Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the immutability of free choice both in the confirmed and in the obstinate.*

Consequently it is asked, secondly, concerning the immutability of free choice both in the confirmed and in the obstinate. And granted that the angels in their [original] condition had free choice, just as man [does], three things are asked here.

The first is whether confirmation has changed the freedom of choice.

The second is whether obstinacy takes away the use of freedom.

The third is whether the one or the other lessens the dominion of freedom.

### Question I. *Whether confirmation changes the freedom of choice*

Concerning the first it is thus proceeded and asked, whether confirmation changes the freedom of choice, such that it is one [thing] before confirmation and another after. And that it [does], it seems.

1. Vertibility [changeableness] is present in created free choice by nature, therefore that which takes away vertibility from free choice changes and alters its nature; but confirmation takes this away from free choice: therefore it changes and alters [it].

2. Likewise, nothing one and the same, remaining the same, can participate in opposite differences; but *mutable* and *immutable* are opposite differences of being, as *mortal* and *immortal* [are differences] of the living thing: if therefore free choice before confirmation is mutable, after confirmation immutable: therefore it is one [thing] and another.

3. Likewise, "rational powers are toward opposites," as the Philosopher says: therefore when a power ceases to be toward opposites, it ceases to be rational; but after confirmation free choice ceases to be toward opposites: therefore it ceases to be a rational power. But no rational power can become non-rational while remaining the same: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, "powers are distinguished through acts, and acts through objects"; where therefore there are diverse objects, it is necessary that the powers too be diversified; but free choice before confirmation can [tend] toward evil,

after confirmation it cannot: therefore it is one [thing] and another.

**On the contrary:** 1. Anselm, *On Free Choice*, says that "free choice is the power of preserving rectitude for its own sake"; but this power is not taken away in confirmation, but strengthened: therefore free choice is not changed.

2. Likewise, grace perfects and confirms nature; but nothing which perfects and completes another according to nature changes its nature: therefore grace, coming to free choice, does not change it. But confirmation is through grace: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that confirms another is preserving [it]; and nothing preserving is corrupting; and nothing changes anything unless it corrupts something, because there is no change without loss: therefore nothing confirming changes [anything]. But confirmation is so called because it confirms the free choice of the angel: therefore it does not change it.

4. Likewise, the grace of confirmation makes [one] to be free from misery in the angels, just as sanctifying grace makes [one] free from fault; but freedom from fault does not change free choice nor its freedom: therefore neither [does] freedom from misery: therefore neither [does] the grace of confirmation.

### Conclusion

> *Free choice is not changed by confirmation as to substance, but only as to state.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the change of anything is twofold: in one way as to *substance* or essence, in another way as to *state*; or in other words: there is being-changed as to *first being,* and there is being-changed as to *well-being.* — If we speak of change in the *first* way, then without doubt it must be said that confirmation does not change free choice, since it perfects and preserves [it]; as the reasons adduced in the second place [the *Contra*] show. But if we speak of change in the *second* way, namely as to *state* or *well-being*; then likewise without doubt it is plain that free choice has another *state* and another completion than it would have had before. — But this change is not opposed by the reasons adduced in the second place, but only by the *first* [set], on which the question was determined toward the negative part, namely that free choice through confirmation, although it be altered, nevertheless does not become another [thing].

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that vertibility is natural to free choice; it must be said that something is natural on account of the *completion* of nature, as for fire, that it tend upward; something natural on account of the *defect* of nature, as for fire the being able to be extinguished. So in free choice there is something natural on account of the *completion* of nature, as the being able [to tend] toward good; something on account of the *defect* of nature, as the being able to be turned toward evil. — To that which is objected, that something is changed according to substance when it loses that which it has by nature; it must be said that, although this can have truth in that natural [feature] which follows upon *completion,* it is nevertheless not true in that which follows upon *defect*; and such a thing is vertibility. For as Anselm says, "*to be able to sin* is not freedom nor a part of freedom."

2. To that which is objected concerning the opposition of differences, it must be said that, just as *mortal* and *immortal* can be compared to a living substance in two ways, so [can] *mutable* and *immutable* to freedom. For if mortal and immortal are each by *nature,* then they state opposite differences, essentially diversifying their supposits. But if mortal be by nature, [and] immortal by a grace taking away the defect of nature; then they are not opposite differences, but are compossible; or at least, that which is under the one can be under the other, by mere otherness as to *well-being* or the completion of grace. In this manner mutable and immutable by *nature* are impossible to be about the same [thing], remaining the same, neither simultaneously nor successively; but mutable by *nature,* [and] immutable by *grace,* are not so opposed nor essentially distinguished; and therefore they do not alter free choice according to substance.

3. To that which is objected, that rational powers are toward opposites; it must be said that it is true; but not toward *all* opposites, but toward *some,* as toward *to do* something and *not to do,* toward *to cut* a tunic and *not to cut,* as the Philosopher himself says. And in this manner confirmed free choice can be toward

opposites, and therefore [it] is a natural power as also before. — As for what is objected, then: it is not toward evil and good, therefore it is not toward opposites; it is manifest that this argument is fallacious *by [the fallacy of the] consequent.*

4. To that which is objected concerning the diversity of object, that confirmed free choice is not toward evil; it must be said that this has truth concerning the object *per se;* but evil is not the object per se of free choice, insofar as it is *free,* but only insofar as it is *deficient.* And therefore it does not follow, if it cannot [tend] toward evil, that it is not free or that it is another [thing]; but it follows that it is not deficient, the influence of the hand of the Omnipotent confirming [it], which in no way allows [it] to fail, although the free [will] has the *being-able* and the *willing.*