Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether in demons there is a continuation of evil will*

Granted that in the will of demons there is no possible rectification, it is asked, secondly, whether in them there is a continuation of evil will. And that there is, seems [to be the case].

1. 2 Corinthians 6: *What concord hath Christ with Belial?* The Gloss: "As Christ does all things well, so the devil does all things evilly"; but he always does something, because he is a spiritual substance, not wearied in operating: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, 1 John 3: *The devil sinneth from the beginning;* the Gloss: "Beginning from the very beginning of his creation, he sins continually right up to the present."

3. Likewise, Augustine, *On Faith, to Peter*, speaking of demons, says: "They can neither be without evil will nor without punishment." *If you say* that he is speaking of habit, not of act; it is *objected* that [he speaks] of act, through Jerome, who says that "the devil still arrogates to himself the same thing that he had presumed before."

4. Likewise, this seems [so] *by reason.* The devil is obstinate; but obstinacy is confirmation in a prior evil: therefore the devil's will is confirmed in the evil that he committed, therefore he cannot withdraw from it: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the angels confirmed in good continually have a good will in habit and in act, and the same [will] that they had in their glorification: therefore from the *opposites* it likewise seems [so] concerning the demons, since they are obstinate in evil, as those [angels are] confirmed in good.

6. Likewise, if he could desist from the act of evil will, he could in some way prepare himself for grace, because to lay aside the act of sin is to prepare oneself for grace; but he can in no way do this, as was proved above: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. James 2: *The demons believe and tremble;* but to believe and to fear are not acts of evil will: therefore it seems that they are sometimes moved without obliquity, and so there is some interruption.

2. Likewise, if they tremble, and fear draws [them] back from an evil act, then it seems that they sometimes desist.

3. Likewise, 2 Peter 2: *The demons do not bring against themselves an execrable judgment;* the Gloss: "Terrified by the magnitude of the punishments, they desist from the judgment of presumption": therefore it seems that the perversity of presuming has ceased in them, at least as to act.

4. Likewise, demons naturally love God, whence Augustine says that "no one's conscience can hate God"; and even if he did not say [it], it seems true, because "vice does not destroy the last traces of nature." If, therefore, to love God is natural, then they are still capable and apt for this act. Grant, then, that they go forth into act, since they are not moved by several motions at once; then, as it seems, they cease from the act of evil will.

5. Likewise, the devil, tempting this man, can desist from the exterior act, such that he does nothing evil exteriorly either to him or to another; but we are more masters of interior acts than of exterior ones: therefore he can desist, so as to will nothing evil in act.

6. Likewise, it seems that the first will of being proud in him has ceased, because, the cause ceasing, the

effect ceases; but the reason that moved the devil to desire the divine sublimity was the beauty and vigor of his natural endowments and his pre-eminence in relation to all — and so he hoped to be able to obtain [it] and desired [it] — but now he does not have that sublimity in himself: therefore, as it seems, neither [does he have] that will: therefore it seems that the affection in him has been changed.

7. Likewise, *love* (*dilectio*) and *appetite* (*appetitus*) differ, because *love* is of the good, but *appetite* is of the good as unitable, since a man desires the good for himself, and the good for himself is nothing but what is unitable to himself; but the devil sees well that he cannot attain to God's sublimity, because his damnation has been revealed to him, and as Augustine says *On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture*, "he despaired, to the heaping up of his damnation."

### Conclusion

> *The demon not only has continuity as to the deformity and the proneness of evil will, but also always deforms and depraves every act, and so sins continually.*

