Dist. 7
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-littera
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### Distinction VII.

### Part I.

### Chap. I. *Whether the good Angels are able to sin, or the evil ones to live rightly.*

It was said above that the Angels who stood fast were confirmed by grace, and those who fell were forsaken by the grace of God. And the good are indeed so far confirmed by grace that they cannot sin; the evil, however, are so obstinate through malice that they cannot have a good will or will well, even though what they sometimes will is good. For they sometimes will that something be done which God wills to be done, and that thing is assuredly good and just to be done, yet they do not will it with a good will, nor do they will it well.

### Chap. II. *That, although each has free choice, they cannot nevertheless be bent toward either side.*

But since neither can the good sin, nor the evil will well or act well, it seems that they no longer have free choice, because they cannot be bent toward either side, whereas free choice is disposed toward both. Hence Jerome, in the treatise on the prodigal son, says: «God alone is the one into whom sin cannot fall; the rest, since they are of free choice, can be bent toward either side». — Here he seems to say that every creature established in free choice can be bent toward good and toward evil. And if that is so, then both the good Angels and the evil can be bent toward either side: therefore the good too can become evil, and the evil good. — To which we say that the good are confirmed by such great grace that they cannot become evil, and the evil are so hardened in malice that they cannot become good; and yet each has free choice, because not by any compelling necessity, but by their own and spontaneous will — aided indeed by grace — they choose good and reject evil; and the evil likewise by spontaneous will, deprived of grace, shun good and follow evil; and the evil have free choice, but depressed and corrupted, so that they cannot rise to the good.

### Chap. III. *That the good, after confirmation, have a freer choice than before.*

The good, however, have a much freer choice after confirmation than before. For as Augustine teaches in the *Enchiridion*: «They do not therefore lack free choice because they cannot will evil; for that choice is much freer which cannot serve sin. Nor is that will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, nor is it to be called not free, by which they so will to be blessed that they not only do not wish to be wretched, but cannot at all so wish». And so the good Angels cannot will evil, nor will to be wretched; nor do they have this from nature, but from the benefit of grace. For before the confirmation of grace the Angels were able to sin, and some even did sin and became demons. Hence Augustine in the book *Against Maximinus*: «The nature of the heavenly creatures could die, because it could sin. For the Angels also sinned and became demons, of whom the devil is the prince, and those who did not sin were able to sin; and to whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this is not of its own nature, but of the grace of God. Therefore God alone is the one who, not by anyone's grace but by his own nature, neither could nor can nor will be able to sin». — Behold, here it is intimated that the Angels before confirmation were able to sin, but after confirmation they cannot. And that they were able was theirs from free choice, which is natural to them; but that they now cannot sin is not theirs from nature, that is from free choice, but from grace — by which grace it also comes about that free choice itself can no longer serve sin.

### Chap. IV. *That they cannot sin from nature, as before.*

Therefore the Angels, after confirmation, were not able to sin from nature as before — not because their free choice was weakened by grace, but rather so confirmed that through it a good Angel can no longer sin; which assuredly is not from free choice itself, but from the grace of God. And so what Jerome says, «The rest, since they are of free choice, can be bent in either direction», ought to be taken according to the state in which they were created. For both man and Angel were created such that they could be bent toward either side; but afterward the good Angels were so confirmed by grace that they cannot sin, and the evil so hardened in vice that they cannot live well. Likewise also that saying of Isidore is to be understood: «The Angels are mutable by nature, immutable by grace», because by nature, in the beginning of their condition, they could be changed toward good or toward evil; but afterward by grace they were so devoted to the good that they cannot be changed from it. For grace, not nature, is opposed to this.

### Part II.

### Chap. V. *By what means the evil angels know the truth of temporal things.*

And although the evil angels are so hardened through malice, they are nevertheless not wholly deprived of a lively perception. For, as Isidore teaches, the demons are vigorous with a threefold keenness of knowledge, namely by subtlety of nature, by experience of the ages, and by revelation of the higher spirits. Of this Augustine also says: «The evil spirits are permitted to know certain true things concerning temporal matters, partly by subtlety of perception, partly by experience of the ages — being more cunning because of the great length of [their] life — partly from the holy Angels, what they themselves learn from almighty God, he revealing it to them at his command. Sometimes, however, those same execrable spirits foretell, as by divining, even the things which they themselves are going to do».

