Dist. 42
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/42/q/bon-sent-II-d42-littera
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## DISTINCTION XLII.

### Chapter I.
### *Whether an evil will and an evil action in the same person and concerning the same thing are one sin, or many.*

Now since an evil will and an operation are sin, it is wont to be asked whether in the same man and concerning the same thing these two are one sin, or diverse; as, for example, if someone steals by his will, he had an evil *will*, which is a sin, and an evil *act*, which is likewise a sin. Now these two are *diverse*, namely the will and the action; but are they also *diverse* sins, or one? — Some say there is *one* sin; but others say they are *diverse* sins; for since it is agreed that these two are diverse, either they are called diverse *two sins*, or two diverse things, not *sins*. — To whom others reply that these two are diverse, but not *sins*. For they are not *many* sins, but *one* sin, because one transgression or disobedience is committed in both, whether when one *wills* or when one *acts*; and there is one contempt there, but a *lesser* one when the sin is contained in the will alone, and a *greater* one when an operation is also added to the will; and so the sin becomes *greater*, but not *more*, when the will is given over to the deed.

But the same men are further objected to. If those two are only one sin, then when someone, having first conceived the will to evil, afterwards perpetrates the deed, he is not liable for anything except that for which he was liable before the deed, when the sin still consisted in the will alone. For no one is liable to eternal death except on account of sin; but no other sin has been committed by the *action* than what had previously been committed by the *will*. Therefore this man is not made damnable on account of any other thing by sinning *in act* than he had been before, when he was offending *by the will alone*. — To this also those men reply, saying that the thief is indeed made liable only on account of the sin; and although his will and action are *one* *sin*, yet he is made liable for *another* thing by sinning in act than he was before by offending by the will alone, because for the act, which is *other* than the will, although not *another sin*.

Moreover, they further press the question, saying that these two are diverse sins for this reason, that they are transgressions of diverse commandments of the law. For by one commandment of the law the action of theft is forbidden, namely: Thou shalt not steal; by another, the *will* to steal, namely: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's property. Now since these are two diverse commandments by which those two are forbidden, it is plain that those two are diverse transgressions, and therefore diverse sins. — To which also those men say that the *commandments* are indeed *diverse*, by which those two are distinctly forbidden, as Augustine teaches on Exodus; yet, when they are not observed, only one transgression is incurred, and one sin is contracted, although two diverse things are forbidden by them; just as, conversely, there are two commandments of charity, by which two things are commanded to be loved, yet one charity is commended to us in them.

### Chapter II.
### *Whether a sin committed by someone remains in him until he repents.*

Furthermore it is wont to be asked, when, after a sin has been perpetrated by someone through the will, the will to do it and the action have passed away, but true repentance has not yet been had, whether that sin remains in him until he repents. And it seems that it does not, because that *will* which existed before does not exist, nor does the *action*, since he does not will or do that which he willed and did before. — But it must not be unknown that sin is said to *be* in someone and to *pass away* in two modes, namely *in act* and *by liability*. It is in someone *in act* while that which is the sin itself, such as the *action* or the *will*, is in the one sinning; but *by liability*, when on account of it — whether it has passed away or is present — the man's mind is polluted and corrupted, and the whole man is bound to perpetual punishments. And sin is never in anyone *in act*, except original sin, without also being there *by liability*; but it is there *by liability* sometimes after it passes away *in act*.

### Chapter III.
### *In what ways "liability" is taken.*

Now "liability" is taken in many ways in Scripture, namely for *fault*, for *punishment*, for the *obligation to temporal punishment*, or to *eternal*. For if it is *mortal*, it binds us to eternal punishment; if *venial*, it binds us to temporal punishment; for there are two kinds of sins, namely of mortal and of venial.

A sin is *mortal* by which a man merits eternal death — for « a *crime*, as Augustine says, is that which is worthy of accusation and condemnation » — but *venial* is that which does not burden a man unto liability to perpetual death, yet nevertheless merits punishment, but is easily pardoned.

