Dist. 7, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p2-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the power of the demons.*

Next, it is asked concerning the second article, namely *on the power of the demons*. Concerning which there are three things sought.

The first is, as it were, a preamble: whether the induction of every form is from the Creator, or whether some are from a created agent.

The second is whether the induction of true forms is from the evil spirit.

The third is whether anyone can use the ministry of the demons in such works without sin.

### Question I. *Whether all forms are induced by the Creator, or by a created agent.*

First, then, it is asked whether the induction of every form is from the Creator, or whether some particular or created agent can induce one. And that every form is from the Creator, seems thus:

**For the opposite side:**

1. First, by the *authority* of the Lord in John: *My Father works until now, and I also work*; but if things were produced as to their form by nature, God would not on that account be said to *work until now*: therefore it seems that every form is from him.

2. Likewise, by *reason* it seems thus. The form is a nobler principle than matter, and says something more divine: therefore since nature cannot do the lesser thing — for she cannot produce matter, which is by creation alone — much more does it seem so of form.

3. Likewise, « *the principles of things are incorruptible* », as the Philosopher holds; therefore both matter and form; but the incorruptible is ungenerable: therefore both matter and form are ungenerable: therefore if it is brought into being, this will not be by nature, but only by creation.

4. Likewise, every action of a creature is terminated at *this something*; but form is not *this something*: therefore it is not terminated at form. Therefore since natural production is terminated at that which is produced by nature, it is impossible for form to be produced by a created agent; nor matter — this is plain; and everything which is produced is produced according to one of these: therefore nothing.

5. Likewise, when a form is produced, it is either *from something* or *from nothing*. If *from something*; but everything which is from something has something constitutive of itself as an intrinsic principle: therefore form is composed of matter and form, which is absurd. If *from nothing*; but everything which is created from nothing is from the Creator: therefore no form is from a created agent.

6. Likewise, when a form is in the potency of matter, it is either in the potency *in which*, or *by which*, or *out of which*. Not *out of which*; this has been proved, since form has no material principle of which it is constituted, but rather *consists in a simple essence*: therefore *in which* or *by which*. Not *by which*, because it is not the function of matter to act: therefore only in potency *as in which*. But a form which is only in potency *as in which* is wholly from outside; and no such form is natural or from nature: therefore no created agent can produce a natural form.

**On the contrary:**

**Fundamenta:**

1. Every thing, as Damascene and the Philosopher will have it, has its own operation; otherwise something in nature would be idle; but every operation of a good thing is *operative*, otherwise it is in vain: therefore it seems that every thing can produce something or can operate toward the production of something — either of matter or of form; not of matter: therefore of form.

2. Likewise, « *the corruption of one is the generation of its contrary* » — for cold is never cast out except by the introduction of heat, nor the reverse — but it is plain that a created agent can cast out and corrupt the contrary: therefore it can introduce itself or its like.

3. Likewise, it is certain that the hot heats — he who does not know this lacks sense — therefore the heat of fire generates heat: therefore by parity of reason by which the hot generates the hot, fire generates fire, since it is of no lesser power.

4. Likewise, it is certain that an object generates a likeness of itself in a mirror — which is clear: if the object is removed, no likeness will reflect there — therefore by parity of reason, if disposed matter is at hand, an agent can generate the *like* of itself in nature: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *A particular created agent can educe substantial forms — at least corporeal ones — which are in the potency of matter, not only* in which *and* by which *in some manner, but also* out of which, *insofar as they are in matter according to seminal reasons.*

**I respond:** It must be said on this point that there were four positions concerning the eduction of form into being.

**Some posited a hiding of forms**, as is imputed to Anaxagoras. And what he posited can be understood in two ways: either that forms actually exist in matter perceptibly, but do not appear outwardly, like a picture covered by a cloth; and this mode is altogether impossible, because then contraries

would be placed at once in the same thing. The other way it can be understood is that the essences of forms are in matter in potency, not only *latent*, but *existing* in potency — so that matter has in itself the seminal reasons of all forms, implanted in it from its primary condition; and this accords with philosophy and with sacred Scripture; and by the agent's action they are educed into act. But this was not the meaning of this position, but the first, according to what the expositors say. For this position was that a particular agent *does nothing, but only uncovers*.

