Dist. 44, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/44/q/bon-sent-II-d44-a1-q2
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### Article I. *On the origin of the power of sinning.*
### Question II. *Whether the power of sinning, as such, is evil.*

Secondly it is asked whether the power of sinning, as such, is evil. And it seems that it is evil, insofar as it is such.

1. The power of sinning is nothing other than the will; but the will to sin is evil: therefore the power of sinning is evil, as such.

2. Likewise, "that whose use is evil is itself also evil," just as "that whose use is good is itself good"; but the use of the power of sinning is to sin, and to sin is evil: therefore the power of sinning too is evil.

3. Likewise, as the power of doing well stands toward the good, so the power of doing ill stands toward evil; but every power of doing well, as such, is good: therefore the power of doing ill, as such, is evil.

4. Likewise, every power is more complete when it is joined to its act; but the power of doing ill, while it is joined to the act of doing ill, is evil: therefore if it is less complete when it is separated from the act, then it seems that even separated from the act it is evil.

5. Likewise, the power of doing ill is either *good* or *evil*. If it is *good*, and every good is in God and from God: then it seems that the power of doing ill, as such, both is from God and is in God, both of which are false: it remains, therefore, that the power of sinning is evil.

**On the contrary:** 1. If the power of sinning is evil, then one able to sin is evil; but the just and holy man is able to sin: therefore the just and holy man is evil.

2. Likewise, if the power of sinning is evil, then either by the evil of penalty or by the evil of fault. Not by the evil of penalty; because that follows upon the evil of fault. Not by the evil of fault; because fault follows upon the power of sinning in time and by nature; for both man and angel were able to sin before they sinned.

3. Likewise, if the power of sinning is evil, then either by a malice which it produced, or by a malice which has been produced in it. By a malice which it produced is not required, because many are able to do ill who do not and have not done so. If by a malice which has been produced in it; but on the contrary: Augustine in the book of Eighty-three Questions proves that "by no other author can a man be made evil except by himself": therefore it does not seem that the power of sinning, as far as it is of itself, is evil.

4. Likewise, it does not follow: this man is able to commit adultery, therefore he is an adulterer; therefore it does not follow: this man is able to do evil, therefore he is evil; but if the power of doing ill were evil, it would necessarily follow upon it, that there be evil: therefore etc.

Together with this it is asked: whence is it that the *will* to do ill is evil, and the *power* of doing ill is not said to be evil? — It is also asked: for what reason is the *will to sin* not called a non-will, just as the *power to sin* is called a non-power? For it seems that it ought rather to be so. For if the will to sin states a greater approximation to the defect of sin than the power of sinning does; the more it seems that it ought to fall away from its proper character, so that the *will to sin* should be called a non-will, than that the *power to sin* should be called a non-power.

### Conclusion.

> *The power of sinning, as such, is not evil.*

**Respondeo:** It must be said that, just as *power* with respect to goods does not state an *actual* ordering to the effect, but only a *habitual* one, whereas *will* states an *actual* ordering; so too in the case of evils it must be understood that *power* does not state an actual ordering to defect, but rather a habitual one. Hence one is not said to have the power of doing ill because he *actually* tends toward evils, but because he *is able* to tend toward evil. But *will* states an *actual* ordering; for one is not said to will evil, except when he actually tends toward evil. For as was said in the first book, the will is what brings the power near to acting. — And therefore, since to be evil states some present defect in that of which, or about that of which, it is said; hence it is that the *will to sin* is evil, and *to will to sin* is evil; but the *power of sinning* or *to be able to sin* is not said to be evil. — Therefore the reasons that show that the power of sinning, as such, is not evil must be granted.

