore the one binds to eternal punishment, it seems that the other does too. If you say that through grace the mortal sin becomes venial, and the eternal punishment is commuted into a temporal one; the objection then arises: since the venial is likewise remitted through grace, if the mercy of God is ordered, then just as it commutes the eternal into the temporal, so it ought to commute the temporal into the instantaneous! And if it does not do this, it seems that that reply is null.

2. Likewise, suppose that someone dies in mortal and venial sin, and that he was punished in this life for neither: if then a sin does not remain unpunished, then he is punished for both, but only in hell, and in hell he is punished eternally. But he is not punished beyond what he deserved: therefore for the venial sin he deserved to be punished eternally. If you say that he is punished eternally by reason of the adjoined mortal sin; the objection is raised that this is not so. Suppose that that mortal sin be punished as much as it deserved to be punished; then therefore for the venial sin he will be punished either eternally by reason of itself, or by reason of the adjoined mortal sin. Not by reason of the adjoined mortal sin, because that is sufficiently punished by itself. If therefore he is punished eternally, this is by reason of itself; but God punishes no one beyond what is condign: therefore it was fitting that someone be punished eternally on account of venial sin.

3. Likewise, the venial sin stands with grace and stands with the mortal, and in both cases the character of the venial is preserved; and it is agreed that it is more preserved with the mortal than with grace, because grace blots it out, the mortal sin never: therefore if it be abstracted from both, it will hold its property more such as it has with the mortal than with grace. But when it is with grace, a temporal punishment is owed to it; when with the mortal, an eternal punishment is owed to it: therefore to the venial of itself and according to itself an eternal punishment is owed. If you say that the objection would hold if a temporal punishment were owed to it by reason of grace; but this is not true, because it is owed to it by reason of itself; on the contrary: it is impossible that a sin be sufficiently punished unless it be remitted, because, as long as the fault lasts, the punishment ought to last — for there ought not to be « the disgrace of sin without the comeliness of justice » — but neither the mortal nor the venial is remitted except through grace: therefore to the mortal as much as to the venial an eternal punishment is owed, so far as concerns itself.

4. Likewise, suppose that someone has only venial sin, yet does not have grace; he would be worthy either of eternal punishment or of temporal. If of temporal: then once that is paid, he would be entirely absolved from the fault; but he can pay that punishment by himself: therefore by himself he could rise again to innocence. But if he cannot by himself return to innocence, he can never, so far as concerns himself, sustain a punishment sufficient for that fault: therefore unless the help of grace supervenes, an eternal punishment is owed to the venial sin.

If you say that by paying the punishment he would dispose himself to grace, which would blot out the fault; this does not solve it, because, if he were likewise to punish himself for a mortal sin, God would infuse grace, which would blot out that mortal fault.

5. Likewise, the delight of mortal sin does not exceed the delight of the venial infinitely: therefore if the guilt corresponds to the delight, neither does the guilt exceed the guilt infinitely, whereas the eternal exceeds the temporal infinitely; if therefore the mortal binds to eternal punishment, then so does the venial. If you say that although it does not exceed *simply,* it nonetheless exceeds *according to reckoning,* because the mortal loves [the creature] above God, who is the infinite good, whereas the venial does so least of all; against this is the fact that, since the venial sin is punished by God and is displeasing to God, it is in some way offensive to God. Therefore if the offense is as great as he who is offended; since by venial sin God is offended, who is infinite; it seems that the guilt of venial sin ought to be reckoned infinite, just as the mortal also is: therefore just as by mortal sin a man deserves to be punished infinitely, so also by the venial.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hugh of Saint Victor: « A venial sin is that to which, according to itself, a transitory punishment is owed »: therefore the guilt of venial sin is only of temporal punishment.

2. Likewise, eternal punishment is the second death; but the second death is owed to no one except on account of the first, which is by the separation of the soul from God: if therefore the venial does not separate from God, as was shown above, then it does not bind to eternal punishment.

