Dist. 43, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/43/q/bon-sent-II-d43-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says: *There is a sin unto death; I do not say that one should pray for it.* For it seems from this that there is no [obligation] to pray for him who sins against the Holy Spirit. **But on the contrary** is this: that such are to be loved out of charity: therefore it seems that one ought to pray for them. — Moreover, such have more need of others and are more prone to evil: therefore it seems that it would be a greater beneficence of mercy to pray for these than for others, who have no need.

There is therefore a question: why did blessed John say that one ought not to pray for such, since one ought to despair of no one?

**I respond:** It must be said that "sin unto death" is said in two ways: either because it *leads* to death, or because it *disposes* to death. And taking it in the first way, sin unto death is altogether irremissible. Taking it in the second way, sin unto death is with difficulty remissible. — In either of the said ways the aforesaid saying is to be understood according to a different exposition of it. For in the first way the sense is: I do not say that anyone should pray for him, that is, no one, neither small nor great. But in the second way the sense is: I do not say that anyone should pray for him, that is, any person whatsoever; as if to say: it is difficult to be heard for such a sinner, since such a one is now to be reckoned among the incorrigible; of whom the Lord says in Matthew the eighteenth: *But if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen and a publican.* And so in *one* sense he generally implies that one ought not to pray for one sinning unto death; but in *another* sense he implies that it does not belong to just anyone to obtain so great a gift. — Yet in neither of the said senses does he *forbid* praying; but by this word he shows that his command, or the admonition by which he had said that one ought to pray for one's neighbor, does not extend generally with respect to all, but with respect to those concerning whom we can probably hope that they will be granted to our prayers. — And thus the answer to that is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Whoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him.* **On the contrary:** the Gloss says in the same place: « Blasphemy shall be forgiven, but the spirit of blasphemy shall not be forgiven »: therefore if blasphemy is forgiven, whether one blaspheme the Father or the Spirit, it shall be forgiven.

In connection with this it is asked, what difference there is between *blasphemy* and the *spirit of blasphemy.* It seems that *blasphemy* is a graver sin than the *spirit of blasphemy*, because the spirit of blasphemy bespeaks the will, [whereas] *blasphemy* bespeaks the deed, and the evil deed adds something above the will. — The contrary of this is what the Gloss says, which says that the *spirit of blasphemy* is not forgiven, but *blasphemy* is forgiven.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as Hugh says, « *blasphemy*, as far as it is of itself, is indifferent as to this, whether it be a sin against the Holy Spirit or not against the Holy Spirit. For some blaspheme out of *weakness* and *compulsion*, and these sin against the Father; others out of *deception*, and these sin against the Son; others out of *certain malice*, and these sin against the Holy Spirit, and this is the most wicked kind of sin, to take delight in revilings of God ». And afterward he adds: « What is the *spirit of blasphemy*, except an affection and desire for reviling the divine? For the *spirit of blasphemy* breathes toward hatred of God, as the Holy Spirit breathes toward love of God. When therefore it is said: *whoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit* etc., it is not understood of just any blasphemy, but of the *spirit of blasphemy*; whence he does not say: whoever shall blaspheme the Holy Spirit, but whoever shall blaspheme *against* the Holy Spirit, that is, by sinning against the Holy Spirit ». And the Gloss itself declares this, which says that *blasphemy* shall be forgiven, but the *spirit of blasphemy* shall not be forgiven.

By this is clear the answer to what is asked, namely what difference there is between *blasphemy* and the *spirit of blasphemy*, and that the sin of the *spirit of blasphemy* is graver than *blasphemy*. For they do not differ as the will and the act, but as the general and the special.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *despair is that by which one wholly distrusts the goodness of God, esteeming his own malice to exceed God's goodness.* For it seems from this that everyone who despairs is unfaithful. For everyone who esteems thus believes that the goodness of God is finite, and everyone such errs against that which belongs to faith. — Likewise, whoever believes the contrary of what Scripture says is judged a heretic and unfaithful; but Scripture says: *In whatever hour the sinner shall groan, I will not remember all his iniquities;* the one who despairs believes the opposite of this: therefore etc. — Moreover, there is a special article concerning the remission of sins, and against this errs the one who despairs. — Similarly it can be objected concerning the one who *presumes*; for it seems that presumption takes away faith. — The contrary of this is, that faith precedes hope just as it precedes charity: therefore just as hatred does not take away hope, so also neither does despair take away faith.

**I respond:** It must be said that faith differs from hope in this, that faith regards the object itself in the *universal*, but hope regards it in the *particular*, namely with respect to the one hoping; and also in this, that faith bespeaks certitude in the *intellect*, and hope bespeaks certitude in the *affection*. Just as therefore it sometimes happens that something is unknown in the *particular* and known in the *universal*, as the Philosopher says in the second [book] of the *Prior [Analytics]*, as is the case of one who knows that every mule is barren, and yet esteems that this one has [a foal] in its womb; so one can, having faith, lack hope; and just as one can, not having certitude about something in the *affection*, have it in the *intellect*, so one can, not having hope, have faith.

To that therefore which is first objected, that such a one esteems his own malice to exceed God's goodness; it must be said that *to esteem* one's malice to exceed [God's] goodness can be in two ways: either *in itself*, or *in effect*; and in effect in two ways: either *universally* with respect to anyone, or *particularly* with respect to oneself. And in the first and second way it belongs to unbelief, and in the third to despair. And this the text of Genesis signifies, where Cain in despair said: *My iniquity is greater than that I should merit pardon;* he did not say that it was greater

than [God's] mercy, but that it was wider than the pardon to which he could attain. — Or it can be said that such an esteem rather comes from a subversion of *confidence* than from a subversion of *knowledge*; just as a man sometimes well knows something, and yet affection so dominates that it draws him to esteem the opposite.

And by this way one must respond to those two [objections] which are afterward raised; for they do not conclude that despair takes away faith, because the defect is of a twofold condition, as has been said. But although despair does not take away faith simply, nevertheless faith is more harmed by despair than by hatred, or any other sin which is not directly opposed to it. For in faith there are three [things], namely *belief* itself and the *aptitude for tending toward God* and the *tending* itself. The first is as it were the *earth*, and the second as the *seed*, and the third is as the *fruit*. The first is taken away only by unbelief; the second is taken away by despair, by which a man is made unfit for tending toward God; the third is taken away by every sin.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the sin against the Father* is understood to be that *which is done through weakness.* For if this is true, then every sin is a sin against the Father, because, since the power of sinning is rather an impotence than a power, by this very fact, by which one can sin, he can fail and be weak. — Likewise, if the sin against the Son is through ignorance, as he himself adds: « since every sinner is ignorant », as the Philosopher holds, it seems that every sin is against the Son: therefore that division of sins is null.

**I respond:** It must be said that when sin is said to be from *weakness* and *ignorance*, there is not taken here just any weakness and just any ignorance, but the weakness which indeed is from the *flesh*, and the ignorance which is with respect to *some circumstance* constituting the formal character of fault. And in this way such weakness is not with respect to every sin, nor such ignorance; although, when weakness is taken in a broad sense for any impotence whatsoever, and ignorance for any want of knowledge whatsoever, whether of practical or of speculative cognition, they are found in every sin. Moreover, it must be known that when sin is divided by these differences, that sin is called [a sin] from *weakness* which proceeds immediately from it, and likewise from *ignorance* and *malice*; and thus these three differences do not concur in the same sin. And so the objections are answered. — And let these things suffice concerning this division, since above it was inquired concerning these matters, in the twenty-second distinction, where that division is set down and made manifest.

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