Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a1-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether evil will is intensified in demons*

Thirdly it is asked whether in demons there is an intensification of evil will. And that there is:

1. Isidore, *On the Highest Good*: "The devil is not content with this, that, esteeming himself equal to God, he fell, but he also calls himself superior to God": therefore it seems that his pride has grown.

2. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason.* Because we do evils, we are evil: therefore the more evils we do, the worse we are: but the devil has done more evils after his fall: therefore he is worse now than when he fell: therefore the disorder of his will has grown in him.

3. Likewise, a greater punishment is owed to the devil now than when he fell — this is not in doubt — but the reward in the good [angels] is not increased unless the good will grows: therefore neither [is] the punishment in the evil [ones] unless the evil will grows: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, evil is "the privation of mode, species, and order"; but these cannot be totally removed from anything, otherwise it would pass into non-being, because Augustine says that "where these are nothing, there is no good": therefore if they are not wholly taken away, they can still be diminished. But they are diminished by sin: since therefore the devil sins, they are diminished the more, the more he sins; but the more they are diminished, the worse the will is: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, he who procures a bodily homicide is a homicide, and the more homicides he procures, the worse the will is in him: therefore by parity of reasoning, indeed by a stronger one, he who procures spiritual death is a homicide, and he who procures the death of more [people] is worse; but the devil after the death of the first man is said to have been *a homicide from the beginning*, because he procured his fall, but in the process of time he procured the death of many: therefore he has grown in malice. *If you say* that the evil will grew in comparison to man, not in comparison to God; *it is shown* that this response is null, *first,* because the devil is moved inordinately against God, as against man. If therefore by multiplying and repeating sin against man it is intensified, and malice grows in him; by parity of reasoning, when he hates and blasphemes God, which can in no way be done well. *Furthermore,* there is no sin in which God is not despised and offended, and in which the one sinning is not turned away from God: therefore in every sin the evil will grows in comparison to God.

**On the contrary:** 1. "*Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing*"; but demons cannot make progress: therefore they cannot fail more, or be worse.

2. Likewise, this seems [so] *by a likeness in damned men,* because the devil and a dead or damned man are in a like state, as Damascene says, that "this is to men as death, what to angels [is] the fall"; but after death the evil will does not grow in a man: therefore neither [does it grow] in a demon after the fall.

3. Likewise, this is shown *by a likeness in the good angels.* For the state of the good [angels] in good is like [that] of the evil [ones] in evil; but in the good [ones] the good will cannot grow: therefore neither [can] the evil [will grow] in the evil [ones].

4. Likewise, an angel is simple and has nothing retarding: therefore in the first conversion he converts himself so [completely] that he cannot be converted further: therefore likewise he turns himself away so [completely] that he cannot [do so] further: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, evil will does not grow in anyone in whom demerit does not grow; but demerit does not grow in him, because he cannot avoid sin: therefore if it is necessary that the devil will evilly, it is impossible that evil will should grow in him.

6. Likewise, the devil and the demons have been rendered wholly incapable of grace in the first fall, nor can they be more incapable; but when the evil will grows, a greater removal from grace comes about: if therefore they cannot be removed further, as a blind man cannot be made more blind: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion

> *The demon's evil will is always intensified as to the administrative power.*

**I respond:** There is here a threefold manner of speaking.

For some held that, just as in the good angels the good will grew in the first conversion up to its term, such that it can no longer grow in itself, but only in the good effects which they bring about regarding men; so likewise concerning the evil angels they wished to say that in the first aversion their will was turned away at its term, such that the will of the evil [ones] was so depraved that it is no longer depraved nor grows, but only in *effects,* when from an equal will it always does more evils. And because punishment regards not only the intensity of the will but also the exterior *act,* therefore the devil is more grievously punished from the evils which he commits. As the ground of this position they assign the simplicity and spirituality of the angel, which has nothing retarding; and therefore wholly and at its term he converts himself in the first conversion; man, however, [does] not so.

The position of others is this: that in the evil angels, speaking simply, malice and the disorder of evil will *grows.* For as is evident from the preceding problem, the devil sins continually and daily devises new malices. And since, because we do evils, we are evil, and every evil takes away from the aptitude of the will, because otherwise it would not be evil: therefore the aptitude is always lessened, and the will is more and more disordered. Nor is it the same with the good [angels], because a good work does not so add to the goodness of grace or of will as every sin takes away.

But since it seems harsh to say that the devil's malice is not intensified, since it is said in the Psalm: *The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually,* and it is expounded of demons; and again it seems unreasonable that malice should grow in the devil just as in a pure wayfarer, since he is already in the state of damnation and has a necessity to certain evils; therefore there is a third manner of speaking, that in the devil malice of will grows as to the *administrative power,* by which he is turned toward man, but not as to the *contemplative power,* by which he is simply and necessarily turned away from God.

