Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.

*On the malignity of obstinacy as regards the evil spirits.*

### QUESTION I.

*Whether the affection or will of a demon can be rectified.*

It is asked, then, first, whether the affection or will of the demons can be rectified. And that it cannot, [thus] it seems.

1. First, [John] Damascene says that «this is to the Angels [their] fall, what death is to men»: but a man after death cannot recover the good and right will which he lost in life: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Faith, to Peter*: «So did God create the Angels, that those who should will [it] would be perpetually good; and those who should not will [it], He would never restore by [His] divine gift».

3. Likewise, this seems [so] by *reason*. The account of confirmation in good and of obstinacy in evil is alike; but the Angels, as soon as they were well moved, were straightway confirmed in good: therefore the evil ones too, as soon as they sinned, were made obstinate in evil: just as, then, the good cannot fall, so neither can the evil rise again.

4. Likewise, the Angel sinned more grievously than man, therefore he ought also to be punished more grievously; but the sin of man was punished by some irremediable penalty, as the penalty of death, from which none escapes: therefore it was necessary that the sin of the Angel, which was the death of the angelic spirit, be punished by the penalty of death. But it could not be punished by the death of [its] nature: therefore it was necessary that it be punished by the penalty of eternal damnation.

**On the contrary:** 1. For the rectification of the will two things suffice, namely these: *the remission of divine mercy* and *the contrition of penitence*; but each of these is possible to be [present] concerning the fallen angels: therefore [it is possible] also that their will be rectified. — That there can be *the remission of mercy*, is shown: because the mercy of God is infinite, the sin of Lucifer and of the demons is finite; but the infinite conquers and surpasses the finite: therefore the divine mercy can remit that sin. *If you say* that He can by [absolute] power, but not by fittingness; *on the contrary*: it befits the mercy of God to be manifested in the highest degree, since it is supreme: therefore if it is thus manifested in the highest [degree], namely in remitting the greatest of all sins; and this was the sin of Lucifer: therefore it befits Him to remit it. — That there can be *the grief of penitence* in the devil, is shown: whenever someone perceives to be present to him what he hates, and to be absent what he loves, he grieves and is saddened, because, as Augustine says, *On the City [of God]*, book fourteen: «Grief is a dissent from those things which befall us unwilling»; but the devil knows that by his sin he has lost that nobility which he had in heaven, and has incurred a penalty in hell, and the first he loves greatly and the second he hates greatly: therefore he repents of what he did or what he willed, or at least it is possible that he should at some time come to this state, if he is not [in it] now. — Therefore there can be on the part of the Angel *the grief of penitence*, and on the part of God *the remission of mercy*: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this is shown [thus]: because, if the will of the Angel cannot be rectified, either this is on the part of *God*, or on the part of *the Angel*, or on the part of *the sin*.

It is shown, then, first, that it is not on the part of *God*, by a threefold reason. The first is this: the obstinacy of the evil will, or the impossibility of [coming] to rectitude of will, is a *defect*, not a *positing*, therefore it does not have an *efficient* cause, but a *deficient* one; but God is the deficient cause of nothing: therefore He is not the cause or reason of this impossibility. — The second is this: «God *antecedently* wills all men and Angels to be saved, as Damascene says, because He did not create or form [them] for punishment, but for glory». If, then, He does not will the evil angels to be beatified, this is by a *consequent* will; but «*the consequent will* is a concession from a cause on our side»: therefore there is some further reason why He concedes this: therefore [it is] not the will of God. — The third is this: if the devil were to ask pardon, the Lord would not repel [him], because, as Ambrose says, «He Himself receives those who flee to Him; this belongs to justice»; but God in no way acts against justice. — *Moreover*, however much a man may have served God, if he repents of [his] good [deeds], God does not accept the past goods: therefore likewise, if he repents of evil, it seems that He remits the evils; and this pertains to one supremely merciful: therefore the reason why the will of the devil cannot be rectified cannot principally come on the part of *God*, as is clear from this threefold reason.

