Dist. 5, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/5/q/bon-sent-II-d5-a3-q1
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### ARTICLE III.

*On the conversion of the good Angels.*

Consequently, in the third place, it is asked about the conversion of the good [Angels]. And concerning this two [things] are asked. First it is asked about the conversion itself in comparison to its principle. Secondly it is asked about the same in comparison to the reward.

### QUESTION I.

*Whether the conversion of the good Angels was by the power of nature, or by the help of grace.*

It is asked, then, first, whether the conversion of the good Angels to God was by the power of nature, or by the help of grace. And that [it was] by the power of nature, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of the Master in the text: «The Angel did not need a grace by which he might be justified», therefore he was just even apart from grace; but he who is just is rightly and orderly converted to the fount of all justice: therefore it seems that the Angels could [do] this without the help of grace.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the third [book] On the Soul: «The intellect is always right»; but this would not be unless rightness were connatural to it: therefore the Angel's intellect was truly and properly of its own nature right. But no one is right except he who is converted upward and who has the head of the mind erect toward divine things: therefore it seems that he had this by nature.

3. Likewise, one can more easily [attain] that to which he is naturally ordered, than that to which he is not ordered; but the Angel was ordered to God more than to anything else, and nature was ordered in him: therefore, since without any aid he could be converted to a changeable good and averted from God, much more strongly can he without any help be converted to him.

4. Likewise, it is natural for someone to be converted to that which he naturally loves more; but the Angel by natural love loved God more than any creature, as has been had in the preceding: therefore it seems that he would naturally be converted to him.

5. Likewise, let us be at the instant of conversion and aversion; there is no difference among the Angels before this instant; if therefore some difference begins to be, this is by aversion and conversion: therefore the aversion and conversion is prior to the infusion of grace: therefore the conversion could not be from grace.

6. Likewise, if the conversion had been from grace and not from nature, then to those Angels who never had grace, but only natural [gifts], it would not be imputable that they were not converted to God: therefore neither would the devil be blameworthy or punishable for not having adhered to the Lord.

To the opposite it is argued first *by authority* and then *by demonstration*.

1. *By authority* thus. The Master says in the text: «The conversion made [them] just, but the aversion [made them] unjust»; but nothing makes [one] just unless it be gratuitous: therefore the conversion was from grace. *If you say* that he means [it] of natural justice; this is nothing, because all the Angels had that from their origin.

2. Likewise, the conversion of a spiritual creature to God, as Augustine says, is *day,* because there is the brightness of cognition and the warmth of affection; but by nature light precedes day: since therefore the Angel is not light except through the information of grace, he first received grace before he was converted to the divine goodness.

3. Likewise, there is no merit without grace, as is clearer below, because God accepts not the man on account of the work, but the work on account of the author; but the Angels merited in their conversion, just as the others demerited in [their] aversion: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if the conversion had been by natural [gifts] alone, since then Lucifer excelled in natural [gifts], it rather seems that he would be converted rather than the others. If therefore he was not converted, that conversion was not by the power of nature, but rather by the help of grace.

### Conclusion.

> The conversion of the good Angels could not be without grace.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the objections it must be premised that in conversion to God the rightness of the spiritual substance is considered with respect to its *mind,* especially by reason of the motive part; nor can it be right unless it be converted to God in act or in habit. As therefore rightness is twofold, so conversion is twofold. For there is a certain rightness of *instituted nature,* and according to this is original justice; and there is a rightness of *grace,* and according to this is meritorious justice, which the supreme judge accepts for eternal retribution. And because he sees in it the beauty of grace, by its merit he leads the soul into a bride, and its works are lovable to him. — Thus it must be understood that conversion is twofold, one from *natural* rightness, one from the rightness of *grace.* The first the Angels could have without grace, but the second not without grace.

When therefore it is asked from what principle that conversion was; it must be said that that conversion was meritorious and pleasing to God; and therefore it could not be without grace. *Again,* because through that conversion they obtained grace, it must be posited that the free will began that conversion, but grace consummated [it]; and therefore there was there a *subsequent* grace, not a *preceding* one; a *cooperating* grace, not an *operating* one, as the Master says in the text. — It must therefore be conceded that that conversion of the Angels, in which they were confirmed, was not without the help of grace.

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that the Angel did not need a justifying grace; it must be said that the act of justification is understood in two ways. For *to justify* is to make just out of the non-just. But *non-just* is taken in two ways, namely privatively and negatively. Privatively, *non-just* is the same as *unjust,* and then *to justify* is the same as to make pious out of the impious; and in this way there was not grace in the Angels for this effect. In another way *non-just* is said negatively, and thus *non-just* is said not only [of] that which has *impiety,* but [of] that which does not have *the justice of grace;* and thus there was in the Angels justification through grace, and from this justice their works were meritorious.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that the intellect is always right; the response is now clear: for he means [it] of natural rightness. Yet that word of the Philosopher must be understood so that it is said *always to be right* with respect to those things to which it is moved as *nature* or naturally; and thus in theology we say that synderesis is always right. But if it is understood with respect to those things into which it is moved as *deliberating,* it is false; nay, with everything imaginable and [every] phantasm circumscribed, the intellect could sin or transgress, as perhaps the angelic [intellect] did.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that one can more easily [attain] that to which he is ordered etc.; it must be said that it is true, if that be *within* the bounds of nature; but to be *converted* by a perfect and meritorious conversion, this is *above* nature; but *to fail* is *below;* therefore that argument does not compel. — Or say that that is true when the kind of work, compared to the power, is of equal difficulty, if it be considered in itself; otherwise it does not have truth, as is clear in many examples.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning conversion, that it follows love; it must be said that, conversion being taken uniformly with love itself, it has no instance [against it]. For just as a certain love is from the *natural* will, as [that] by which God is desired as beatifying; a certain [love] from the *elective* will, by which one wishes honor and glory to God; a certain [love] from the *gratuitous* [will], by which the whole will itself is taken captive into the divine service: so also conversion by the appetite of *concupiscence* is from *nature;* conversion by the affection of *friendship* is from the deliberative or elective will; but conversion by the *service of pleasing obedience* is from grace itself. And so that is clear. 

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that they differed in nothing; it must be said that that concludes that grace did not begin [it], but does not exclude that it confirmed [it]; and this is true.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that it would not be imputable to the evil [Angels], if the conversion were from grace; it must be said that it is false, because they could stand and not be averted, if they willed; and therefore the aversion is imputed to them as a fault.