### Chap. VI. *That the magic arts have force by the virtue and knowledge of the devil, which is theirs from God.*

By whose knowledge and virtue even the magic arts are practiced; to whom, nevertheless, both the knowledge and the power has been given by God, either to deceive the deceitful, or to admonish the faithful, or to exercise and prove the patience of the just. Hence Augustine in the third book *On the Trinity*: «I see, he says, what can occur to a weak understanding — namely, why these miracles are wrought even by magic arts. For the magicians of Pharaoh too made serpents and other things. But this is the more to be wondered at: how the power of the magicians, which could make serpents, when it came to the tiniest flies, namely the gnats, wholly failed; by which third plague Egypt was being struck. There certainly the magicians failed, saying: *This is the finger of God.* Hence it is given to understand that not even those transgressor angels and the aerial powers — thrust down into this lowest murk as into a prison of their own kind, from the dwelling of that sublime ethereal purity, [those] through whom the magic arts can do whatever they can — avail anything unless power be given from above. And it is given either to deceive the deceitful, as upon the Egyptians — and it was given even upon the magicians themselves, that in the working of their spirits they might appear admirable, by whom they were [made] to be damned — or to admonish the faithful, lest they desire to do any such thing as something great, on account of which these things have also been handed down to us in Scripture; or to exercise, to prove, and to make manifest the patience of the just».

### Chap. VII. *That the matter of visible things does not serve the evil angels at their beck.*

«Nor is it to be thought that this matter of visible things serves these transgressor angels at their beck, but rather God, by whom this power is given, as far as he, the immutable one, judges».

### Chap. VIII. *That they are not creators, although through them the magicians made frogs and other things; just as neither are the good [creators], even if through their ministry creatures come to be.*

«Nor truly are those *evil* angels to be called *creators* because through them the magicians made frogs and serpents; for they did not themselves create them. For of all things which are born corporeally and visibly, certain hidden seeds lie concealed in the corporeal elements of this world, which God implanted in them at the origin. He therefore is the creator of all things, who is the creator of the invisible seeds; since whatever things, in being born, come forth to our eyes, take from the hidden seeds their beginnings of advancing here and their increments of due magnitude, and draw the distinctions of their forms from the original rules, so to speak. Just as therefore we do not call parents the creators of men, nor farmers the creators of crops — although, by their externally applied motions, the power of God inwardly works these things to be created — so it is not lawful to suppose not only the evil but even the good Angels to be creators; but by the subtlety of their perception and of their body they know the seeds of these things, more hidden from us, and scatter them secretly through fitting temperings of the elements, and thus afford occasions both for the begetting of things and for the hastening of their increments. But neither do the *good* [do] these things except in so far as God commands, nor do the *evil* do them unjustly except in so far as he himself justly permits. For the iniquitous one's malice has its own will unjust; but the power it does not receive except justly, whether for its own punishment, or for that of others, either the punishment of the evil or the praise of the good».

### Chap. IX. *That God alone so works the creation of things, as [he works] the justification of the mind.*

«As therefore our mind cannot be formed by justification except by God — whereas to preach the Gospel outwardly even men can do, not only the good through truth, but also the evil through occasion — so the creation of visible things God works inwardly. But the outward operations and temperings or occasions are applied by Angels, both good and evil, or even by men». «But these are applied by men so much the more difficultly, the more the subtleties of the senses and the mobilities of the bodies are lacking in earthly and sluggish members. Hence the swifter it is for Angels of whatever kind to draw the proximate causes from the elements, the more wonderful are the speeds that arise in their operations of this sort. But there is no creator save he who principally forms these things; nor can anyone do this save the one creator God». «For it is one thing to found and minister a creature from the innermost and highest hinge of causes — which the creator God alone does — and another to apply some outward operation, by the powers and faculties distributed by him, that what is created may come forth then or then, thus or thus. For these things, originally and primordially, have all been created already in a certain weaving of the elements, but come forth when the opportunities are received».

### Chap. X. *That the evil angels can do many things by the vigor of nature, which they cannot do because of God's prohibition.*

It is also to be known that the evil angels can do *certain* things by the subtlety of nature, which nevertheless they cannot do because of the prohibition of God or of the good Angels — that is, because they are not permitted to do those things by God or by the good Angels. Those who made frogs and serpents could indeed have made gnats. *Certain* things, however, they cannot do, even if they are permitted by the higher Angels, because God does not permit it. Hence Augustine in the third book *On the Trinity*: «By the ineffable power of God it comes about that what the evil angels could do, if they were permitted, they therefore cannot do, because they are not permitted. For no other reason occurs why those who made frogs and serpents could not make gnats, except that a greater dominion of the prohibiting God was present, through the Holy Spirit; which the magicians too confessed, saying: *This is the finger of God.* But what they can do by nature, and yet cannot do because of the prohibition, and what by the very condition of their nature they are not allowed to do, it is difficult — nay, impossible — for man to explore». «We know that a man can walk, and cannot even do this if he be not permitted; but cannot fly, even if he be permitted. So also those angels can do certain things, if they be permitted by the more powerful Angels at God's command; but certain things they cannot do, even if they be permitted by them, because he does not permit, by whom there is for them such a mode of nature — [he] who also through his Angels does not for the most part permit those things which he granted [they] should be able [to do]».

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