Dist. 42, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/42/q/bon-sent-II-d42-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there is asked about what he says, namely that *sin sometimes remains in a certain liability after it has passed away in act*. For this seems to be false. For the liability or obligation of sin is founded either upon the act of the sin, or upon the proneness, or upon the deformity. If upon the act; then, when the act passes away, that liability must necessarily pass away too: therefore the sin does not remain as to liability after it passes away as to act. If upon the proneness; then, since the proneness remains in a man after the reception of grace, it seems that the liability remains after sin, even after

grace has been received; which is plainly false. If upon the deformity; but, *on the contrary*: deformity bespeaks privation, and a privation is nothing: therefore the liability of sin is founded upon nothing: therefore for nothing is man obliged to punishment. If, then, there is nothing more in sin than these three, it does not seem that sin can remain in liability and pass away in act.

It is asked, therefore, upon what the liability or obligation to punishment is founded.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according as there are three things in sin — namely the *act* of sinning, the *habit* of proneness or stain of sin, and thirdly the *defect* or privation of good, which is called *deformity* — accordingly there have been here three ways of speaking.

For some have said that the liability of sin is founded upon the *act*; nor yet does it follow that it passes away with the act, because for a past act a man can remain obliged to a future punishment. For when someone is made liable to punishment by the depravity of his action; although that act passes away, the liability or obligation does not pass away, as is plain in the case of a robber, or of one who has perpetrated some crime. — But against this way of speaking stands the possibility of absolution from the liability. For if the liability were founded upon the past act; since a past act must necessarily be past, when he is liable, he cannot not be liable, which is manifestly false.

Another way of speaking was that the liability is founded upon the *proneness*, which proneness indeed is said to be the stain of sin; and that stain is, as it were, a certain disposition rendering the soul combustible; and by reason of the removal of that stain we are said to *be washed from our sins in the blood of Christ*. — But against this way of speaking stands the possibility of the removal of that proneness without the infusion of grace; as is plain: when from a miser a man becomes a spendthrift, the proneness to avarice is taken away from him. If, then, the liability were founded upon that proneness, when someone became from a miser a spendthrift, he would be absolved from the liability of sin without grace, which is plainly false.

The third way of speaking is that the liability is founded upon the *deformity*. Now deformity bespeaks not only the *privation of good*, but also the *debt of having it*; and because the sinner owes God justice and honor; and, while he is deprived of these through sin, he is deformed, and on this account he is obliged to undergo punishment. For because he was a debtor and could not pay in works, it was necessary that he should pay in sufferings. — But against this way of speaking stands the multiplicity of liabilities. For as many sins as a man has actually perpetrated, to so many punishments he is liable; but from many sins of the same species one deformity results in the soul. *Moreover*, the lack of good in a man obliges to the lack of the highest good, not to the suffering of punishment, as is plain in original sin. *Moreover*, when the deformity is removed by grace, there still remains an obligation to punishment.

And therefore it can be said that the liability or obligation to punishment is twofold: one, namely, in respect of *eternal* punishment, and another in respect of *temporal* punishment. Now the obligation in respect of temporal punishment does not always require present guilt, but it suffices for that obligation that the guilt was past, and that full amendment did not follow. But the obligation to *eternal* punishment is founded upon the guilt itself. Now guilt, properly speaking, is not the proneness itself, but the disorder itself, whether it is in the *act*, or whether it is in the *soul*. Now the disorder in the *act* consisted in conversion and aversion; and according to this twofold relation the soul is disordered when it sins; and that disorder in the soul, by reason of aversion, is called *deformity*, and by reason of conversion is called *stain*. — I say therefore that the liability of eternal punishment is founded upon sin, both insofar as it is *deformity* and insofar as it is *stain*; but differently, because by reason of *aversion* he is worthy to be deprived of the eternal good, whereas by reason of *conversion* he is worthy of torment. Now the liability is founded upon the *stain* and *deformity* which is in the soul by relation to the *act* by which that stain or deformity was introduced; and therefore the liabilities are multiplied according as the sins committed are multiplied.

And through this the response to the objections is plain. For I say that the liability of eternal punishment is not founded simply upon the *stain*, according as it is called a proneness or some disposition, but rather according as it is called *disorder* and *privation*. I say also,

that it is founded upon the deformity not only by reason of *privation*, but also by reason of *debt*; nor only by reason of *aversion*, but also by reason of *conversion*; nor only upon sin according as it is deformity, but according as it is *stain*. And this is what the Master says in the text: « By liability sin remains in a man, since on its account, whether it has passed or is present, the mind of the man is polluted and corrupted, and the whole man is obliged to perpetual punishments »; and the Master here speaks, as is plain, of the liability of *eternal* punishment, not of *temporal*; for the liability of temporal punishment is indeed founded upon that which has passed away.

