Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/5/q/bon-sent-II-d5-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.

*On the aversion of Lucifer.*

### QUESTION I.

*Whether Lucifer sinned by the sin of pride.*

That he sinned by the sin of pride, it seems thus.

1. On that text of Luke, chapter ten: *I saw Satan* etc., the Gloss: «Who was so singularly elated that, at his fall, the rest might fear elation».

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, chapter ten: *The beginning of every sin is pride;* but the first among all sins was the sin of the devil: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Augustine, on the eleventh [book] On Genesis according to the letter: «Made [good], he straightway turned himself away from the light of truth, swollen with pride and corrupted by the delight of his own power».

4. Likewise, Isidore, On the Highest Good, book one, chapter ten: «As soon as he was made, he burst into pride and was hurled down from heaven».

5. Likewise, it seems *by reason,* because one does not happen to sin except in three ways, namely either from *concupiscence of the flesh,* or *concupiscence of the eyes,* or *pride of life*. But the first sin could not be concupiscence of the flesh, nor could it be the appetite for riches, since a spirit does not need these things: therefore it must be that it was pride of life.

6. Likewise, of spiritual sins there are only four kinds besides avarice, which holds as it were the middle between the carnal and the spiritual, namely pride, anger, sloth, envy; but in all three kinds there is hatred: therefore, since all hatred is caused by love, inordinate hatred is caused by inordinate love: therefore before these three kinds some spiritual sin must precede in the devil. But this could not be except pride: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, the affection is never perverted unless the judgment is first perverted; the judgment is never perverted in those things which are of the necessity of salvation unless there is some blinding in the reason: therefore a blinding of reason precedes every appetite. But a blinding cannot be unless a sin preceded; and a sin of *appetite* could not precede: therefore a sin of *presumption* preceded; but this is the sin of pride: therefore etc.

On the contrary: 1. That the first sin was *omission,* it seems, because, if he had deliberated whether that thing was to be desired, he would never have sinned, nor could he avoid it otherwise: therefore he was bound to deliberate; and he omitted to deliberate before he desired that thing: therefore he omitted before he was proud. *If perhaps you say* that through a deiform intellect he could see without deliberation what was to be done; *on the contrary:* for him to inspect this, it was necessary for him to consider the circumstances of the thing desired and the consequences, and these are many; but for a simple [power] of finite virtue, which knows many things through many, it is impossible to know many things at once, since it turns itself wholly to the *thing known*: therefore he had to deliberate. *Moreover,* this does not solve [it], because, whatever it might be, he was bound to avoid sin, he was bound to repress his thought lest it proceed to consent, and this before he consented: therefore he omitted beforehand: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems [that he sinned] by the sin of *ingratitude.* Bernard, On the Steps of Humility: «Because to the gratuitous goodness of God, by which you were made, you show yourself ungrateful; the justice which you have not experienced you do not fear; therefore you boldly commit the fault»: therefore he was ungrateful before he committed that fault of pride.

3. Likewise, it seems *by reason,* because one is bound to give thanks for benefits when he considers them; but the devil considered the benefits of God, when he beheld his own beauty and excellence, and did not give thanks, nay did the opposite, because he wished to attribute to himself what was God's: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it seems [that he sinned] by the sin of *infidelity,* because Anselm, On the Sin of the Devil, and Bernard, On the Steps of Humility, say that the devil did not believe that he was to be punished, or believed that he ought not to be punished; but whoever believes that a sin is left unpunished by God is unfaithful: therefore the devil, before he sinned by desiring, sinned through infidelity.

5. Likewise, it seems *by reason:* the devil would never have desired unless he had believed it to be good or possible for himself; but everyone who believes that a creature can be made equal to the Creator himself is unfaithful: therefore the devil, before he was proud, was unfaithful.

6. Likewise, it seems that the sin of *curiosity* was the first. Bernard, On the Steps of Humility, chapter ten: «Through curiosity he fell from the truth, because what he first beheld curiously, he affected illicitly and hoped for presumptuously».

7. Likewise, this seems *by reason:* because the vice of curiosity is to look diligently at what it is not licit to desire, according to that [saying]: «It is not licit to gaze upon what it is not licit to covet»; but the devil diligently looked at what was above himself, when he said: *I will ascend into heaven:* therefore [it is] manifest etc.

8. Likewise, that there was *envy,* it seems. Augustine, On Holy Virginity, speaking of pride and envy: «By these two the devil is a devil»; but in the first sin he was made a devil: therefore there was envy together with pride: therefore by the same reasoning as pride was first, so also envy.

9. Likewise, it seems *by the reasoning of the Master*: «As to be converted is to adhere by charity, so to be averted from the opposites is to hold in hatred or to envy»: since therefore in the first sin the devil was averted, envy was his first sin.

### Conclusion.

> The first sin of the Angel was pride; which was initiated in presumption, consummated in ambition, confirmed in the aversion of envy and hatred.