**Replies to the arguments for the affirmative:**

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the will, it must be said that it does not hold, because the will to do ill posits more than the power of doing ill; for it states an actual ordering to evil, or, to speak more properly, an actual disordering. Hence, just as that argument does not hold: *to will to do ill* is evil, therefore *to be able to do ill* is evil; so neither does that hold which it objects, namely that the power of doing ill is nothing other than the will. For although it is not something other, yet it is signified in one way by the name *power*, and in another way by the name *will*; because in the one it is signified in greater remoteness, but in the other in greater nearness; and therefore there is here a fallacy *of accident*, as here: it is the same will which is distant from evil and which is brought near to evil: therefore if

it is evil, insofar as it is brought near, by comparison to evil it will likewise be evil, insofar as it is distant; for here it is assigned that something belongs alike to the accident and to the underlying thing.

2. To that which is objected, that the use of the power of sinning, as such, is evil; it must be said that that maxim is to be understood of the use to which each thing is directly and proximately ordered; but the power of sinning is not ordered, neither directly nor proximately, to the act of sinning; for the reason that that same power is toward opposites, and is ordered *per se* to its opposite, but to this it is ordered *per accidens*. Hence the opposite of sin is its *use*, and sin is its *abuse*; and therefore it does not follow that, if to sin is evil, on account of this the *power of sinning*, as such, is evil.

3. To that which is objected, that among goods the power of doing well is good, therefore etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, because among goods the goodness of the act is from the goodness of the power; whence it is wont to be said that it is not because *we do good things* that we are good, but because *we are good* that we do good things. But it is not so in the case of evils; rather the contrary, because we do evil things, *we are evil*. And the reason for this is that, although the power cannot *perfect* itself through its act, yet it can *disorder* itself through its act and make itself deficient; and on account of this a good work does not add to a good work as much, in respect of meriting, as sin adds to sin in respect of demeriting.

4. To that which is objected, that the power is more complete when it is joined to its act; it must be said that this is true of the act to which it is ordered *simply*; but it is not true of that to which it is ordered *per accidens*, especially when that act holds more the character of a defect than of an effect. For then it disorders more than it perfects; and so it is in the power of sinning with respect to the act of sinning; and therefore the power recedes more from completion in this, that it sins, than in this, that it was able to sin.

5. To that which is asked, whether the power of sinning is good or evil; it must be said that if the *power of sinning* be called the power by which one is able to sin, without doubt it is good and is from God. Likewise, if the *power of sinning* be called as ordered to the act underlying the sin, it is likewise from God. But if the *power of sinning* be called the very capacity for failing, in this way it ought to be called neither *good* nor *evil*. It ought not to be called good, because it does not state any being, and nothing has the character of being which does not have the character of good. It ought not to be called evil for this reason, that it does not state the privation of any good naturally apt to be present, nor does it state an actual defect, but a habitual one; whence such a power ought not to be called an *evil power* or *deficient*, but a *defective power*; nor is it properly a *power*, but a *non-power*. Hence just as *not being able to see* in a stone is neither good nor evil, because it states neither a position nor the privation of any good naturally apt to be present: so it must be understood concerning the power of sinning in the rational creature, insofar as the power of sinning states a defectibility which belongs to it from the character of a creature, according to which it has being from nothing.

From these things appears the answer to what was asked last, namely why the *will to sin* is said to be evil, and not so the *capacity*. For this is from the fact that the will is the immediate and proximate cause with respect to the acts which proceed from deliberation. — But the power of sinning is rather called a non-power, than the will to sin should be called a non-will, for the reason that the name *power* was imposed from positing and completion; and therefore to sin diminishes from the character of power, since it states a defect, just as a *dead man* diminishes from the character of *man*. But the name *will* was imposed from liberty and complacency. And because sin is something pleasing and is to be committed through free choice; hence it is that, although it depraves the power of the will, yet it does not diminish from the character of the will, because it has no repugnance toward it, according as it is so named; and therefore to will to sin is to will, but to be able to sin is not to be able; and therefore it was said in the first book that God is *omnipotent*, and yet he is not called *omnivolent*.

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