It is shown also that this impossibility does not come on the part of *the nature* of *the Angel*. First by the *authority* of Augustine, *On the Faith, to Peter*: «If human nature, after being turned away from God [and] having lost the goodness of [its] will, could have it again of itself; much more possibly would the angelic nature have this, which, by as much as it is less weighed down by the burden of an earthly body, by so much the more would be endowed with this faculty». — Likewise, this seems [so] secondly by *reason*, because the Angel by sinning did not lose the liberty of choice, since liberty of choice is natural to it; but by reason of free choice it was capable of rectitude from its [own] nature: therefore still, as far as is on the part of its nature, it is capable. — Likewise, if the nature of the Angel were the cause of that impossibility, and [if] of whatever a thing is the cause through the mode of *nature*, *God* is likewise the cause; because the will alone is opposed to God: therefore God would be the cause, who made such a nature; if therefore in no way is *God* the cause of the impossibility for good, neither [is] *the nature of the Angel*.

It is shown also that the reason is not on the part of *the sin* of the angel: because the angelic sin did not exceed the sin of man *infinitely* in respect of any condition, therefore it did not harm infinitely more than the sin of man; but the sin of man, although it takes away rectitude, did not however take away the possibility for rectitude: therefore it seems that the sin of the Angel, although it has set [him] further off, has not set [him] off infinitely: therefore it seems that it set [him] off with a possibility of return, and thus the reason does not seem [to be] on the part of *the sin*. — Likewise, however small a grace, if it should come to the will of the devil, would expel the whole fault — I speak of sanctifying grace — but a disease which can be cured by a small remedy when it is applied is not called incurable in itself, but on account of a defect of the remedy, if it be not at hand: therefore the impossibility of rectification in the will of the Angel is not principally by reason of *the fault*. — Likewise, the fault does not induce necessity upon the will, because it is in the will, according as the will is [will], and thus according as it is free and changeable: therefore if it does not induce necessity, then neither does it take away the possibility for the opposite, and thus for rectitude: therefore that impossibility does not come on the part of *the sin*, therefore in no way [at all].

### Conclusion.

> *The obstinate will of the demons cannot be rectified, because it is outside the state of the way and of merit.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Saints and the authorities say, the will of the devil can in no way be rectified, according as this word *can* predicates a potency having some *ordering to act*. For if it be understood of the potency of *an efficient [cause] absolutely*, without doubt *God* is able to restore a good will to the devil; yet on the part of *the devil* there is no ordering to this, but rather his will has been made impossible [of rectification], as the Saints say and the reasons show.

But if the *cause* of the impossibility for rectitude be asked, it must be understood for this that for the rectitude of a will fallen through actual sin two things concur, namely on the part of *the will* penitence, on the part of *God* healing grace. And both are lacking to the devil; and therefore the way of rectification is wholly lacking to him.

If you ask further, which of these is the reason of the defect of the other; it must be said that *the defect of penitence* is the reason why sanctifying grace fails, because formless penitence disposes to it. — *Again*, if it be asked, why does *penitence* fail? it must be said that the freely-given grace fails which prevents the will, that it may repent, and without which no one ever prepares himself for grace, as will appear better hereafter. — If it be asked whence comes the defect of the freely-given grace, or what is the reason; without doubt a defect can have only a deficient cause; and thus neither *God* nor *the nature of the Angel* can be the first cause; but it is necessary that [it be] the *fault* itself, by which the devil so sickened and [still] sickens that the access of grace does not lie open. And in this all who rightly judge concerning this matter commonly agree.

But whence the fault of the devil has this irremediableness, those who opine have varied in diverse ways.

For some have drawn the reason from the comparison of the fault to the *severity of the one judging*. For because the devil and his angels sinned most grievously, the Lord, a severe judge, condemned them straightway; just as a judge has a great robber, caught in a base robbery, straightway hanged, although he defers the hanging of one petty robber, who could have had some excuse. — But this is a reason of fittingness: because, granted that the devil had sinned less, then it would seem he could return; and we see that God frequently shows mercy to the most wicked, and sometimes plunges into hell some who have sinned little; and therefore there is only [a reason of] fittingness.

