Dist. 42, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/42/q/bon-sent-II-d42-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the modes of dividing sins.*

There follows, in the third place, the question concerning the modes of dividing sins. And since there are many modes of dividing, about which it would be very lengthy to dispute here, leaving those aside, two are asked here in general.

First it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or by formal and specific differences.

Second it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by aversion and conversion as by diverse differences of sins.

### Question I. *Whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or also by formal ones.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked, whether sin is to be divided by material differences only, or also by formal ones. And that it is to be divided not only by material differences, but also by formal ones, is shown thus.

1. As chastity stands to virtue, so lust stands to vice: therefore, as chastity is a species of virtue, so lust is a species of vice; but one species is distinguished from another by formal differences: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, good is opposed to evil not only materially, but also formally, and to diverse goods diverse evils are opposed; but the goods to which the evils are opposed are formally distinguished: therefore by parity of reasoning the evils too, which are formally opposed to them, formally differ.

3. Likewise, concerning a single act of sin diverse differences of sins are assigned, as is plain in the sin of Adam, in which there is said to have been gluttony and pride and disobedience; but sins that consist in a single act do not have a material difference: therefore if they differ in any way, it is necessary that they have a formal difference.

4. Likewise, multiplication according to matter is multiplication according to number, and multiplication according to number has no limit: therefore if sins were distinguished only by materially differing differences, sin could never be divided by a sufficient division. If therefore in Scripture sin is divided by differences that divide it sufficiently and embrace every sin; it seems that sins are distinguished from one another not only by material differences, but also by formal ones.

**On the contrary:** 1. The formal element in the genus of mortal sin is *aversion*; but sins are not distinguished on the side of aversion, indeed they agree — for all of them imply aversion from God — if therefore they are distinguished, this is only on the side of *conversion*, which is the material element in sin: therefore sin is divided only by material differences, not by formal ones.

2. Likewise, sin, formally speaking, is nothing; but what is nothing has no dividing differences: therefore if sin is divided, in no way is it divided insofar as it is considered formally: it remains, therefore, that it is divided only by that which is material in it, and thus the same returns as before.

3. Likewise, everything that has formal and specific differences in some way, formally speaking, has a species; but sin or evil, formally speaking, is a privation of species; and a privation of species has no species; and what lacks species lacks formal and specific difference: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, if sin had differences formally dividing it, then it would have true species; but everything of this sort is ordered in a genus directly; but that which is in a genus is from God: therefore sin, formally speaking, would be from God; which is against the faith.

5. Likewise, the first division of sin is into original and actual; but original and actual sin are not formally distinguished, because what is original to one was actual to another, as is plain, since what is original to us was actual to Adam. If therefore the first members differ most, and original and actual are not formally differing differences of sin; much more neither are the others.

6. Likewise, the first division of actual sin is by mortal and venial; but mortal and venial do not state diverse differences according to form and species: therefore much less do the other differences according to species and form make [things] differ. The major proposition is manifest. The minor is proved by this, that a venial sin is made mortal by the sole intensity of desire concerning the same genus of the pleasurable. Therefore if more and less do not make diversity according to species and form, it seems that venial and mortal sin do not add a formal difference: therefore neither do the others.

### Conclusion

> Sin taken abstractly has formal differences only by accident; taken concretely, also per se.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking about sin: either in its *concretion*, or in its *abstraction*. If [it is taken] in *abstraction*; then it must be said that, just as sin, since it is a privation, cannot be ordered except by accident, namely by comparison to its opposite, so likewise it cannot be formally distinguished except by reason of its opposite; for privations are distinguished by [their] habits. Hence, just as chastity and fortitude are virtues formally differing in the genus of virtue, so likewise lust and pusillanimity, which are the opposites of those two virtues, are said to differ formally in the genus of vices, yet not according to *their own* form, but according to the form *of their opposite*. — But if we speak of sin in its *concretion*, then it states not only a privation, but also an act, or an underlying habit; and since the act, or habit, underlying the sin is diversified not only *materially*, but indeed also by a *formal* difference — for one thing is the proneness to lust, another the proneness to pride, and one is the act by which someone is proud, and another that by which he is lustful, not only according to *matter*, but also according to *form* on account of the formal difference of the objects — hence it is that sin, according as it is taken *concretively*, is to be divided by differences not only *material*, but also *formal*; formal, I say, not with respect to the *deformity*, but with respect to the *habit*, or *act*, underlying [it].

