Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/44/q/bon-sent-II-d44-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article I. *Whence the power of sinning takes its origin.*
### Question I. *Whether the power of sinning is in us from God.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the power of sinning is in us from God. And that it is, seems to be the case:

**On the affirmative side.**

1. First, by the authority of Augustine on the Psalm, which the Master also adduces in the text: « The will to harm can be from man's own mind; but the *power* is only from God »; but the will to harm, which belongs to man from himself, exists only in respect of the harm by which one sins: therefore if in respect of that same thing the power is from God, it seems that the power of sinning is from God in him.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the *Topics*: « Both God and the virtuous man are able to do depraved things »; but everything in which man shares with God, he has from him as from a cause and principle: if therefore man shares with God in the power of sinning, it seems that he receives the power of sinning from God.

3. Likewise, everything that bears witness to the nobility of nature is from God; but the power of sinning, in that in which it exists, bears witness to the nobility of nature — for it cannot be found except in a rational creature, which is the noblest of all creatures — therefore it seems that the power of sinning is in man from God.

4. Likewise, everything that makes for the amplification of praise is from God, to whom belongs all honor and praise; but to be able to sin makes for the praise of the just man, according to what is said in Ecclesiasticus 31: *He that could have transgressed and has not transgressed, and could have done evil and has not done it:* therefore it seems that to be able to sin is in man from God.

5. Likewise, the power of sinning is in the rational creature either according to that which is from God, or according to that which is from nothing. If according to that which is from God, I have my thesis, namely that man receives such a power from God. If according to that which is from nothing: then since every creature is from nothing, every creature has the power of sinning: if therefore this is false, the rest follows, etc.

**The foundations. On the contrary:**

1. To sin is to fail; but to be able to fail is a non-ability and a privation of power: if therefore the privation and defect of power is not from God, it seems that the power of sinning is not in man from God, but rather from himself.

2. Likewise, acts and potency are from the same principle: therefore if sin is in no way from God, then neither is the power of sinning in man from him.

3. Likewise, glory is perfective and preservative of nature; but through glory the power of sinning is taken away: if therefore glory does not take away what God has given, it seems therefore that man has not received the power of sinning from God.

4. Likewise, the power of sinning is the power of acting against God: therefore the power of sinning, as such, is opposed to the divine power: if therefore

the divine power does nothing against itself, it seems therefore that the power of sinning is not from him.

5. Likewise, everything that is in man from God has an exemplar in God; but the power of sinning, as such, does not have an exemplar in God; for it is impossible that God should sin, as Augustine shows in many places; and it is also impossible that a defect should have an exemplar in God. If therefore man, according to the power of sinning, is not made like to God, but rather is made like to the devil; and everything that man has from God has in him an exemplarity and likeness: it seems that the power of sinning in man does not have its cause and origin from God.

> **Conclusion.** The power of sinning, taken in one way, is from God, but in another way not at all.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say "the power of sinning," I say two things: I say some power, and I say a power orderable to such an act. — If therefore we speak of the power of sinning, according as it is a *power*; since that power is free choice, in this way it is without doubt from God. — But if we speak of the *orderability* of that power toward sin, then it must be said that, just as sin is sometimes taken *abstractly*, sometimes *concretely* — for sometimes it names the deformed action, sometimes the deformity itself — so there are two ways of speaking of that orderability toward sinning: either in respect of the *deformity*, or in respect of the *underlying action*. If in respect of the *underlying action*, then such orderability is from God, just as is the action underlying the sin. But if we speak of that orderability in respect of the *deformity*, then, since that deformity is nothing other than a privation and defect, such orderability is nothing other than defectibility; and therefore, just as the *defect* of deformity is not from God, so neither is such *defectibility* from God, but it is in the rational creature itself, because it is from nothing. Thus then the power of sinning in one way is granted to be from God, in another way not at all. — And according to this the reasons run to the opposite sides, and there were also diverse opinions.