### Doubt II.

Likewise there is asked about what he says: *The modes of sins have various distinctions in Scripture*. For it seems that they have not only various but even infinite distinctions; because, as the Philosopher holds, « the good is in one way, but the evil in manifold ways ». And Dionysius himself also says that « evil is infinite »: therefore it seems that in Scripture it cannot have determinate distinctions.

In connection with this there is asked about the number and sufficiency of these distinctions, which the Master sets down in the text. For it seems that some are assigned unsuitably; because, since every sin is in the will moved by desire, sin is ill distinguished into the sin which is from love and that which is from fear. — Likewise, since every sin is in thought and will, sin is ill distinguished through sin of thought and of word and of deed. — Likewise, since every sin is against God, sin is ill distinguished through these differences: against *God* and against *self* and against *neighbor*. — Likewise, since in every sin there is a defect of some circumstance, every sin seems to be an omission: therefore it is ill distinguished through commission and omission. — Finally it seems, since the beginning of every sin is pride, that sin is ill distinguished through the seven capital sins.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master in this part intimates seven divisions of sin according to its sevenfold relation.

For first sin is compared to its *cause*, from which it has its origin; and thus there is that division of sin into *actual* and *original*.

Secondly it is compared to the *punishment* to which it is ordered; and thus there is that division of sin into *mortal* and *venial*. These two divisions the Master set down above.

Thirdly sin has to be compared to its *motive*; and this indeed is either toward attaining a *good* or toward fleeing an *evil*; and thus there is the third division, which the Master sets down into sin from *love* and sin from *fear*.

Fourthly sin has to be compared to the *underlying act*; and thus there is the fourth division of sin into sin of *thought*, of *word*, and of *deed*, according to the threefold power, namely the affective, the interpretative, and the operative; for *thought* is there taken for *affection*.

Fifthly sin is compared to the *person* whom it offends; and thus there is the fifth division of sin into [sin] against *God* and against *self* and against *neighbor*.

Sixthly sin is compared to the *commandment* to which it is opposed; and thus there is that division into *transgression* and *commission*, because *transgression* is against an affirmative precept, and *commission* against a negative one.

Seventhly it is compared to the *vices* which arise from it; and thus there is that division of sin into the seven differences of the *capital* sins.

And thus the Master sets down seven divisions according to the seven relations of sin. Yet although other divisions may be found, they can be reduced to one of these, because they are taken according to one of these relations; as that division by which blessed John in his Canonical Epistle divides sin into the *pride of life* and the *concupiscence of the eyes* and the *concupiscence of the flesh*, is reduced to that one which is on the side of the motive. — Likewise also that division by which Isidore divides sin into the sin which is « from *malice* and *infirmity* and *ignorance* ». Likewise that division by which Gregory divides into *carnal* and *spiritual* sins, which he draws from that word of the Apostle in the second to the Corinthians, chapter seven: *Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit*, is reduced to that one by which sin is divided through relation

to the underlying acts. — And thus the sufficiency, number, and order of these divisions is plain.

To that, then, which is objected, that evil is in infinite modes; it must be said that, if this is true on the side of evil itself, and also through the relations which it has to particular goods and to particular persons; nevertheless by reason of the good opposed to it and by reason of the general relations, it has to be distinguished in finite modes, though various ones.

To that which is objected, that those divisions which are here assigned are not rightly taken, chiefly because in those first three divisions the first member is general to every sin; it must be said that in those three divisions the first member is to be taken *with precision*, so that the sense is that one sin is from *love* alone, another from *love* together with *fear*; and likewise in the other two. — Or say that he divides sin by way of *motive* and *act* and *object*, as these are taken properly and immediately. — But that which is objected against the division which is into *transgression* and *commission*, is of no force; because not just any omission of any good circumstance is called a *transgression*, but that which is the omission of a due act.

To the last it must be said that *pride* is spoken of in two ways: in one way, insofar as every contempt and elevation of the mind is contained under the name of pride; and thus it is the *beginning of every sin*; for in every sin a man becomes proud and exalts himself against God. In another way pride is called the *appetite for dignity and honor*; and in this way it is a special sin, distinct from the other sins.