Others have drawn the reason from the comparison of the fault to the *nature of the one sinning*, because the one sinning was a *spiritual* substance, having no burden of flesh at all; and because a spiritual substance is *always in its act*, whence it is not wearied, but rather continually has a disordered will and continually assails grace: therefore grace is not offered to it. — But these are not reasons of necessity; *both* because the burden of the flesh did not incline the first man to sin, and so neither did it so excuse [him] that his sin should receive the remedy of rectitude; nor on the other hand did the absence of flesh so impede the Angel. *Likewise* neither [is] the other reason [valid], because God frequently gives freely-given grace to a man existing in an actual will to sin; for this stands together with the fault. And an example of this is clear in Paul, who was converted and encompassed with light in the very act of persecution. — There are nevertheless certain fittingnesses on the side.

Others have drawn the reason on the part of the fault as related to the *mode of sinning* by way of opposition to the sin of man; for because man had sinned at another's suggestion, therefore it was fitting [for him] to be relieved by another. *Again*, because the whole human race had fallen, lest the whole should perish, it was fitting [for it] to be brought back to rectitude. The contrary is [the case] in the angelic spirits, because they did not sin through temptation, especially Lucifer; therefore he did not return. Whence Gregory in the fourth [book] of the *Morals*: «He never received the light of the former state, because he lost [it] not [having been] persuaded». *Likewise*, because he fell as to a part [only], so that the sin was particular and personal; therefore he ought not to be rectified. Whence Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: «It pleased the Creator of the universe that, since not the whole multitude of the Angels had perished by deserting God, that [part] which had perished should remain in eternal damnation». — But these likewise are reasons of fittingness, because if a man had sinned by his own will, without suggestion, or in a particular [way], I do not see how he could not recover a good will, the Lord restoring [it].

Others have drawn the reason by comparison to the *state of the one sinning*, because the time of merit and the state of meriting was fixed for them up to the first good or evil operation; and therefore, just as a man, after the time of meriting has passed, however little he should sin, provided nevertheless he sin mortally and in whatever manner, can no longer reacquire a good will; so also it must be understood concerning the Angels. And in this manner Damascene assigned [it], when he said that «this is to the Angels [their] fall, what death is to men». And likewise Augustine *On the Faith, to Peter*, when he said: «So did God create the Angels, that those who should will [it] would be perpetually good, and those who should not will [it] He would never restore by [His] divine gift». And so He fixed the time of merit and the state up to the first conflict. — And this reason I believe to be proper and necessary. And this is clear: because, if any passion [property] is in any subjects, it is in them according to something common; but the devil cannot recover a good will, so obstinate is he, and likewise Judas and another damned sinful man. It is established that this being-in cannot [come] either by reason of *nature* or by reason of the *mode of sinning*, because it is not common. If, then, no commonness is found except on the part of the *state*, because each is outside the state of merit, it is manifest that this is the most powerful and necessary reason. — And this is clearer in the sin of man, if it be considered more diligently. For the sin of Judas in the beginning did not take away the possibility for justice; and yet without addition and without renewal, *the time of meriting passing away*, he was made incapable of a good will. For God decreed to offer grace as long as it is the time of meriting; this passing away, since He does not act against His disposition, He does not offer grace which should prevent the will and form it to penitence; and thus the will remains in everlasting impenitence, and thus in fault.

*And if you object* that, since God foresaw that the devil was going to fall or sin, why did He fix for him so *little* a time of meriting, that he should not have space to return? it must be noted for this that in the constitution of things the reason of *mercy* and of *justice* is not principally regarded, but [that] of *wisdom*. For the divine wisdom decreed to make in the universe a twofold rational creature, to the end that the universe might be complete: one united to a body, namely the rational soul; the other absolute and spiritual, namely the Angel. And since a wholly spiritual substance is wholly incorruptible and ingenerable, one Angel could not be produced from another; therefore they were produced simultaneously; and just as they were produced simultaneously, so also [they were] to be glorified simultaneously, or disposed to be glorified simultaneously. And because they are spiritual and incorruptible, in no way having anything that retards [them]; hence it is that they were created in the *place* of glory, namely in the empyrean, and thus disposed near to glory both by reason of *nature* and of *place*. And therefore the time of merit was fixed for them as brief as it could be, and therefore up to the first deliberative aversion or conversion. — But to man, because he was created in an animal body for procreating offspring for the worship of God, and thus in a disposition more remote from glory, there was given a *place* distant for meriting from his condition, namely the earthly paradise; and a lasting *term* was fixed for him on account of the office of procreating offspring. And therefore, when the angel sinned, straightway the time of merit and the state went out, but not so for man; and therefore the latter could be rectified, but not the former. And this is what Augustine says *On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture*: «The Angel fell from the most sublime state of his order, therefore he could not rise again».