For as the Master says in the text, some have said that the power of sinning is not from God; but others have said that the power of sinning is from God; which the Master strives to prove by many authorities. But those authorities are not valid for concluding this, unless *the power of sinning* be taken according to *that which it is*, that is, in respect of the action *to which it is ordered*, since in this way it is contained under the genus of power. But according as *the power of sinning* is considered in comparison to *the deformity itself*, then it is not in the genus of *power*, but rather of *impotence*; for thus it does not name a power, but a defect. And just as it does not follow: God can do all things, therefore he can sin; so it does not follow in this way: all power is from God, therefore the power of sinning is from God. And speaking in this way Anselm says that « the power of sinning is not liberty nor a part of liberty ». — And in this way proceed the reasons showing that the power of sinning is not in man from God; and therefore they are to be conceded.

**Solution of the opposing arguments.**

1. To that argument which is raised about the power of harming, that it is from God although the will is not from him; it must be said that Augustine lays weight in that statement upon the distinction between *the power itself*, by which one sins, and the *actual ordering* of that power, by which one sins; and he means to say that the power itself is from God, although the ordering of it toward sin is not from him, because it is rather a disordering than an ordering. And therefore from this it is not gathered, except that the power of sinning, according to *that which it is*, is from God; but according as it *is ordered to sinning*, it cannot be elicited from that authority that it is from God, but rather the opposite, because the power of sinning does not arrive at sin except by the mediation of a voluntary disordering, which Augustine denies to be from God in the aforesaid authority.

2. To that statement of the Philosopher, by which he says that God and the virtuous man can do depraved things; some explain that the Philosopher understood it of the evil of punishment. But this plainly contradicts his text; and therefore, since sacred Scripture says, and all expositors agree, that he can in no way sin, just as he can neither lie nor even deny himself; it must be said that that statement of the Philosopher does not hold true. Nor do I believe that he placed great weight on that statement, since he said it only by way of example and in passing; and his example sufficed well enough for his purpose as regards the part in which it holds true, namely this, that the virtuous man can do evil things, although this is not so insofar as he is *virtuous*, but insofar as he can *fail from virtue*.

3. To that argument which is raised, that the power of sinning bears witness to the nobility of nature; it must be said that this is not true insofar as it bespeaks an ordering toward

a defect, but insofar as it bespeaks an ordering toward the underlying act; for no act is deformable through fault except one that proceeds from the deliberative power, which is noble, because that alone is informable through justice. — Or it must be said that to bear witness to nobility is twofold: either *per se* or *per accidens*. But the power of sinning and sin bear witness to the nobility of nature *per accidens*, as Augustine says, that « the grief over a good that is lost is a witness of a good nature ».

4. To that argument which is raised, that it makes for the amplification of praise; it must be said that, just as virtue is rendered more commendable by sins, so the power of doing well is rendered more commendable by the power of doing ill; not because vice adds anything to the goodness of virtue, nor because the power of failing adds anything to the power of doing well; but because by the presence of its opposite it shines forth the more in its goodness. Thus the virtuousness of a man appears the more when he can do evil things and does not will to, than if he could not nor would; and therefore the just man is praised in this, that he could do evil and did not, that is, he is praised in this, that he did good and did not do evil, although he could; so that praise essentially regards that which is doing good, while that which is being able to sin it regards only *per accidens*; whence, even were the power of doing evil removed, if he were to do good voluntarily, he would still be praised.

5. To that which is asked, whether the power of sinning is present in the creature from God or from nothing; it must be said that by reason of the underlying act, which is a deliberative act, it is present in it from God; but by reason of the defect it is present in it from nothing. And hence it is that the power of sinning is not found in every creature, because by reason of imperfection it is not found in the irrational creature, in that there cannot be in it an act of deliberation. And by reason of total perfection it is not found in the beatified creature, because there cannot be in it a defect; so closely is it joined to its Creator. And thus the power of sinning is in a certain way taken away through glory, in a certain way left remaining; in a certain way it is *liberty* itself, in a certain way it *diminishes liberty*; in a certain way it is a *power*, and in a certain way an *impotence*; for in a certain way it bespeaks *position*, and in a certain way *privation*. And therefore, when it is asked whether it is from God, one must not answer simply, but according to the aforesaid distinction.