### Doubt III.

Likewise there is asked about what he says, that *there are seven capital or principal vices*; because upon that text of Proverbs, chapter six: *There are six things which the Lord hates*; the Gloss « enumerates six capital vices, which in comparison with the seventh are lesser »; and these are not contained under those: therefore they seem to be fourteen. — Likewise, Isidore upon Deuteronomy enumerates *eight* capital vices, namely « gluttony, fornication, avarice, sadness, wrath, vainglory, sloth, pride »; and so it seems either that this division is *deficient*, or the other *superfluous*. — Likewise, since vices are opposed to virtues, and we have the habits of virtues, of gifts, and of beatitudes; it seems that there should be at least *twenty-one* capital vices. — Likewise, since a virtue has a vice opposed to it on the side of *excess* and *defect*; it seems that according to the number of the good habits the number of capital vices ought to be doubled, so that there are *forty-two*.

In connection with this it is also asked: since we have a capital vice on the side of gluttony, why do we not have others on the side of lust, the vice of the sense of touch and of taste? — It is also asked, in what sense something is called a *capital* sin; and about the *number* and *sufficiency* of this division.

**I respond:** It must be said that a *capital* vice can be spoken of in two ways: either because it is *chief* and *great* in the genus of vice, or because it is a *head* and *principle* of the others. In the first way it is taken in the Gloss on Proverbs six, where those vices are called capital because they are *great*, and a man is worthy of great punishment. In the second way *capital* is taken here; for a capital vice is here said to be that which is the ground of giving rise to many sins; whence Gregory assigns to each capital vice its *daughters*. For sin is by this very fact held to be the *head* and principle of another, in that its motive so falls into the soul's appetite that it can furnish fomentation and movement, so that from it there arises a certain body of sin, in a manner metaphorical, containing a variety of branches and members, of sons and daughters. — And hence it is that *unbelief*, which is opposed to faith, is not held to be a capital sin, because error does not fall first into the soul's appetite; likewise neither is *prodigality*, which is opposed to avarice. But *vainglory* is in one way a *capital vice*, in another way a *daughter*. For insofar as vainglory bespeaks the *appetite for dignity and excellence*, thus it is the same as pride and is a capital vice. And so the Master takes it in the text, because the mind is directly moved to the seeking of excellence and dignity. But insofar as vainglory

is called the *appetite for praise*; thus it is a *daughter*, because human praise is not desired except for the sake of excellence. — And thus it is plain that there is no controversy between this assignment and that of Isidore. For Isidore takes vainglory or vainglory for pride properly so called, and lastly superadds *pride* to the seven capital vices as, so to speak, the queen of all vices.

The sufficiency of the capital vices and their number can be taken in many ways.

In one way thus. Since a capital sin is a corruption or *proneness* in respect of that to which nature is prone by reason of the primary corruption, it has to be multiplied as that *proneness* has to be multiplied. Now that proneness can be multiplied on the side of the *object* thus: because it is regarded either as to the *appetite* for an apparent good, or as to the *flight* from an apparent evil. — If in the first way, either in respect of an *interior* good, and thus it is pride; or of an *exterior* good, and thus it is avarice; or of an *inferior* good, insofar as it pertains to the conservation of one's own flesh, and thus it is gluttony; or to the conservation of the species, and thus it is lust. — If in respect of an apparent *evil*; this can be in three ways: either of an *interior* evil, and thus it is envy; or of an *exterior* evil, and thus it is wrath; or of an *inferior* evil, and thus it is sloth, which flees the evil of the flesh. — But this manner of taking it does not seem altogether suitable. For every proneness is directly in respect of an apparent good.

And therefore there is another mode of multiplying this *proneness* according to the diversity of the powers of the soul, since the proneness is regarded either in the rational will itself in itself, or by conjunction with the sensible, or by conjunction with the vegetative. — If in itself; thus it can be in three ways: either in comparison to God, and thus it is pride; or to the neighbor, and thus it is envy; or to oneself, and thus it is sloth. — If by conjunction with the sensible; thus it can be in two ways, according as the sensible motive power is twofold, namely the concupiscible and the irascible. If by conjunction with the concupiscible, thus it is avarice; if with the irascible, thus it is wrath. — If it is regarded by conjunction with the vegetative; thus it can be in two ways: either as to the generative, and thus it is lust; or as to the nutritive, and thus it is gluttony. — As to the augmentative there is none, because that is purely natural. — But since wrath is a spiritual sin just as envy and sloth are, it still seems that this manner of assigning has some unsuitability.

Therefore in a third way it can be said that the *proneness* toward some apparent good is either in respect of a good which regards the spirit *in itself*, or in respect of a good which regards the spirit *in the flesh*. — If in respect of the good which regards the spirit *in itself*, this can be in four ways according to the four conditions of the good to which our appetite is prone. For one desires the good under the ratio of *dignity*, and this through pride; under the ratio of *propriety*, and thus it is envy; under the ratio of *security*, and thus it is wrath; under the ratio of *rest*, and thus it is sloth.