**I respond:** It must be noted on this point that some wished to say, to the aforesaid arguments and authorities, that the devil sinned at the same time by several kinds of sins; yet naturally and principally, before the other sins, it was the sin of pride. And thus they answer with a single brief response to all the objections, that they conclude what is true. — But this response neither *says what is true* nor *solves [it].* It does not *say what is true,* because, since the devil's affection is simple, as also his intellect, and the intellect cannot understand many things at once or have several thoughts, similarly neither can the affection commit several sins at once and in the same instant, especially those which pertain wholly to diverse actions, such as infidelity, pride, and envy. *Moreover,* granted that it were true, it does not *solve [it],* because the aforesaid arguments prove not only that the aforesaid sins accompany pride, but that they precede [it].

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that one may speak of the sin with respect to a threefold state, namely with respect to inception, consummation, and confirmation. The devil's sin was *initiated* in *presumption,* for at once, as he saw his own beauty, he presumed; it was *consummated* in *ambition,* because, presuming about himself, he desired what was wholly above himself and to which he could not attain; but it was *confirmed* by the aversion of *envy and hatred,* because, since he could not obtain what he desired, he therefore began to envy and to go against [God] with the affection of hatred. And in this he was made firm, because this wholly separated him from God and set up a perfect obstacle, just as perfect charity perfectly joins to God.

The first arguments are therefore to be conceded, that pride was the first sin; for the pride of presumption and swelling was first in generation, the pride of ambition was first in consummation.

*To 1.* To that which is objected concerning *omission,* it must be noted that omission neither was nor could be a principal or first sin, because the relinquishing of a good comes from *fear that badly humbles,* and every such fear comes from *love that badly inflames*. Hence no one relinquishes doing something he ought to do unless he loves something he ought not [to love]; just as someone omits to go to matins because he loves sleep and rest in his little bed. — By this same reasoning ingratitude could not be the first, nor even envy. — It must therefore be said that not every relinquishing induces the sin of omission. For it happens that one omits a *circumstance,* and then there is not a sin of omission, but a certain negligence. It happens that one omits an *act,* and this in two ways: either *generally* or *specially; generally,* according as it comprehends an *affirmative and negative* precept; *specially* against the *affirmative,* as a *transgression* [is] against the *negative.* Hence he does not omit who does not avoid fornication, but he who does not honor [his] parents. And according as it is a *special* act, it can be a *principal* act or a *non-principal* one. And omission is not a principal sin except for a principal act, as is clear of him who is bound to go to matins, [and] is bound to dress himself and rise from bed, and so of the rest; and although there are many acts, there is one omission. But for some sin to be reckoned a sin of omission, it is required that it be an omission of an *act,* not of a circumstance; of an *affirmative*, not a negative; of a *principal,* not an annexed [one]. — Thus it is clear that it is not so in the case at issue, because the devil did not relinquish some principal act to which he was bound, but desired what he ought not. And so it is briefly clear concerning *omission.*

*To 2. 3.* To that which is objected concerning *ingratitude,* it must be said that ingratitude can be spoken of in two ways, namely *negatively* or *privatively*. *Negatively,* when someone is not grateful to God as he ought, and thus it is a circumstance of all sins. *Privatively,* when not only is he not grateful, but nay is moved contrariwise, as for instance when he thinks of a benefit, as it is a benefit, and makes little of the benefit or the benefactor; and thus it is a special sin. But the devil did not sin in this way, because he did not think of the benefits of God insofar as they were God's, but insofar as they were goods proper [to himself], and therefore he was elated.

*To 4. 5.* To that which is objected concerning *infidelity,* it must be said that neither the sin of infidelity nor of curiosity was the first, because the sound and clear eye of his intellect is not perverted in judging or inquiring unless first stained by some elation.

To that, then, which is objected, that he did not believe etc.; it must be said that to the sin of infidelity two things concur. For it is required that there be a *consent* of reason with a *universal judgment.* For if someone thinks that to fornicate is good *for himself;* or thinks in the universal what is good, and does not consent to the judgment of reason, he is not unfaithful, as is clear. And of the devil I say that he did not consent to the judgment of reason, but estimated [it] good for himself.

*To 6. 7.* To that which is objected concerning *curiosity,* it must be said that two things make a consideration to be called curious, namely *attention of care* and *privation of usefulness*. Hence if the devil, from all the things he beheld, had elicited his own good, referring them to the glory of God; that consideration would be neither blameworthy nor to be called curious. That it was *curious,* then, came from this, that he did not elicit his own good from it, but incurred the evil of ambition and presumption; and so the ground of the sin is first in presumption and in consideration. And thus it is clear that, although there was curiosity in the devil, it was not a fault antecedent to presumption, nor any other, but a condition annexed to it.

*To 8. 9.* To that which is objected last concerning *envy,* the response is clear through the word of Augustine, that it was not the first sin. For Augustine says that it is the *offspring* of pride, in the book On Virginity, and so it follows it, even if not in the same instant, yet in the same time without an interval of delay. Hence in the generation of this offspring pride was confirmed, and the devil was called a devil, because he *flowed downward* and from this was made firm in his malice. And therefore the Master, describing the perfect aversion, such as is in the devil, not such as is in sinful men, says that «to be averted is to hold in hatred or to envy». For the devil, proud, not able to ascend, but compelled to descend, hates the just God and envies his excellence.