Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the cognition of demons.*
### Question I. *Whether deception falls upon demons concerning present things*

That deception falls upon demons concerning present things, it seems.

1. Romans 1: *Because they did not approve to have God in [their] knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense;* the Apostle says this of men. If therefore God is equally or more severe toward the angels, then it seems that they were given up to a reprobate sense; but in all such [cases] error falls: therefore, etc. *If you say* that this is understood of sense in things-to-be-done, not in things-to-be-known; *on the contrary:* Augustine says on Genesis according to the letter that "the evil angels are understood by darkness, but the good by light"; but darkness signifies privation of light rather than of heat: therefore it seems that their cognition is darkened, therefore also subject to error.

2. Likewise, it seems that it is utterly subject to error, because Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, says that "in the demons there is irrational fury, mad concupiscence, wanton phantasy"; but phantasy is the source of error: therefore it seems that their reason is utterly subjugated to error.

3. Likewise, *by a likeness.* Upon man, for sin, was inflicted ignorance not only of things-to-be-done, but also of things-to-be-known: therefore since the angelic sin ought to be punished no less, [the conclusion] is evident, etc.

4. Likewise, this is seen *by a likeness.* As affect is related to good, so intellect to truth;

but the affect of the demons is so depressed that it cannot be moved into the love of good, or is moved inordinately, if it loves: therefore neither [can] the intellect [be moved] into the speculation of truth. *If you say* that sin corrupts the affect of the demons more than the intellect; *the contrary is seen:* for every depraved choice is preceded by a depraved judgment, because the will does not choose deliberatively unless a judgment precede: therefore it seems that the first ground of disordering is in the judgment, and so in the cognitive [power]: therefore the punishment ought to be more in [it] than in the will, or equally. Likewise, this is confirmed, because blinding and obstinacy are punishments of sin: therefore just as affection presupposes cognition, so obstinacy, which is the punishment of the affection, [presupposes] blinding, which is the punishment of cognition: therefore since the devil is obstinate, he is also blinded.

5. Likewise, "*the good is diffusive of itself*" and the true likewise, and the good is more diffusive of itself than the true, because this it has of its own account: therefore God, insofar as He is good, withdraws the influence of affective goodness from the demons themselves; therefore, insofar as He is truth, [He withdraws] the diffusion of light from their cognitive [power].

6. Likewise, whatever [be the case] concerning the conservation of the light given, nevertheless to the demons, since they are in the state of damnation, new gifts ought not to be given by God; but "no one can learn anything except with Christ teaching," as Augustine says in the book *On the Teacher*: therefore if Christ ought not to give them new gifts, then neither new cognition: therefore in those things which they did not know before the fall, since they have no teacher of truth, they necessarily err and are deceived.

**On the contrary:** 1. In Luke 16 it is said that *the children of this world are wiser than the children of light in their generation;* he speaks of the evil [ones]: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*: "The gifts given to them themselves we say are by no means changed, but are entire and most splendid"; he speaks of the demons: therefore if they had a natural power of judgment, illuminated and able to be directed in things-to-be-known, it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, Isidore, *On the Highest Good*: "The transgressing angels, even with sanctity sent away, did not lose the sense of the angelic nature."

4. Likewise, sin is not against the *act,* but against the *order of the act*: therefore it is not against cognition simply, but against cognition ordered to the end: if therefore speculative cognition, as far as it is of itself, does not state cognition ordered to the end, it is evident that by sin it ought not to be depraved.

### Conclusion

> *In the demons the judgment of the speculative intellect, although it remains entire as to the substance of the power, is nevertheless in some way darkened by fault; but the judgment of the practical intellect is wholly subverted.*

**I respond:** It must be said that deception and error come from the disordering or deviation of judgment. Now judgment is twofold in every reasoning [being]: one, which is of *things-to-be-known,* which is of the true under the account of the true; another, of *things-to-be-done,* under the account of the good. And the first belongs to the *speculative* intellect and does not pertain to free choice; the second belongs to the *practical* intellect and is a part of free choice.

