Dist. 7, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p1-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether confirmation in good, or obstinacy in evil, lessens the dominion of freedom*

Thirdly it is asked whether confirmation, or obstinacy, lessens the dominion of freedom. And that confirmation lessens [it], it seems.

1. A power is more free and more the mistress of its own acts which is subject to no necessity at all, than [one] which is subject [to it]; but confirmed free choice has a necessity to doing good, whereas the non-confirmed [has it] not at all: therefore confirmation lessens dominion.

2. Likewise, the ampler a power, the more free; but confirmation constricts free choice to good, whereas before it was indifferent to good and to evil: therefore it seems that it was more free before and more the master of [its] acts.

3. Likewise, a power which goes forth into act of itself is more the mistress of its own acts than [one] which goes forth by means of another's benefit or grace; but non-confirmed free choice of itself did what it willed, whereas confirmed [free choice] fulfils what it does through grace; therefore it was more free before confirmation than after.

Likewise, this same [thing] is seen concerning *obstinacy*:

1. First, through Anselm, who says that "the power of sinning, added to free choice, lessens it," therefore much more the act of sinning, therefore most of all the necessity of sinning; but this is [present] in obstinacy: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, a thing is more free which is subject to no servitude, than [one] which is subject; but free choice in the obstinate is subject to the servitude of sin, whereas before [it was] not at all: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, a power is more free the more easily it goes forth into the act for which it is, and so much the less free, the more difficult it is toward it; but it is most difficult for an obstinate angel to will good: therefore it seems that in them free choice is most of all lessened.

**On the contrary:** That obstinacy does not lessen [it], it seems.

4. Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*: "The gifts given to the angels themselves," he says, "we say are by no means changed, but are entire and most splendid"; therefore if free choice was given to them naturally, then it is not lessened.

5. Likewise, free choice is called free because it cannot be coerced; therefore if freedom is lessened, some coercion is introduced; but the free choice of the obstinate can in no way be coerced: therefore it can in no way be lessened.

6. Likewise, if it is lessened through obstinacy and sin, then since it is not infinite, it could be wholly taken away: therefore it seems that the demons would at some time lose free choice, which was disproved above.

But that confirmation does not lessen [it], but increases [it], it seems:

4. Through Anselm in the book *On Free Choice*, who says thus: "That which has what is fitting and expedient and cannot lose it is more free than that which can [lose it]"; but confirmed free choice cannot lose the justice and rectitude which it is expedient and fitting to have, [whereas] non-confirmed [free choice] can: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, the more a thing is assimilated to that which is free at the term of freedom, the more free it is; but confirmed free choice is more as-

similated to God and His choice than non-confirmed [free choice]: therefore it is more free.

6. Likewise, every power which has a disposition elevating [it] and rendering [it] easy toward that for which it is, is more free than [one] which lacks [it]; but confirmed free choice is so disposed with respect to the non-confirmed: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion

> *The dominion of freedom which is opposed to the servitude of coercion is lessened neither by confirmation nor by obstinacy; but the dominion which is opposed to the servitude of subjection is increased by confirmation, lessened by obstinacy.*

**I respond:** It must be said that, when it is asked concerning the lessening of the dominion of the freedom of choice, a distinction must be made in "dominion." For one [kind] is the dominion which is opposed to *coercion*; another, [the one] which is opposed to *subjection.* Now if we speak of the dominion of freedom which is opposed to the servitude of *coercion,* thus it excludes coercion; and this dominion is essential to free choice, and therefore is neither lessened nor increased. Again, since it excludes all coercion, it is equally in all, both good and evil, both in the Creator and in creatures, as Bernard says in the book *On Free Choice*, where he says that "the freedom of the will remains as entire in the evil as in the good, as [much] in the Creator as in creatures." — But if "dominion" be taken [as] that which is opposed to the servitude of *subjection,* thus it admits of more and less and is not equally present in all. For in the *miserable* it is subject to misery, in the *blessed* free; in the *evil* subject to fault, in the *good* free, and so much the more free, the more they are distant from evil; in *creatures* subject to commands, but in *God* above every command. And taking "dominion" in this manner, by confirmation it is increased, which more removes [one] from the subjection of fault and misery, and by obstinacy it is lessened, which submits the neck to both. — The reasons, therefore, that obstinacy lessens and confirmation increases [it] are to be granted, because they proceed by this way, and therefore conclude truly.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that confirmation lessens [it] on account of necessity; it must be said that the necessity *of immutability toward good* in no way is repugnant to free choice, neither insofar as it is free from *coercion,* because coercion is from outside; nor insofar as it is free from *fault* or *misery,* and therefore it does not lessen [it]. That proposition, then, has truth only concerning the necessity *of coercion,* or *of proneness to evil.*

2. To that which is objected concerning amplitude, it must be said that for a power to be made ampler is twofold: either with respect to those things of which *to be able is [really] to be able,* and concerning such it is true; or with respect to those things of which *to be able is not [really] to be able, but to fail*; and with respect to such it is not true, and such is evil. Whence the divine power, which is most ample and most free, is not [a power] with respect to evil.

3. To that which is objected concerning benefit and grace, it must be said that this is true, if it could [do] equally well of itself as it can with grace; but this is not true, because that benefit of grace elevates the power to those things to which it was [ordered] and of itself could not attain.

4. To that which is objected, that obstinacy does not lessen [it], because the gifts remain entire; it must be said that that is to be understood as to the *substance* of the natural [endowments], not as to the *aptitudes,* as will be seen better below.

5. To that which is objected, that freedom is dominion on account of the privation of coercion; it must be said that as to that it is not lessened, as was said before.

6. To that which is objected, that freedom could be wholly taken away; it must be said that this is true of that [freedom] which is lessened, such as freedom from *fault* and *misery*; but of the other it is not true; and so that [point] is evident.

The literal points too are all evident through these things said.

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