Dist. 44, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/44/q/bon-sent-II-d44-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the power of presiding.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the power of presiding. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked whether all power of ruling is from God.

### Question I. *Whether all power of ruling is from God.*

Concerning the first the matter proceeds thus, and it is asked whether all power of ruling is from God. And that it is, seems [so]:

1. John nineteen: *Thou wouldst have no power over me, unless it were given thee from above*, the Lord said to Pilate: therefore if Pilate's power over Christ was from God — and yet it by no means appeared that he ought to have power over him — therefore it seems that much more is all such power from God.

2. Likewise, more expressly to the Romans thirteen: *There is no power but from God*; and it is agreed that there he speaks of the power of presiding: therefore etc. — And let these two authorities suffice, since several others are adduced in the text.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [so] *by reason*. The power of presiding bespeaks a potency in eminence, and everything of this sort bespeaks some positing; but everything that bespeaks some positing is from the highest power: therefore all power of presiding is from God, in whatever way one presides.

4. Likewise, all punishment is from God which has simply the character of punishment; but all servitude is a punishment: therefore it is from God. But from the same source from which servitude is, from the same is the power of ruling: therefore all power of ruling is from God.

**On the contrary:**
1. Hosea eight: *They have reigned, but not by me; they have been princes, and I knew not*: therefore it seems that such presiding of the wicked is not from God.

2. Likewise, nothing unjust is from God; but many rule over others unjustly: therefore it seems that not all power or dominion that is among men is from God.

3. Likewise, nothing disordered is from God; but when a fool is set over a wise man, and an evil man over the good, this is disordered: therefore it does not seem to be from God.

4. Likewise, nothing that is against the law of nature is from God; but the power of ruling over men is against the law of nature: therefore it is not from God. The *major* is manifest. The *minor* is proved by what is said in the book of the Institutes: « Wars have arisen, and captivities have followed, and servitude, which are contrary to the law of nature ».

5. Likewise, nothing is to be taken away from anyone which is given to him by God: therefore if all power or prelacy is from God, prelacy or power is to be taken from no one: therefore no prelate or prince should be deposed, however evil he be.

6. Likewise, nothing that one has by God's donation does one have by usurpation: therefore if all power is conferred by God, none is usurped; but it is plain that many powers are usurped: therefore not all power is bestowed by God.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** All power of presiding, according to what it is, and also in respect of him over whom it is, is just and is from God.

**I respond:** It must be said that the power of presiding is said to be that by which one presides over and rules another. But that by which one presides can be spoken of in two ways: in one way the *virtue* itself is meant, by which one prevails over another, and this virtue is without doubt from God; in another way that by which one presides is meant as the *mode of arriving at* or *of remaining* in this excellence of virtue; and so a distinction must be made. For some preside over others out of *justice*, some out of *cunning*, and some out of *violence*. But when anyone presides over others through *justice*, then that power of ruling, speaking simply, is from God both in respect of the one presiding and in respect of the subjects.

But when anyone presides through *cunning* or through *violence*, then it must be said that such power both has to be compared to the will of the one presiding, and has to be compared to the merit of the subject. In comparison to the merit of the subject such presiding is just, since it is either for the *proving of the good* or for the *punishment of the wicked*. But if it be compared to the will of the *one presiding*, thus it is unjust. — And in the first way indeed it is said to be from God *as doing* and ordaining, according to what is said in Job thirty-four: *He maketh a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people*; and Hosea thirteen: *I will give thee a king in my wrath*. But in the second way, namely in comparison to the will of the *one presiding*, it is thus said to be from God *permissively*, but not approvingly, on account of which it is said: *They have reigned, but not by me, and they have been princes, and I knew not*.

It must therefore be granted that all power of presiding according to *what it is*, and also in respect of him over whom it is, is just and is from God; and this the reasons and authorities that are adduced for the first part show, and therefore they are to be granted. It must nonetheless be granted that the *mode of arriving* at this presiding, in comparison to the will of the *one presiding*, can be just and unjust; and insofar as it is just, it is from God, insofar as it is unjust, it is not from God. But because it is never so unjust on the one side but that it is just on the other, therefore of no power of presiding can it be said that it does not proceed from God.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that the Lord says that they have reigned but not by him; it must be said that there is not there a negation of any and every will, but of the *antecedent* will and of the *approving* will. For the dominion of the wicked is rather from God *avenging* than from God *accepting*. Hence in them is verified what is said in Ecclesiastes eight: *Sometimes one man ruleth over another to his own hurt*.

2. To that which is objected, that nothing unjust is from God; it must be said that it is true, insofar as it is unjust. But although the potency of ruling is often unjust in comparison to the will of the *one presiding*, nevertheless it is always just in comparison to the merit of the *subject*, since it is *for the punishment of evildoers, but for the praise of the good*, as is said in the first [epistle] of Peter, two.

3. To that which is objected, that some power is disordered; it must be said that although in some way some power can proceed from a disordered will, the power itself is nevertheless always ordered, as Gregory says in the Morals, that « the swelling of pride, not the order of power, is in the crime; God gave the potency, the malice of our mind devised the puffing-up of the potency ». — And if it be objected that it is disordered that fools preside over the wise, and the evil over the good, and slaves over the free; it must be said that although some disorder may appear exteriorly, nonetheless a fair ordering lies hidden interiorly according to the divine judgment, which is frequently hidden, yet never unjust. On account of which it is said in Ecclesiastes ten: *I have seen an evil, as it were by an error, proceeding from the face of the prince: a fool set in high dignity* etc.; as if to say: that, although an error may appear there, yet there is great ordering there, since by it the wicked are punished and the good are advanced.

4. To that which is objected, that no power is from God which is against the law of nature; it must be said that *to be against the law of nature* is twofold: either *simply*, or *according to some state*. When therefore it is said that the power of ruling is against the law of nature, this is not understood with regard to the universal dictate of nature, but with regard to the dictate of the nature of some determinate state, in which indeed there would be no subjection of servitude nor prelacy of power.

5. To that which is objected, that nothing which is given by God is to be taken away; it must be said that this is true if God gave it to him simply; but if it was given only for a *time*, as the Lord willed to give, so also he willed to take it away through human ministry. And this we know that God wills, when we see the order of justice so to require. For God gave life to the robber, and yet the judge justly takes it away from him, this command of justice requiring it, by which it is said: *Thou shalt not suffer a wrongdoer to live*. So too it is to be understood to hold in our power and in that of princes, since according to the rectitude of right both dominion and the privilege of power he deserves to lose who abuses the power granted to him.

6. To that which is objected, that no power conferred by God is usurped; it must be said that it is true, if it be given *wholly* by God. But God so gives power that frequently *man cooperates* in the obtaining of that power; and when he rightly cooperates toward the obtaining of that power, then he is said to rule it out of *justice*; but when [he does so] unjustly, then that power is said to be *usurped*, in which he does not preside by *right*, although he presides in *fact*; nevertheless, because such power is not altogether without the order of justice, it is granted to be from God. And these two are at once true according to different respects, namely that the same power is usurped and conferred by God, without any contradiction.