**I respond:** It must be said that one can speak of evil will in three ways, namely as to *deformity,* as to *proneness,* and as to *actuality.* — As to *deformity,* the devil is continually in evil will, such that no variation intervenes by a ceasing or a lessening of the deformity, because the stain of sin has so adhered to the devil's will that it can in no way be separated from it. — As to *proneness,* there is a continuation of the same, yet in such a way that a variation intervenes as to the mode of inclining. For the devil even now has a proneness to the very thing that he first desired, but in a different mode than before. For before, he desired with the purpose of obtaining, whence he said: *I will set my seat to the north* etc.; now he desires as far as in him lies, like an ambitious man who hopes to obtain a bishopric, and if he does not obtain it, the ambition does not depart, but the mode of being ambitious is varied; so it is also in the devil. — But as to *actuality,* there is a continuation in the act of sinning, yet a variation intervenes as to kind, because he does not sin continually with a sin of one kind, since he is not moved by diverse motions at once. For now he sins by pride, now by envy, now in other modes; yet his will never rests, because it is never wearied, since it is incorruptible. And since perversity reigns in it, it always deforms and depraves every act that it elicits, and so sins continually. — And the reasons brought forward for this [conclusion] are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected, that they believe and tremble; it must be said that an act is judged good in two ways: either *of itself,* as for instance when it is the act of a virtue eliciting it, such as abstaining from pleasures, and the like; or *from something adjoined,* as to go to St. James [of Compostela]. So too an act is called evil in two ways: either because it is *directly* elicited from a vice, as to will to be in command; or because a deforming vice *accompanies* [it], as to give alms for the sake of vainglory or with murmuring and impatience. And in this mode the devil deforms the act of believing, because with murmuring and impatience and displeasure at that which he believes, he is moved into that act; and so in believing he sins, not because he believes, but because he ought not to believe in the mode in which he believes. The like is to be judged if the devil obeys God.

2. To that which is objected concerning fear, I say that it is true that they fear; but nevertheless the fear is so slight, and the will of sinning is so wicked, that on account of this he does not cease, as in the case of a thief who, although he fears the gallows, nevertheless on account of the appetite for stealing does not cease from theft; and in that very fear he sins, because the justice of God, which he dreads, displeases him.

3. To that which is objected, that they desist from the judgment of presumption; it must be said that, as has been said, although they do not dare to desire what they first dared, nevertheless by a wicked will they do not desist from desiring; and if they could find a way by which they believed they might attain [it], without doubt they would presume the same. Whence, although the judgment is varied on account of the consideration of the punishments, nevertheless the appetite is not torn away nor [is] the evil desire, but rather it reigns in act.

4. To that which is objected concerning the natural motion, some respond that nature, even if it is not extinguished, is nevertheless so lulled to sleep and overcome by the malice of free choice that it cannot go forth into its own act. — Yet it can be said otherwise: that, just as the free will deformed the act of believing, so too it deforms the natural act when it is joined to it. An example of this is the following. Although the miser naturally desires beatitude, so great is the perversity of judgment in him and of will, that he says beatitude to be nothing except in riches; and so he never goes forth into the appetite of beatitude except as it is in riches; and so in desiring that beatitude he sins, because the motion that nature begins by inciting, the will consummates by deforming. So it is to be understood that the devil naturally loves God as preserver, but the devil's will refers that love to his own utility; therefore he sins, because, although he loves God, nevertheless he loves [Him] for his own sake. I therefore grant well that he goes forth into a natural act, but never into a purely natural one.

5. To that which is objected, that he can desist from the exterior act; it must be said that it is not the same, because, since the devil does not fall asleep, the interior powers are always vigorous in him, and so they are always in act, whether he will or not, as in a waking man. But work directed to another is wholly subject to free choice, and therefore he can cease from this and from all; in the interior [act] he can cease from this or from that according to diverse turnings, but never from all. — As for what is said, then, that we are more masters of interior acts; if it is understood as to restraint by oneself, it is manifestly false; if as to restraint by another, it is true, because someone can restrain me from an exterior act and compel [me]: it is not so concerning the interior.

6. To that which is objected, that he does not seem now to be proud, because the cause has ceased; it must be said that there is a cause that *induces,* but yet does not *effect* nor *preserve;* and when this ceases, the effect does not cease, as is plainly evident; and such was the beauty in the devil. There is another [cause] that *effects* and *preserves;* and such was the devil's will, oblique and turned away, and this is always in the devil, therefore pride is always in him; and although he does not rise up to obtain that [sublimity], nevertheless he still rises up to that which he can, and more than he can, because [he rises up] to dominion over men, and especially over the saints.

7. To that which is objected last, that appetite is of a unitable thing; it must be said that *absolute* and *deliberate* appetite is of a unitable and possible thing; and this is appetite with choice. But the appetite of *velleity,* which is of impossible things, is not of a unitable thing according to truth, but of a thing that is desired, as someone desires to be swift like a swallow and the like. But the devil, by a will of *choice,* does not desire what he first desired, in the mode in which he desired it, but only as far as in him lies. — If, however, someone contends that he does desire [it]; it must be admitted that his judgment, or estimation, is perverse, at least [that] of the practical intellect, by which he judges that he can attain to that, although the judgment of speculation dictates the contrary.