Dist. 42, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/42/q/bon-sent-II-d42-a3-q2
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### Article III. *On the modes of dividing sins.*
### Question II. *Whether sin must be divided by aversion and conversion as by diverse differences of sins.*

Secondly it is asked whether sin must be divided by aversion and conversion as by diverse differences of sins, that is, diverse sins.

And that it must, seems [to be the case].

1. Jeremiah 2: *My people have done two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water*, etc.: therefore to forsake God and to cleave to a creature are two evils, therefore they are two sins.

2. Likewise, aversion is through *contempt*, but conversion through *desire*: if therefore desire and contempt are diverse genera of sins, it seems that aversion and conversion make diverse sins.

3. Likewise, among good things it is so, that one *habit* is that by which someone turns away from evil, and another that by which he does good; and likewise there is another *act*, as is evident in fear and love: therefore if the diversification on the side of evils is much greater than on the side of goods; much more does it seem that the sin by which one turns away from God is one thing, and the sin by which he turns toward a changeable good another.

4. Likewise, the precept by which one is commanded to do good is one thing, and another is that by which one is commanded to turn away from evil; but aversion is against that precept by which one is commanded to do good, namely to cleave to God and to turn toward him; whereas conversion is against that precept by which one is commanded to turn away from evil: therefore if the precepts to which conversion and aversion are opposed are diverse, then they are diverse sins.

5. Likewise, aversion agrees more with another aversion than aversion with conversion; but aversion together with another aversion makes diverse sins: therefore much more will conversion together with aversion make diverse sins.

**On the contrary:**
1. Upon that text of Ecclesiasticus 10: *The beginning of all sin is pride*; the Gloss: « Let us beware of pride and covetousness, not as two evils, but as one, from which all things arise »: therefore if pride makes one be turned away, and covetousness makes one be turned toward; it seems that with respect to aversion and conversion two sins are not reckoned, but one.

2. Likewise, Augustine against Pelagius: « Sin is not the appetite for evil things, but the desertion of better things »: therefore conversion never makes a complete sin, unless aversion be present. If therefore aversion concurs in every sin, it seems that with respect to it the difference of sin is not taken.

3. Likewise, every mortal sin is voluntary; but it is not voluntary except by reason of conversion to a changeable good: therefore conversion concurs in every sin: therefore conversion cannot be a difference of sin.

4. Likewise, withdrawal from the terminus *from which* and approach to the terminus *to which* do not make diverse motions nor diverse acts; but aversion signifies withdrawal from the terminus *from which*, conversion the approach to the terminus *to which*: therefore they do not make a diverse act or motion. But from the unity of act the sin is one: therefore they do not make diverse sins.

5. Likewise, in sin aversion is *formal* with respect to conversion; but the *formal* does not enter into number with its material: therefore neither does aversion enter into number with conversion: therefore conversion and aversion do not make diverse sins.

### Conclusion
> Aversion and conversion do not make two sins, except insofar as aversion signifies an act distinct from conversion.

**I respond:** It must be said that *aversion* is taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it signifies a *disorder concerning the act of conversion*; in another way, insofar as it signifies an *act distinct from conversion*. In the first way conversion does not enter into number with aversion nor make diverse sins; rather those two are essentially included in every mortal sin. For conversion is not a fault except because it is disordered; and it is not disordered except because man is turned away from God, to whom he ought to cleave as to his ultimate end; and this aversion is in the sin, in the perpetration of which the sinner thinks nothing of God. — In the second way, namely insofar as aversion signifies an *act distinct over against conversion*, it constitutes a diverse genus of sin. For in this way « to be turned away is to hate or to envy », as the Master said above in distinction five; and it is established that to hate God is one genus of sin, and to love a changeable good another. And since for the most part *aversion* is taken in sin as signifying disorder away from God as from an end, rather than as signifying a disordered motion against God; hence it is that conversion and aversion are compared to sin rather as constituting differences than as dividing differences. — And therefore it must be conceded that in this way aversion and conversion do not make diverse sins; and the reasons that show this are to be conceded, since they proceed by this way.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1.* To that which is first objected concerning Jeremiah; *My people have done two evils*, etc.; it can be answered that forsaking is there said not only for the disorder that is joined to conversion, but also for the omission of the commandments of God; and then those two evils are distinguished not as aversion and conversion, but as omission and commission. — Or it must be said that they are called two evils, not because they are two sins, but because they are two diverse evil roots, concurring in the completion of one sin, as the Gloss already cited upon the tenth chapter of Ecclesiasticus says.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that aversion is through contempt, and conversion through desire; the response is already evident; for it speaks of conversion and aversion as a diverse act and motion. But if it understands otherwise, so that contempt and desire be taken *broadly*, insofar as they concur in one sin; thus they are not two evils, but one.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that one habit is that by which someone turns away from evil, and [another] that by which one does good; it must be said that to turn away from evil is said in two ways, as was said of aversion. For insofar as turning away from evil signifies an act of detestation and flight with respect to evil, it signifies an act and motion diverse from that which is to do good. But insofar as it signifies withdrawal from evil, thus it does not signify a diverse act and habit, because by the same motion and habit by which one approaches the good, he is removed far from evil.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that conversion is opposed to one precept, and aversion to another; it must be said that this is false; for aversion and conversion are not against diverse precepts, but concur in the same sin, which is both against the affirmative precept and against the negative precept; unless perhaps aversion be taken insofar as it names an act or motion against God.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that aversion agrees more with aversion, etc.; it must be said that it is true of formal agreement, which consists in this, that it is assigned in something as in one common [thing]; but it is not true of agreement of order, which concurs in the constitution of one third [thing]. For one sin is not constituted out of several aversions, as out of aversion and conversion concurring together.

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