But if this proneness is in respect of the good which regards the spirit *in the flesh*, this can be in three ways according to the threefold condition under which the carnal spirit desires the good. For it desires the good either under the ratio of the *sufficient*, and thus it is avarice; or under the ratio of the *soothing*, and thus it is lust; or under the ratio of the *refreshing*, and thus it is gluttony.

From these the sufficiency and number of the capital vices is plain. For they are not taken by opposition to the virtues, nor to the gifts, nor to the beatitudes, but according to the *pronenesses* regarding the conditions of the apparent good. — It is also plain why we do not have capital vices on the side of the other senses, as on the side of taste and touch, because in these there reigns a greater proneness than in the other senses. Hence, if pleasures are sought in the other senses, they are reduced to these, as for instance if someone wishes to behold a beautiful woman, that he may delight in her and lust, such delight is reduced to lust. Likewise, if someone wishes to behold a beautiful horse or book, that he may have it, such delight is reduced to avarice. For just as the appetite of the spirit in itself is in a certain way quieted, if it has an excellent good with propriety and security and rest; so the carnal appetite is quieted while it has a good that is *sufficient*, *soothing*, and *refreshing*, and seeks nothing except for the sake of these three.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise there is asked about what he says: *The beginning or root of every sin is pride*; because Chrysostom says, upon that text of the Psalm: *From the presence of folly*: « The beginning of every sin is folly »: therefore, since

there cannot be several first and principal beginnings of the same thing, it seems that pride is not the beginning of every sin. — Likewise it is objected, according as the Master objects in the text, because in the first to Timothy, the last chapter: *The root of all evils is covetousness*. If you should *say* that these two are roots of sins according to a diverse relation; then it is *asked* about the *diversity of roots*; and what is understood by the name of *root*; and what difference there is between a *capital vice* and a *root*; likewise, what difference there is between a *beginning* and a *root*.

**I respond:** It must be said that to say *beginning* and *root* differ. For *beginning* properly bespeaks that from which motion starts; but *root* bespeaks that whence it draws its fomentation and nourishment. And therefore, since sin draws its fomentation from the side of the desirable and bespeaks a withdrawal from God, hence it is that the *beginning* is regarded on the side of *aversion*, and the *root* on the side of *conversion*, properly speaking. And since aversion is by reason of *contempt*, and conversion is by reason of *covetousness* or *desire*; hence it is that *pride*, properly speaking, is called the *beginning*, and *covetousness* is said to be the *root*. And since in every sin there is aversion and conversion; hence it is that *pride* is called the *beginning of all sins*, and *covetousness the root of all evils*. And those two can stand together; yet sometimes the name of *root* is taken for the name of *beginning*, and conversely.

A *capital* vice, moreover, differs from a *root* in this, that as a head bespeaks a principal member and a complete member, and that which is the principle of the others as to *motion* and *sense*; so a *capital* vice names a complete sin, from which other vices arise; but a *root* bespeaks something under greater incompleteness: and therefore, properly speaking, the *root* does not name a determinate genus of sin, but the *proneness of desire*, which concurs in every sin.

Whence note that *root* is sometimes taken *most generally*, sometimes *generally*, sometimes *less generally*. Most generally, as when *desire* or *covetousness* is said to be the *root of all evils*. But generally, as when it is said that the root is twofold: *love evilly kindling* and *fear evilly humbling*. For love is taken in respect of good, and fear in respect of evil. But less generally, as when it is said that the root is threefold, namely the *concupiscence of the flesh*, the *concupiscence of the eyes*, and the *pride of life*, by relation to the threefold good, namely to the *inferior*, the *exterior*, and the *interior* good.

Likewise the *beginning* of sin can be taken or named in three ways: either insofar as it bespeaks the withdrawal of free choice from the *law of majesty*, and thus it is called *pride* or *contempt*; or from the *law of truth*, and thus it is called *error*; or from the *law of goodness*, and thus it is called *folly*, which is contrary to wisdom.

And thus it is plain that there is no contrariety, when it is said that the *beginning of every sin is pride*; and when the same is said of *error* and *folly*. — It is also plain that there is no contrariety in the fact that sometimes it is said that the root is *one*, sometimes that it is *two*, sometimes that it is *three*. — It is also plain the difference of *beginning* and *root*, and of *root* itself and the *capital vice*. — And let these things said about the general division of sins suffice.

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