### Chapter IV.
### *On the modes of sins.*

Now the modes of sins have various distinctions in Scripture, in which it is said that sin is committed in *two* modes, namely « by desire and by fear », as Augustine relates on that passage of the Psalm: Burned with fire and dug under. For in these two modes he says that all mortal sins are included. And he calls those things *burned* which arise from *desire* that evilly inflames; but *dug under* those which come from *fear* that evilly abases; which is, when someone desires what is not to be desired, or fears what is not to be feared. — But elsewhere it is said that sin is committed in *three* modes, namely by *thought*, by *word*, and by *deed*; whence Jerome on Ezekiel: « There are three general offenses to which the human race is subject: for we sin either by thought, or by speech, or by deed ». To these is sometimes also added a *fourth* mode, namely of *habit*, which was signified in the four-days-dead Lazarus. A man is also said to sin *against God*, *against himself*, and *against his neighbor*. *Against God*, when he thinks ill of God, like a heretic, or presumes to usurp the things that are God's, by participating unworthily in the Sacraments, or when by perjury he makes the *name of God* contemptible; he sins *against his neighbor* when he unjustly harms his neighbor; but *against himself*, when he harms himself, not another.

### Chapter V.
### *That "offense" and "sin" differ.*

It also has a varied appellation: for it is called *sin* and *offense*. And « an *offense* is perhaps, as Augustine says in the Questions on Leviticus, to turn aside from good, while *sin* is to do evil. For it is one thing to turn aside from good, another to do evil. Therefore *sin* is the perpetration of evil, *offense* the desertion of good; which the very name shows. For what else does *offense* (delictum) sound but *forsaken* (derelictum), and he who offends (delinquit), what does he forsake (derelinquit) but the good? » « Or *offense* is what is done in ignorance, *sin* what is committed knowingly. Yet indifferently both *sin* is called by the name of offense, and *offense* by the name of sin ».

### Chapter VI.
### *On the seven principal vices.*

Furthermore it must be known that there are seven principal or capital vices, as Gregory on Exodus says, « namely vainglory, anger, envy, sloth or sadness, avarice, gluttony, lust »: which, as John Chrysostom says, were signified in the seven peoples who held the land of promise that was promised to Israel. From these, as from seven fountains, all the deadly corruptions of souls flow forth. And these are called *capital*, because from them all evils arise. For there is no evil which does not draw its origin from one of these.

### Chapter VII.
### *On pride.*

Yet from pride all evils arise, both these and others; for, as Gregory says, « the root of all evil is pride »; of which it is said: The beginning of all sin is pride, « which is the love of one's own excellence ». Of it there are four species, as Gregory says: « The first is when one attributes to oneself the good which one has. The second, when one believes it to be given by God, but yet on account of one's own merits. The third, when one boasts of having what one does not have. The fourth, when, despising the rest, one wishes to be seen as singular ». Rightly, therefore, pride is called the *root of all evil*. But to this there seems to be opposed what the Apostle says: The root of all evils is covetousness; for if covetousness is the root of all evils, then it is the root of pride. How, then, is pride the root and beginning of all sin?

### Chapter VIII.
### *How pride is called the root of all evils, and also covetousness, although pride is not covetousness.*

But « both are understood to be rightly said, if both expressions are understood to include the *kinds of individual sins*, not the *individual kinds*; for there is no kind of sin which does not sometimes arise from pride; there is also none which does not at some time descend from covetousness. For there are some men who become proud from covetousness; and some who become covetous from pride. For there is, as Augustine says, a man who would not be a lover of money, unless he thought through this to be more excellent, and therefore, in order to excel, desires riches; in such a one covetousness arises from pride. And there is another who would not love to excel, unless he thought to have greater riches through it ». Therefore he labors to excel because he loves to have riches. In this man pride is born, that is, the love of excellence, from covetousness. It is plain, therefore, that from pride covetousness sometimes arises, and from covetousness pride sometimes arises; and so of each it is rightly said that it is the root of all evil.

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