The ground of this position is this. For the increase of evil will or of demerit an *inordinate affection* does not suffice, because this is in the damned and will be forever, but there is further required the *time* of merit and the *state* of meriting or demeriting. But the devil is in the state of demeriting as to the *administrative power,* not as to the *contemplative;* and therefore both demerit and sin grow as to the *administrative power,* not as to the *contemplative.* — The ground of this is evident if there be recalled to memory the things said before in the solution of the preceding first problem, where mention was made of the prefixing of a time for meriting to the angel himself. For it was said that an angel was constituted spiritual and incorruptible and near to glory; therefore a short time was prefixed for him, but for man a long term. But since God so founded the universe that the greater and more powerful should help the lesser; therefore He gave to the angel not only the contemplative power, by which he might merit and be turned to God, but also the administrative, by which he might assist man. Since therefore the contemplative power was the angel's own in himself, as to it a span of meriting was prefixed up to the first conversion or aversion. But since the administrative has a regard to man, there was prefixed to the angels a span of meriting, until men should be wholly assumed into glory. There remained therefore, as to that power, the state of meriting or demeriting, and it remains until the day of judgment. — But since merit and demerit are not in the administrative power except through the contemplative power, and in the good [angels] the contemplative is so turned to good that it cannot be turned away; therefore the administrative has only a place of *meriting*. On the contrary, since in the evil [ones] the contemplative is so turned away that it cannot be converted, therefore as to the administrative it has only a place and span of *demeriting.* And in this it is evident that the divine decree remains just and inviolate, because the time which it had prefixed from [their] founding ought not to be taken away either from the good or from the evil. And for those indeed who love God that span was turned into good, but for the impious and sinful angels it was turned into evil. And therefore it is evident in what manner the evil will grows in the evil [ones], namely as to the administrative power alone. — Nor is it altogether the same in the good and the evil, because the will in the good [angels], on account of the perfect influence, immediately arrives at its term; and therefore, although they do more goods, yet the good will is not on this account intensified. But in the evil [ones] it is not so, because the corruption comes from themselves; and they could not so infect themselves but that [they do so] still more, as long as the time lasts. Whence both the *stain* grows in them and also the appetite of harming and of dominating men; not so in the good angels.

The reasons proving that the evil will in demons is intensified and grows are therefore to be granted, yet as to the administrative power, or in comparison to man.

To that, then, which is objected, that he is moved inordinately against God; it must be said that, just as in the damned the inordinate motion of the will is turned into punishment and is imputed to chastisement, not to demerit; so in the evil angels that inordinate motion is turned into punishment.

To that which is objected, that in every sin God is despised; it must be said that there is no sin but that the contemplative power is present, and but that it is against God in some way; but yet these are distinguished from one another as to the principality of the acts. For some sin is said to be against God, some against the neighbor; some as to the administrative power, some as to the contemplative power; and according as they are distinguished, so we speak.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that opposites are by nature produced about the same thing; it must be said that this has an instance [i.e. a counterexample] in inseparable accidents, whether it be inseparable by nature or by *acquisition.* Since therefore in the good angels grace is [present] inseparably, therefore it is impossible that fault be present. The contrary is to be understood in the evil angels. For an inseparable accident is either *natural* or *quasi-converted into nature;* and in those things which are present naturally, that maxim has an instance even according to the Philosopher.

2. To that which is objected concerning the state of a dead man, it is now evident that it is not the same, because he simply went out of the state of merit, an angel [does] not.

3. To that which is objected concerning the good angels, that the good will is not increased in them; it is evident that it is not the same, because the good will is not so from the *work* as malice [is].

4. To that which is objected concerning the simplicity of the angel, it must be said that that argument fails in two ways: *first,* because the deliberative will, since it is free, is not moved according to its whole power, although it has nothing retarding; and this is manifest, because an angel loves one more than another, and hates one more than another; but this would not be so if it were moved wholly into [each and] every one. And therefore the argument is not valid. *Furthermore,* there is another defect there, because, granted that he turned himself in the first time as much as he could, he could still [do so] *more*, since *to be able to sin* is *to be able to fail* and *to be able to be moved inordinately;* and although he cannot be moved more intensely as to the motion, he can nevertheless be more disordered, because proneness and inclination to evil can always grow. And so that [point] is evident.

5. To that which is objected, that he cannot avoid [sin]; it must be said that it is false. For although he cannot change the malice of the will, he can nevertheless cease from the harm which he does to man. And *furthermore*, he led himself into this necessity and does not repent, and therefore he is not excused; for no one is excused by an induced necessity, unless he repent of the inducing [of it].

6. To that which is objected, that the devil is wholly incapable of grace; it must be said that the evil will does not grow as to the incapacity of receiving grace, because this is equally [so] in all the damned; but [it grows] as to unworthiness; and the devil is unworthy and can be more unworthy, according as he more offends and abuses the natural goods given to *him*.

---