3. Likewise, if the venial makes a man worthy of eternal punishment, it harms a man unto death; but what is of this kind ought to be called mortal: therefore the venial sin is mortal.

4. Likewise, if the venial binds to eternal punishment; since everything eternal lacks an end, and what lacks an end lacks remission and pardon, the venial sin states an opposition to remission and pardon; but what is of this kind is not venial: therefore the venial sin is not venial.

5. Likewise, if the venial makes one worthy of eternal punishment, and grace makes a man worthy of eternal life; since the venial sin and grace are simultaneously in the same [subject], a man is simultaneously worthy of eternal life and eternal punishment: therefore if a recompense be made to him according to what he deserved, he could be simultaneously in eternal beatitude and in eternal punishment, than which nothing is more impossible.

### Conclusion.

> To venial sin an eternal punishment is not owed of itself, but only by reason of its conjunction with the mortal.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that, as our faith says, an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin.

Now as to why an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin, many reasons are wont to be assigned; but for the present let one suffice, since this question has its place elsewhere, namely in the fourth [book], where it is asked concerning the eternity of infernal punishment. For the chief among the reasons why an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin is this: that, while a man sins mortally, he separates himself from the life of grace and subjects himself to a perpetual impotence of coming out of the fault, so far as concerns himself. For no one can rise again from a mortal fault except through the creation and infusion of a new grace and a new life; and therefore by reason of that impotence an obligation to the eternity of punishment is annexed to mortal sin. — But this eternal punishment, although it be owed to every mortal sin, is nevertheless not paid by every one; because, although a mortal sin renders a man impotent to rise again by himself, it nonetheless happens that a man is relieved through divine help. Therefore an eternal punishment is owed to mortal sin, because it separates a man from life; but the eternal punishment is paid in this, that it holds a man eternally separated from life. — Since therefore the venial sin neither separates a man from life, because it does not exclude grace, nor holds a man perpetually separated from life; hence it is that the venial sin neither of itself binds to eternal punishment, nor is an eternal punishment rendered to it according to itself.

But since the venial sin is apt to be conjoined to that which separates from life, and also to that which holds [one] separated from life; hence it is that by reason of the adjoined [sin] an eternal punishment is owed, and an eternal punishment is paid. Whence if someone dies in mortal sin together with the venial, he will be punished eternally for both.

And the reason of this is that no sin can be blotted out without grace; and as long as the fault lasts, the punishment too ought to last. And therefore, since the venial fault lasts with the mortal infinitely, by reason of its conjunction with it, it is punished infinitely. Nevertheless to it, so far as concerns *itself,* a temporal punishment is owed, since it can stand together with grace; and therefore it is named *venial,* that in this it be distinguished from the genus of mortal sin; for the *mortal* takes away the principle of life and pardon, namely grace itself, whereas the *venial,* so far as concerns *itself,* does not take it away, but rather remains together with it. — Therefore the reasons showing that an eternal punishment is not owed to venial sin according to itself are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that a satisfactory punishment for the venial and the mortal is proportionable; it can be said that that reasoning does not conclude that an eternal punishment is owed to the venial, except insofar as it is conjoined to the mortal. Furthermore, that reasoning does not compel, because, as was said in the objecting, in the infusion of grace the punishment of mortal sin is commuted into a *temporal* one; but the punishment of venial sin is not commuted into a *non-temporal* one. — And if you ask whence this is, since the mercy of God ought to be ordered; it must be said that, because the obligation to eternal punishment cannot stand together with grace, necessarily through the infusion of grace there comes about an absolution from the liability to eternal punishment. But grace stands well with temporal punishment; and therefore it is not necessary that through the infusion of grace the temporal punishment be commuted into an instantaneous one.

