Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether obstinacy takes from demons the use of freedom*

Secondly it is asked whether obstinacy takes from demons the use of freedom. And that it [does], it seems.

1. "Free choice, as Anselm says, is the power of preserving rectitude," therefore the preserving of rectitude is the use of free choice; but this the obstinate angels do not have nor can have: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Anselm: "The power of sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom," therefore to sin is in no way to use freedom; but the demons through free choice never do an act which is not sin, nor can they do [otherwise] on account of obstinacy in evil: therefore they have lost the use of freedom.

3. Likewise, to will freely and to will necessarily are opposites; but the demons necessarily have an evil will: therefore they necessarily will evil, therefore not freely. But to will freely is the use of freedom: therefore they have lost the use of freedom.

4. Likewise, the frenzied and the insane do not have the use of freedom, since in them the phantastic appetite reigns more than the rational; but "in the demons there is irrational fury, mad concupiscence, wanton phantasy," as Dionysius says: therefore it seems that they have lost the use of free choice.

5. Likewise, beasts do not have the use of free choice, because they are moved according to impulse: but the devil is moved by a greater impulse to do evil than a beast: therefore he does not have the use of freedom. And that he is moved by a greater impulse, [thus] it seems. In the book of *Eighty-three Questions* Augustine says: "We see most ferocious beasts drawn away from the greatest pleasures by fear of punishments"; but the devil by fear of punishment does not give up being proud: therefore he is borne into evil by a greater impulse.

**On the contrary:** 1. In whatever there is use of reason and of appetite, there is use of free choice; but in the demons there is use of reason, because they confer and dispose [things]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, to him who does not have the use of free choice

nothing that he does is imputed; but to the obstinate demons the evils which they do are imputed: therefore they have the use [of it].

3. Likewise, an incorruptible power not bound to an organ is always in its act and use; but free choice in the demons is of this kind: therefore it can in no way be impeded from its use.

4. Likewise, nothing that is caused by the use of free choice and cannot be caused without it takes away the use of free choice; but obstinacy is of this kind: therefore obstinacy does not take away the use of free choice. The *first* [premise] is evident of itself, because a proper effect does not destroy its cause; the *second* is evident, because obstinacy is from an evil will.

5. Likewise, *by the things by which one sins, one ought to be punished*; but the demon sinned by free choice: therefore he ought to be punished in it; therefore the demon has free choice; and it is established that it is not idle: therefore it has some use.

### Conclusion

> *Obstinacy does not take from demons every use of free choice, but only the act ordered to the end.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, although "use" is said in many ways, as was treated in the first book, nevertheless for the present it suffices that the use of any power is said in two ways: in one way, *an act elicited by the power,* in another way, *an act elicited by the power toward the end for which it is.* Speaking in the first way, the use of free choice is to will or choose freely. In the second way, the use of free choice is to preserve rectitude, since it is for that. It must therefore be said that obstinacy does not take from demons the use in the first way, because they freely will what they will; but the use in the second way, thus [it does], because their power, although it goes forth into act, nevertheless [does] not into an act ordered to the end. But the reasons proving that the demons have the use of free choice proceed concerning use according to the first way; whence they are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected on the opposite side concerning Anselm, it must be said that Anselm defines free choice through the act ordered to the end, which is to preserve rectitude, and so as to use in the second way said, and this the obstinate demons lose.

2. To that which is objected, that the power of sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom; it must be said that it is true; nevertheless it is never without freedom, just as neither is to sin without the use of freedom or of a free will. For everyone who sins, wills freely. And therefore the continuation of sin does not exclude the use of free choice, but includes [it].

3. To that which is objected, that to will freely and to will necessarily are opposed; it must be said that necessity is twofold: one [kind is] from an *extrinsic* cause, as the necessity of coercion, and this is opposed to that which is to will freely; but another is from an *intrinsic* disposition, and this is not opposed, but rather stands together with freedom; such [a necessity] is in the free choice of the demons, which has so glued evil to itself that it in no way wills to be separated from it.

4. To that which is objected concerning the frenzied, it must be said that the frenzied so have the use of phantasy that the use of reason is *absorbed,* and they are more acted-upon than they act; but the demon so has a wanton phantasy that the use and act of reason is *not excluded.* For that wantonness is rather from free choice than from an infirmity of nature, as we posit in the frenzied [man].

5. To that which is objected concerning beasts, that they are drawn away, therefore they are moved by a lesser impulse; it must be said that that is moved by impulse which has nothing drawing [it] back. But to have something drawing back is twofold, namely *within* and *without*; and the impulse which more opposes free choice is that which excludes the *interior* restraint, not that which excludes the *exterior.* Since therefore the impulse of a beast excludes the restraint *within,* although it can be drawn back by that which is *without*; therefore it does not have free choice. But the demon has an *interior* power, through which, without anything exterior repelling, it can be drawn back, and which can be overcome by nothing extrinsic; and therefore the impulse of the demons toward evil does not oppose free choice, but is consonant [with it]; and so that [point] is evident.