And thus it is plain that whether sin be taken abstractly or concretely, it has formal differences; but in one way *per se*, in the other way *by accident*, because in one way it states a being in a genus according to right co-ordination, in the other way it states a being in a genus only by *reduction*.

— And because in this way the arguments proceed to the first part, therefore they are to be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the formal element in sin is aversion; it must be said that it is true that aversion is the formal element with respect to *conversion*; yet, properly speaking, sin ought rather to be called formally a privation of the good opposed to it than aversion from God, or at least equally properly. And although sin is not multiplied by reason of aversion from God, because that from which the aversion takes place is one; yet by reason of the privation of the good to which it is opposed, it is to be multiplied; and thus by reason of that which is the *formal* element in it, it has diverse differences. Moreover, to the *being* of sin there concurs not only aversion, but also conversion; and since conversion regards created objects, which are not only distinguished *materially*, but also differ *formally*; hence it is that on that side sin can be multiplied by *formal* differences. Likewise, conversion is not said to be the *material* element in sin, *absolutely* speaking, but only *by reason of the aversion*; nor is it altogether material with respect to the aversion; for although aversion gives to conversion that it be *sin*, conversion nonetheless gives to aversion that it be *such a sin*.

2. To that which is objected, that sin, formally speaking, is nothing; it must be said that it is true. But although it be *nothing*, nevertheless it is *of something*, not only as of a *subject*, but also as of an *opposite*; and by that ground by which it is of something to which it is formally opposed, it has to be formally distinguished, not according to the form which is in it, but according to the form which is in its opposite.

3. To that which is objected, that sin is a privation of species, therefore it does not have a species; the response is already plain. For it is true that it does not have a species properly, according as it is a privation; nor is it said to have formal and specific differences in this way, namely that it have in itself diverse species; but because it is opposed to diverse goods according to species, insofar as it deprives those.

4. To that which is objected, that if it had species, it would be in a genus; it must be said that it is true, if it had species *in itself* and *per se*; but sin, according as it is taken *abstractly* and *formally*, just as it is not in a genus *per se* except *by reduction*, so it is not to be divided by formal differences differing *per se*, but only *by accident*. But although sin, according as it is nothing and is taken *abstractly*, is not in a genus; nevertheless according as it is taken *concretely*, namely by reason of the underlying act and habit, it is in a genus; for the action underlying the sin is from God.

5. To that which is objected concerning the original and the actual, it must be said that the original and the actual not only differ in that the one is from an act, and the other from nature, but also differ as regards the good which they deprive; whence the actual deprives the gratuitous or personal justice; but the original takes away the original justice, that is, that which regards man according as he is nature. Moreover, the original is spoken of in one way in *us*, and in another way in *Adam*. In *us* it is called original because it is drawn from [our] origin; but in *Adam*, because he was the origin of the other sins. And although the original spoken of in the second way can be the same as the actual; yet as it is spoken of in the first way, the original cannot concur in the same genus of sin with the actual; and in this way a difference is set between them.

6. To that which is objected concerning the venial and the mortal, that they do not differ formally, because more and less do not vary the species; it must be said that the first proposition is false. — But to this which is said, that a difference according to less and more does not vary the species; it is answered in three ways. First, that this is true in the genus of *nature*, but is not true in the genus of *morals*, as is plain: for vices are formally diversified according to species by *superabundance* and *defect*, not only from one another, but also from virtue. — In the second way it is answered, that this is understood of more and less that is *accidental*; but to take delight under God is essential to the venial, and to take delight above God is essential to the mortal. — In the third way it is answered, that this is true of more and less *short of the limit*, but not of more and less *beyond the limit*; whence the hot in the fourth degree is of another species than the hot in the third. So too in the matter at hand it is to be understood that to love something *short of* God is the limit of venial sin; and however much the love be intensified, so long as it is *short of* God, it is a venial sin; but if it *prefers* something to God, then it goes beyond its limit; and thus it falls into another genus of sin, namely into mortal sin.