2. To that which is objected concerning him who dies with the venial and the mortal; it must be said that such a one is punished eternally both for the venial and for the mortal; but this is not by reason of the venial *principally,* but by reason of the adjoined *mortal.* — Nor does it avail that he objects that the mortal is punished in itself as much as it deserved; because, just as the good is invigorated from the good, so evil is invigorated from evil, in that mode in which evil is said to be invigorated. Therefore although to the venial, so far as concerns itself, an eternal punishment is not owed, it can nonetheless be owed to it, insofar as it is *conjoined to the mortal;* and therefore, when God punishes both the venial and the mortal in the same eternal punishment, He punishes neither beyond what is condign, but punishes both, as each deserves to be punished, not only *in itself,* but also as it is *conjoined to another.*

3. To that which is objected, that the character of the venial is more preserved with the mortal than with grace; it must be said that if it be understood of grace as to its *act,* it is true; for the act of grace or the motion of grace blots out venial sin. But if it be understood as to its *habit,* it is false; because the venial with grace is more preserved in its proper character than with the mortal; for then its guilt is neither increased nor diminished nor changed. But when the venial is joined to the mortal, then its guilt is increased and in a certain way changed, because what is joined to evil is invigorated. — Nor does it avail that he objects that a temporal punishment is not owed to the venial except by reason of grace, because it would always last unless there were grace. For it must be said that it is true that it would always last unless there were grace; yet because it of itself does not exclude grace, as the mortal does, it stands together with the principle of its remission and blotting-out: therefore, although it cannot be blotted out without grace, nonetheless, so far as concerns its own nature, it is blottable-out and terminable. It is not so with the mortal, which altogether excludes the gift of grace.

4. To that which is objected, that if someone were in venial sin alone and were to die, he would be tormented eternally; it must be said that this supposition is impossible. First, because it never was nor is nor will be that anyone was in venial sin alone, in such a way that he does not have grace. For there is no middle state now, but that a man either has grace or is in mortal sin. And in the first state there was no middle between innocence and mortal fault, because the purity of innocence could not be lost except through mortal fault, as was shown above; and therefore that supposition is vain. — Yet granted that some child were in venial sin, I say that God would never lead him out of the state of merit, but that either he himself would sin mortally, or He Himself would give him grace. — And if it be asked whether to this venial [sinner] an eternal punishment is owed, or a temporal one; I say that a temporal one is owed. And if one proceed further: then once that is paid, he will be entirely free from fault;

it must be said that this is true; but because he can never pay it to God, in such a way that God may accept it without grace; hence it is that God, lest He be compelled to punish this man beyond what is condign, would infuse grace upon him, through which He would accept the payment of the punishment. And therefore it does not follow that an eternal punishment is owed to that sin according to itself; nor does it follow that a man can by himself rise again from fault to innocence.

5. To that which is objected, that the delight does not exceed the delight infinitely; it must be said that it does not exceed infinitely according to the *true intensity of the delight,* but according to the *reckoning of the sinner.* — An example of this is set in charity, which loves some created good and loves the uncreated; and it so reckons the uncreated good as good that, if the created good were multiplied infinitely, it still would not equal it in love; but it would love God more than the created good multiplied infinitely, although it loves each finitely. So also in the matter at hand it is to be understood concerning the love of concupiscence, which destroys charity, and that which is preserved with charity. For *the one,* namely that which destroys charity, prefers the creature to God, who was to be preferred to infinite created goods; but *the other,* which remains with charity, does not prefer the creature to God: and therefore according to the reckoning both of the sinner and of God who punishes, the mortal exceeds the venial disproportionably.

6. To that which is objected, that by the venial God is offended; it must be said that this is false; for God is not said to be offended except when He is contemned. But it is true that with venial sin God is *loved* less, according to what Augustine says in the book of the Confessions: « He loves Thee less who loves anything together with Thee, which he does not love on account of Thee ». Therefore the venial does not take away eternal life, but delays it, because it does not separate from God, but estranges; nor does it bind to a punishment eternally tormenting, so far as concerns itself, but to one temporally afflicting.

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