Dist. 5, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/5/q/bon-sent-II-d5-a2-q2
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### QUESTION II.

*Whether the sin of the lesser Angels has an order to the sin of Lucifer.*

Secondly it is asked about the comparison of the sin of the lesser Angels to the sin of Lucifer, and it is asked whether it has an order to it. — And that it has an order of a certain *causality,* it seems.

1. Apocalypse, chapter twelve: *The dragon drew with him the third part of the stars.* The Saints and masters expound [this] of Lucifer and of the demons. If he *drew* [them], therefore he in some manner procured their fall: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in John, chapter eight, it is said that *he is a liar, and the father thereof:* therefore the devil is the father of lying: therefore, since there every sin is called a lie, it seems that he was the father of every sin, therefore also of the sin of the lesser Angels: and so it seems that there is an order of *causality.*

3. Likewise, that there is there an order of *time* or of duration, it seems, because Hugh says, and the Master, that they sinned by consenting to [his] sin: but they could not consent to the sin of Lucifer unless it had preceded; for one wills something before he requires consent [to it]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this seems [so], because the devil in some manner was the *origin,* either by *suggesting,* or by *furnishing an example.* He could not *suggest* except after he desired, nor even *demonstrate* his concept to others, nor [could] they *consent* except after they knew: therefore in the middle between the sin of the devil and [that] of the others fell the *suggestion,* or at least the *demonstration* and *perception* and *adjudication* concerning what was perceived. But these cannot be at once: therefore there was there an order of time.

But on the contrary: 1. That there could not be there an order of *causality* or of occasion, it seems, because as soon as he sinned, he was deformed: therefore, since the Angels before [their] sin had a clear sight, if they saw the deformity, they ought rather to have been drawn back from sin than to imitate his example or suggestion: therefore they did not sin by his example or suggestion.

2. Likewise, that there was not there an order of *time,* it seems, because as soon as the devil sinned, he fell; otherwise «there would have been the disgrace of sin without the adornment of justice»; but all fell at once — whence Damascene says that «together with him, namely Lucifer, an innumerable multitude was torn away» — therefore at once, in time, all sinned.

3. Likewise, it can be objected that *neither order* was there; because the good were converted at once, so that there was there neither an order of *causality* or of suggestion, nor of time: therefore if at once light was divided from darkness, at once the good were made light, and the evil darkness: therefore at once not only in *time,* but even in *nature.*

4. Likewise, further, that *neither* order was there, it seems, because, if there was an order of *causality,* then it seems the sin of the other Angels [was] remediable, just as also the sin of man, which had a remedy from elsewhere, because it had its occasion from elsewhere. But if there was an order of *time,* then it seems that the sin of the lesser Angels is graver, since they did not fear the divine judgment, which they beheld concerning Lucifer.

### Conclusion.

> Between Lucifer's sin and that of the rest there was an order both as to degree and as to occasion and as to duration.

**I respond:** It must be said, for the understanding of the foregoing, that here a threefold position is wont to be set. For some wished to say that there was there no order except according to *degree,* because the sin of Lucifer was greater and more excellent, in that he was more proud; yet it was not *prior* to the sin of the others in *time* nor in *origin,* but at once in the same point each one, depraved by his own will, sinned without an example; and because they had their gaze on the same thing, therefore they sinned in a like manner and by the same kind of sin. And they concede the arguments for this.

The position of others was, that there was an order not only of *excess*, nay of *causality,* taking causality broadly not only for a true cause, but also for an occasion; not only for the perpetration, but also for the suggestion; yet not an order of *time.* And they wish [it] to be understood thus, that in Lucifer there was at once in *time* the *appetite* and its *expression,* and in the Angels at once the *perception* and the *appetition,* and so they sinned at once in *time;* yet the sin of the devil furnished the others a way, as an example. — And they set a *simile:* if an eye, being in the west, should look directly into the east, at once the flashing would occur and would appear in the eye. From the lesser they wish this to be able to be [so] in the Angel; and through this they solve the objections.

The third position is, that there was there an order both as to *degree* and as to *occasion* and as to *duration:* as to *degree,* because that of Lucifer was greater; as to *occasion,* because he furnished the others an example; as to *duration,* because, just as in Lucifer it was necessary in time to be before [he could] sin, since he could not in the same instant have the cognition which is pre-required for sin, together with a disordered affection; so they say it was in the lesser Angels in sinning, since they sinned by looking at what the Angel willed, and thence by looking at their own advantage. — And this position seems more intelligible, whence the arguments adduced for it are to be conceded.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that he was deformed at once; it can be answered that he was deformed, but that deformity was within the conscience, and therefore did not appear, because he did not reveal [it]. — Or it can be said that there is a deformity against *nature* and against the *will.* A deformity against *nature* the nature at once knows and rejects, because it is not moved except in one way. But a deformity of the *will* the will does not so reject, because it is itself free; and therefore a culpable and deformed act frequently pleases it; nor ever does such an act displease it, except insofar as it adheres in some manner to justice. And because certain Angels adhered to justice, therefore the motion of the Angel and the deformed will displeased them. But others did not adhere; therefore they did not perceive the uncleanness, but rather accepted [it] as an apparent good.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that they fell at once; it can be said that [they fell] *at once,* not because in the *same instant,* but because *suddenly,* as it were in an imperceptible time; and there an order can well be, although it is not perceived. — Or it can be said otherwise and better, that Satan did not fall as soon as he desired, but after his sin was consummated and confirmed through hatred and envy, and after the division was made of the good Angels from the evil, from whose fellowship, after the beatification, they were at once repelled. Nor does that which is objected concerning the disgrace of sin hold, because sin always has an internal punishment joined to it. Hence, just as man was not at once cast out of paradise as he sinned, but yet at once had punishment; so it seems must be said of the Angel, that he did not fall in the same instant.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the good Angels, it must be said that the sin of Lucifer preceded both the conversion of the good Angels and the aversion of the demons. For he first was proud and made his pride known to all; and from then some adhered to him, but others resisted and adhered to God; and at once these were made light, those darkness. Although therefore the conversion of the Angels and the aversion of the demons were at once, yet [they were] not at once with the sin of Lucifer.

*To 4.* To that which is objected last concerning *excusability* or *gravity,* it must be said that the *first* part of the reasoning is deficient in two ways: first, because that is not a sufficient reason why the sin of man was remediable, as will be clearer below; second, because it is not similar. For the devil gave an occasion to man in one way, to the evil Angels in another: to man by *promising* and *deceiving,* but to the Angels only by *insinuating* his concept; whence he is not said to have tempted them, as [he did] the first parents. The *second* part is deficient, because they did not advert to his ruin, nor did they see the severity of the divine judgment upon him, until his sin was consummated, as was touched upon and determined before.