Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/5/q/bon-sent-II-d5-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II.

*Whether Lucifer desired to be made equal to God.*

Secondly it is asked, what Lucifer himself desired. And that he desired to be made equal to God is shown:

1. By the text of Isaiah, chapter ten — rather, fourteen — where his sin is described: *I will ascend into heaven, and I will be like the Most High;* but he did not say [it] of the empyrean heaven, since he was there: therefore of the heaven of the Trinity; but in that there is nothing but equality: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that text of the Psalm: *What I did not take away,* the Gloss: «Because Adam and the devil wished to seize divinity, they lost felicity»; but they did not wish to seize divinity as to identity: therefore as to equality.

3. Likewise, Bernard, On the Steps of Humility: «This iniquity of yours is worthy not of a momentary anger but of an everlasting hatred, in that you desire always to be made equal to your most beloved and most high Lord».

4. Likewise, that it was an object of appetite, it seems by reason, because likeness is an object of appetite, therefore a greater likeness more so, and the greatest likeness most of all an object of appetite; but the likeness of equivalence is of this kind: therefore it seems that it was very easy to desire it, because the inclination would be great.

5. Likewise, everything that can be thought delightful can be desired; but the devil could think it delightful to be such as God is, since to be God is supremely delightful: therefore it seems reasonable that he could desire this.

6. Likewise, that he *desired [it],* it seems. The proud devil desired something which he saw above himself, because this is the ground of pride; but above Lucifer in that state there was nothing but God and his loftiness: therefore he desired the divine loftiness.

7. Likewise, pride was as much surpassing as the malice of envy and hatred surpasses; but the devil does not so much hate and envy the creatures of God, as man, nay envies God himself: therefore [he wished] not only to be set over creatures, but he wished also to make himself equal to God.

8. Likewise, it is licit to desire a likeness of conformity: if therefore the devil desired the illicit, he progressed beyond this; but beyond a likeness of conformity there is nothing but a likeness of equality: therefore Lucifer desired this, as it seems.

On the contrary: 1. First to Timothy, chapter two: *Adam was not seduced* etc., the Gloss: «It is not to be believed that a man endowed with a spiritual mind would have desired to be as God». If it is not to be believed of man, since the Angel was still wiser than he, much less is it to be believed of him.

2. Likewise, Anselm in the book On the Fall of the Devil: «He desired nothing to which he would not have come, if he had stood»; but he would never have been made equal to God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that this is not an object of appetite, it seems. The divine immensity cannot be grasped by the mind, therefore no one can think equality to God: but nothing can be desired which cannot be grasped by the intellect: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Anselm proves this: «If God cannot be thought except as so alone that nothing like him can be thought: how could the devil will what he could not think»?

5. Likewise, that the devil did not *desire* this is shown, because he desired nothing except that to which he believed he could come — this is clear, because he himself said: *I will set my throne* — but no one, unless mad, could ever believe that a creature could be made equal to the Creator: therefore, since the devil was not yet wholly a fool, he never desired this.

6. Likewise, the devil loved himself above all things, therefore he did not wish to be other than he who he was; but if he were equal to God, he would be other than he who he was, because he would be God: therefore, since he did not desire this, he did not desire to be wholly equal to God. *If you say* that an antecedent is well desired without the consequent; that is true with a *desiderative* appetite; but with the *elective* no one, unless a fool, wishes deliberatively to be an abbot without wishing to be a monk.

7. Likewise, every sin is by a conversion to a changeable good: therefore if the devil desired to be made equal to God, the devil did not sin; but he did sin: therefore he did not desire this.

### Conclusion.

> The wicked Angel desired in one manner a likeness of imitation to God, in another manner [a likeness] of equality.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a twofold likeness of God, namely of *equivalence* or equality, and of *imitation*. A likeness of *imitation* can be desired *ordinately* and *inordinately; ordinately,* that the likeness be desired in those things which are of our aptitude and of divine acceptance, of which kind are the perfections and adornments of the virtues; *inordinately,* that a man desire what is not fitting, or what does not please God, as if he desire to be set over men, or to avenge himself on his adversaries. — A likeness of *equality* can in no way be desired *ordinately,* but in one way is an *object of appetite,* in another not. For an *all-encompassing* likeness is not an object of appetite, because it cannot fall into cognition or into the intellect, and therefore neither into the appetite; and if anyone imagines [it], he does not desire *equality,* but his own *fiction.* In another way there is a likeness of equality *in some condition,* as in dominion, presidency, knowledge; and thus I believe it can be desired.

It must therefore be noted that the devil in one manner desired a likeness of *imitation,* in another manner of *equality.* And this appears, if the *object of appetite* and the *manner of desiring* be attended to. For the devil desired to be set *over* others, yet by his own *authority.* That he desired to be set over [them], this was of imitation, and this indeed he would at some time have obtained, if he had stood. But that [he desired it] *by his own authority,* so that without merits and without a giver and so that he should be subject to none; this is of God alone, and this is of *equivalence.* — And so it is clear what he desired; and many authorities of the Saints are clear, because Gregory says that he desired to be of his own right, so that he should be subject to none; Bernard says that he desired equality of power; Anselm, that he desired to be set over [others] without merits; and all say what is true, and the diverse authorities speak circuitously of this which is *to be set over all by one's own authority.*

To that, then, which is objected, that he desired divine equality; it must be conceded *in something;* and thus the arguments adduced for that side run on, because it could well be desired, and most of all by him who was the proudest among all, it was desired.

But what is objected last does not hold, because, although it were licit to desire a likeness of *imitation,* yet not *every* likeness, as has been shown.

*To 1.* To the things objected on the contrary it is easy to respond through what has been said. — For what is objected concerning Adam is not similar, because Adam had grace; and besides he did not have so great an occasion of exalting himself.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning Anselm, the response is now clear, because he says what is true as to the object of appetite itself, not as to the *circumstance* under which he desired [it], namely that [it was] by his own authority.

*To 3. 4.* The two following arguments, which prove that it cannot be desired, speak of an all-encompassing assimilation; because if anyone thinks of God in general and thinks of something like him, he does not think God, but *imagines;* and therefore he does not desire to be like *God,* but his own *fiction.* 

*To 5. 6.* To that which is objected, that he did not desire [it]; it must be said that those arguments prove that he did not desire *every* [likeness]; and this is true.

*To 7.* To that which is objected last, that he did not sin, if he desired a likeness, because he was not converted to a changeable good; it must be said that he converted himself to an unchangeable good, that it might be his own, and thus as to a changeable [good], and through this inordinately. And to be converted inordinately to God by being proud is to be averted from God and converted to oneself. And this is clear, because the devil desired for himself what was God's, and so was finally converted to himself, not to God. And thus all that was asked is clear.