The first judgment, although it remains entire as to the *substance of the power,* is nevertheless in some way *darkened* in the angels by fault; because they frequently err in judging about many things and are deceived in many [things], especially when they judge about contingent [things]. The other judgment is in them wholly *subverted*; and as to this the evil angels are *blinded,* just as as to the affect [they are] *obstinate*; and on account of the subversion of this judgment they are said to have been made *darkness* and *given up to a reprobate sense.*

1. And so the response to the first [objection] is evident.

2. To that which is objected from Dionysius, that there is in the demons a *wanton phantasy*; it must be said that "phantasy" is taken in two ways: sometimes for the *sensitive* power, collating the sensibles received; sometimes phantasy is called *appearance,* according as it is named from *phanos*, which is "appearance"; and in the first way it is in corporeal [things] alone, in the second way in spirits. Now this phantasy is said to be *wanton* in the demons, since, although the demons are intelligent and know many true [things], nevertheless they do not wish to teach others, but to seduce [them] from the truth; and therefore, since they cannot [do so] except through apparent likenesses, hence it is that

the study of the demons is most of all bent upon such [things] — like a great cleric who would want to lead others into paralogism [and so] would study sophisms — and therefore they are called *phantastic* on account of the phantastic and apparent reasonings which they devise. And He calls this phantasy *wanton,* because, although by their own judgment they know the truth, nevertheless they knowingly impugn the known [truth]; and this is *to be wanton,* namely to set oneself against the understood truth; therefore they have a *wanton phantasy.* They also have *mad concupiscence,* because, since they ought not to desire anything but the honorable and the profitable, they desire things most harmful, such as to sin and to cast others into sin, although they do not intend this finally. There is also *irrational fury,* because, since they ought by reason to be angry at evil [things] alone, they are angry and rage against good [things].

3. To that which is objected, that upon man was inflicted ignorance as to the speculative intellect; it must be said that this is true in [his] posterity; but upon Adam was not *inflicted* ignorance of *things-to-be-known,* because he had cognition innate to him. Likewise also the demons, because they had cognition innate to them, and God scarcely withdraws their natural gifts, namely those freely given; therefore He did not so *inflict* ignorance in the *speculative* intellect; but yet there was an enacted punishment of ignorance and blindness in the *practical* intellect. But upon little children He is said to *inflict* ignorance, not by withdrawing knowledge, but by not adding [it]. *Furthermore,* the mass of corrupt flesh weighs down the judgment of the intellect; and therefore it is not the same.

4. To that which is objected, that the affect is deprived of the rectitude of the will; it must be said that sin regards the will more and is more directly opposed to the *goodness of affection* than to the *truth of cognition*; and therefore the demons are not so deprived of the light of cognition by fault as of the goodness of affection. Nevertheless, as was touched on before, there is a certain judgment which is conjoined to the will, and it is subverted in the evil angels and blinded. And therefore the solution to the [other] two following [objections] is evident.

5. To that which is objected, that the good is diffusive of itself; it must be said that there is speaking of the diffusion of *good simply,* or of *gratuitous good.* If we speak of the diffusion of *good simply,* the account of good extends to as many [things] as that of the true, because each is convertible with being and [is] in all beings. But if [we speak] of the diffusion of *gratuitous good,* it is not true; because there are many who are fit to receive intelligence, who nevertheless are not fit to receive grace.

6. To that which is objected, that gifts ought not to be given to them; it must be said that "gift" can be taken in two ways: *properly* and *commonly.* Properly a gift is called that which is simply from elsewhere, of which kind are infused graces or infused gifts; and such is sanctifying grace or [grace] enabling for it. In another way a gift is called that which is through divine help, yet nevertheless through our own acquisition; and that is not called *properly* a gift, but [only] with respect to this, that it is not acquired without God's help; and in this way God gives gifts to good and evil [alike]. For since God gave the light of cognition from the beginning, which could [extend] to the acquisition of many knowables; and He Himself does not withdraw what He *gave,* nor even [its] *conservation,* since such [things] can stand with mortal sin: therefore he who has the first gift can multiply [it], even being a reprobate; and God is said *to teach,* not by *inspiring* or infusing, but by *cooperating* with the light given and *conserving* it. — An example of this is: God gave *grain* to a miser and gave *land* able to bear fruit; when he gathers much corn from the good land, God gives, but not as if He Himself made barren land bear fruit without the casting of seed; for this would *properly* be a gift, [whereas] in the first way only *broadly* [so]. So God gives gifts to good and evil [alike], and to demons and men [alike], although these very [gifts] are turned into evil for them.

But to those things which are objected on the opposite side, it must be said that they are understood of the speculative judgment; yet of that it is not to be understood that it is more vigorous than in the good [angels], or even as much [as] before the fall, because in truth, although they know many [things] clearly, especially those whose cognition is innate to them, by reason of which Dionysius says that they have the [gifts] given to them entire; nevertheless in many [things] those unspeakable spirits err and are deceived, because they are presumptuous and curious, and therefore frequently judge about things which are not subject to their judgment; and therefore they slip from the path of truth into error. And so all the objections are clear.