Dist. 44, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/44/q/bon-sent-II-d44-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the power of presiding is in man according to the institution of nature, or according to the punishment of sin.*

Secondly it is asked concerning this, whether the power of presiding is in man according to the institution of nature, or according to the punishment of sin. And that it is in the first way, it seems:

1. Genesis 1: *Let us make man to our image and likeness, and let him preside* etc. If you should say that he had preeminence with respect to the beasts, but not with respect to men; by this the difficulty is not escaped, because in 1 Corinthians 11: *The head of the woman is the man*: if therefore the head presides over the body and ought to govern the body, then it seems that according to the institution of nature there is a power of ruling in the human race.

2. Likewise, in the Angels, who are perfect in nature and in glory, there is not only order and grade according to the excellence of natural endowments, but also according to the presidency of offices: therefore it seems that lordship is not repugnant to, but consonant with, the institution of human nature, as also of angelic nature.

3. Likewise, the power of ruling is a property of dignity and nobility; but if anything of dignity belongs to fallen nature, much more does it belong to instituted nature: therefore it seems that the power of ruling pertained more to the state of instituted nature than to the state of fallen nature.

4. Likewise, everything that is for the conservation of the natural order pertains to the institution of nature; but the power of presiding pertains to the conservation of the natural order: therefore the power of presiding is in man from God according to the institution of nature. The major is manifest. The minor is proved by what Augustine says in the nineteenth book *On the City of God*: "Penal servitude is so ordained by that law which commands the natural order to be conserved and forbids it to be disturbed"; but the power of ruling and penal servitude are ordained to the same end: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Gregory: "He made all men equal by nature, but for their various merits the hidden, yet just, dispensation of God sets some over others": therefore it seems that subjection and preeminence are not in man according to the institution of nature.

2. Likewise, Augustine, in the nineteenth book *On the City of God*: "God did not will that rational man, made to the image of God, should have lordship over any but the irrational creatures": therefore if the power of presiding and ruling is in one man with respect to another, it seems etc.

3. Likewise, by reason this same thing seems true. Liberty is in man from nature; but the power of ruling is an impediment to liberty: therefore it does not seem that it is from nature. And that liberty both is from nature and is liable to be impeded by the power of presiding, is manifested, because liberty is to be defined thus: "Liberty is the natural power by which it is permitted to a man to do what he wills."

4. Likewise, man according to his first condition was made to the image of God; but inasmuch as he is the image of God, he is born to be borne immediately into God: therefore if God alone is greater than he, then according to nature nothing is above man except God: therefore there is no lordship in man according to the institution of nature except only the divine lordship.

5. Likewise, there is no master without a servant, therefore neither lordship without servitude; but "servitude was introduced on account of sin," as Augustine says in many places: therefore it seems that the power of ruling in man is according to the condition of sin, not according to the institution of nature.

6. Likewise, in the glorification of men "the vices will be taken away, and nature will be preserved," according to what Augustine holds in the book *On the City of God*; but in the state of glory the lordship of preeminence and the subjection of servitude will not remain: therefore these do not seem to be in human nature according as it is instituted, but only according as it is fallen and vitiated.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The power of ruling, insofar as it means the power of coercing subjects, is in man only according to the state of fallen nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that the power of ruling or of presiding is spoken of in three ways, namely, most broadly, commonly, and properly. Most broadly, the power of ruling is spoken of with respect to every thing which a man can use according to his pleasure and wish; and in this way a man is said to be the master of his possessions, whether movable or immovable. In another way the power of ruling or of presiding signifies an excellence of power in commanding one who is capable of reason and precept. In a third way the power of ruling is said to be the power of coercing subjects; and this power signifies a certain constraining of liberty; and such power of ruling is properly called *lordship*, to which *servitude* corresponds.

In the first way the power of ruling is common to every state, namely to the state of instituted nature and of fallen nature and of glorified nature; and it was in a more excellent way in the state of instituted nature than it is in the state of fallen nature. — In the second way it belongs to the state of the wayfarer, whether for the state of instituted nature or for the state of fallen nature. For if man had stood firm, the husband could have commanded the wife, and the father could have commanded the son. And this is found also in the Angels, as long as they are *ministering spirits*, because on that side they are in some way in the state of the wayfarer. Yet this presidency will not remain in glory, as was shown in the preceding. — But in the third way the power of ruling in man is only according to the state of fallen nature; for it belongs to him according to the punishment of sin, not according to the institution of nature, and this because the servitude corresponding to it, according to what the Saints say, is a penalty of sin. — And because it is in this way that we here speak of the power of ruling, therefore those reasons are to be conceded which show that such a power is not in man according to his primary condition or according to the state of instituted nature.

1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the text of Genesis and from First Corinthians, the response is already clear; for they proceed about the power of presiding taken in the first and second way, not the third. For although the woman is in a certain way inferior to the man by reason of the weaker sex, nevertheless, because she was not created to be to him as a maidservant for assistance, but as a companion; hence it is that, although she is called his head, yet he is not called her master, because she is not his handmaid. And therefore the Master said above, in the eighteenth distinction, that the woman was created for equality; and so she was formed from the side, not from the feet, nor from the head, that she might seem to be the man's companion, not his mistress, nor his handmaid.

2. To that which is objected, that preeminence is in the Angels: the response is already clear, because, although one presides over another and commands another and has authority over another to command him something which pertains to the office of ministry, nevertheless one Angel is not called the servant of another Angel; and therefore from this it is not concluded that the power of ruling, according as servitude corresponds to it, is in man according to the condition of nature.

3. To that which is objected, that lordship is a property of dignity; it must be said that although it is a property of *dignity* in him who presides, yet it signifies *unworthiness* in him who is subject; and therefore it can naturally belong to a man with respect to another, inferior creature, but with respect to another man it does not belong naturally, but in a certain way preternaturally, namely as a punishment of sin; for as Ambrose says: "Servitude was introduced through the sin of drunkenness."

4. To that which is objected, that lordship and servitude conduce to the conservation of the natural order; it must be said that there is an order which regards nature according to *every* state; and there is an order which regards nature according to the state of *its own condition*; and there is an order which regards nature according to the state of *its own corruption*. And accordingly some things are of the dictate of nature *simply*; some of the dictate of nature according to the state of *instituted nature*; some of the dictate of nature according to the state of *fallen nature*. That God is to be honored, nature dictates according to *every* state; that all things be in common, it dictates according to the state of instituted nature; that something be private property, it dictates according to *the state of fallen nature*, to remove contentions and disputes. Thus that all men are servants of God, nature dictates according to every state; but that man be made equal to man, it dictates according to the state of his first condition; but that man be subjected to man and that man serve man, it dictates according to the state of corruption, so that the wicked may be checked and the good defended. For unless there were such lordships coercing the wicked, on account of the corruption which is in nature, one would oppress another, and men could not commonly live together. But it would not be so, if man had remained in the state of innocence; for each one would remain in his own grade and state. And thus it is clear that that reason does not conclude that servitude or lordship regards instituted nature, but only that it regards fallen nature, where the order is liable to be disturbed and can be conserved through lordship.

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