It is clear, then, that the will of the Angel is not rectifiable, nor has been from the time at which it fell. For because it was outside the state of merit, its damnation was most certainly revealed to it; and therefore, just as the Blessed cannot fear damnation, so the evil angel, on account of the certitude of damnation, cannot *hope* for salvation, and on account of the absence of grace cannot *repent*, and therefore neither be good. — These things being seen, it is easy to solve all the objections.

**To the arguments:** 1. For to that which is objected, that there can be the remission of mercy; it must be said that He can [do so] by *absolute* power; but by *ordained* power, which operates according to the order of wisdom — and that order God does not corrupt, but rather inviolably preserves — it neither ought to be nor can be; because the counsel of God and [His] disposition cannot be changed by any reason.

To that, then, which it says, that mercy ought to be manifested in the highest degree: it must be said that *mercy* ought so to be manifested that *justice* also be manifested; and therefore the divine goodness decreed to manifest *mercy* in man, the weaker and more wretched; and it manifested [it] supremely, when He spared not [His] Only-begotten; in the angelic spirits it pleased [Him] to manifest *justice*; and it was done most wisely and most elegantly, because mercy does not take away justice, nor conversely. And therefore Origen erred, who gave the whole to the mercy of God and took away the place of justice, which although it is not of so great impiety on the surface, yet it is of equal error to take away from God the act of justice, just as to take away the act of mercy.

To that which is objected concerning the grief of penitence, that it can be in the devil; it must be said that the grief of penitence is in two modes. For someone grieves over a fault *on account of the harm* which he incurs, and the injury; and thus one can grieve from pure naturals without freely-given grace; and then he grieves when he feels a greater injury than delight. This [grief] the devil now does not have, on account of [his] habitual disposition of sinning, but nevertheless he will have [it], when he shall be absorbed by the punishments after the judgment. But this penitence does not dispose to grace, but rather is only punishment, for thus Judas too repented. — In another mode there is a grief of penitence by which someone grieves over a fault *because it is offensive to God*; and this grief disposes to penitence, and this is not without freely-given grace; and this grief the devil or the demons cannot have, because they are *outside the state* in which grace is given, and irreversibly are outside [it]. And so that is clear.

2. To that which is objected secondly, whence the impossibility comes; it must be conceded that it does not come on the part of *God*, as the first three reasons show; nor on the part of the *nature* of the Angel, as far as is of itself, as the three reasons placed in the second place show; nor even on the part of the *magnitude of the sin*, as far as is of itself, as the last three reasons show. But the *fault* has this *by reason of the state*. For because the will is outside the state of *merit*, all grace is absent; because in the state of *damnation* there is present a most certain despair: which two are conditions wholly disposing the will to the impossibility of rectitude.

Yet that which is objected, that [the impossibility] cannot come on the part of *the sin*, because it does not infinitely exceed the sin of man; some wish to solve [it], that on the contrary [it does], because the angelic intellect is *deiform*, and therefore understands in an instant, [whereas] the rational [intellect] is collative *in time*. And therefore, because the sin of the Angel is against a deiform intellect, it exceeds the sin of man disproportionately, just as a line disproportionately exceeds a point and the instant of time. — But this need not be said, because it is not necessary that an incurable disease exceed a curable one infinitely, since one disease, which in one state is curable, by increase or duration becomes incurable; thus it is manifestly in bodily disease. Likewise we see manifestly in spiritual disease. For sin before death is curable, but by the mere excess of death it becomes incurable. We see the like in a *fall*. For he who falls from a place not very high does not die; but he who falls from a tower is injured beyond remedy, yet the magnitude and the height is not disproportionate to the height. And therefore that reason is not valid.