**The second position was that of more modern philosophers, that all forms are from the Creator.** And this position can be understood in two ways: in one way, that God is *principally* the agent and producer in the eduction of every thing — and so it holds true; or that God is *the whole efficient cause*, and the particular agent does nothing except adapt matter — as he produces the rational soul, so also the other forms; and this meaning seems to have been that of those philosophers. — And this meaning is impossible, because a particular agent either induces *something*, or *nothing*. And if nothing: then it does nothing. If it induces something: then it seems that it produces some disposition; but by what reason it can do this for one, it can also for another. Therefore that position is not reasonable.

**The third position is that the natural forms — almost all of them, at least the corporeal — such as the forms of the elements and the forms of mixtures, are in the potency of matter and by the action of the particular agent are educed into act**; and this is the position which the Philosopher seems to have held, and which now the doctors in philosophy and theology commonly hold. — But yet this has two ways.

For some say that such forms are in matter in a *receptive* potency and in some way *active* or *cooperative*; because matter both has the possibility of receiving, and also an inclination to cooperate; and in the agent there is the form to be produced as in an effective and original principle, because every form by the nature of its species receives the power of multiplying itself; whence the induction of the form is from the agent multiplying its form. And they give the example of a candle, in which manner one ignites many, and from one object many images shine forth in many mirrors. And such forms, as they say, have *that out of which* they are not *materially*, but *that out of which originally*; and therefore they are not said to be created, nor to be from nothing. For that is created which in no way is; but such a form thus produced is in some way — both by reason of the agent and by reason of the matter.

**The other way is that forms are in the potency of matter not only** in which **and** by which **in some manner, but also** out of which. And this they say, not because the essence itself of matter is that out of which the thing is produced, but because in matter itself there is something concreated, out of which the agent, while it acts on matter, educes form; not, I say, out of that as out of something which is, as it were, some part of the form to be produced, but because it can be form and becomes form — as the bud of a rose becomes a rose. And this position holds that in matter there are the *truths* of all forms to be produced naturally; and when one is produced, no *quiddity*, no *truth* of essence is induced anew, but a *new disposition* is given to it, so that what was in potency may become in act. For *act* and *potency* differ, not because they bespeak different *quiddities*, but different *dispositions* of the same; yet these dispositions are not *accidental* but *substantial*. And this is no great matter, if it is in the power of a created agent that what is in one way may be made to be in another.

And this position, among all the foregoing, seems to be more intelligible and closer to the truth. This position I believe must be held, not only because reason recommends it, but also because the authority of Augustine on *Genesis according to the Letter*, which the Master cites, confirms it: that « *what are produced by nature are produced according to seminal reasons* ». But what these *seminal reasons* are, will be seen below, when the discourse will be of them. — According to this position, then, it must be held that the particular agent educes for-

ms and induces and produces natural things. And the reasons brought forward for this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To the objection that God works *until now*: it must be said that this is true, since either he works by himself or together with others; whence the argument is not valid: God works until now, therefore the created agent does not cooperate with him.

*To 2.* To the objection that it cannot act upon matter: it must be said that the case is not parallel, because the *material principle* is not in another as in a potency, since it is of itself potency: for then potency would be in potency, and potency would be educed from potency — which is unintelligible. It is otherwise with form, as has been seen; and therefore the case is not parallel. — One may also take a reason from the side of the *agent*, because the production of a creature, since it is a *limited* agent, is the production of *like from like*: but it is clear that nothing acts by reason of *matter* but by reason of *form*: therefore it has more power over form than over matter.

*To 3.* To the objection that the principles of things are incorruptible: this is understood *in the universal*, not *in the particular*; or it is understood according to *essence*, not according to *being*; and therefore the form in the particular is generated and corrupted. — Or it can be said that its *essence* remains in potency after corruption, as it did before generation.

*To 4.* To the objection that the action of nature is terminated at *this something*: it must be said that, as the Philosopher says, properly speaking, « *form is not generated, but the composite* ». For when form is produced, it is not produced *in itself* nor *per se*, but as *in matter*; and so it makes the composite, and generation is terminated at that; nevertheless natural generation or production looks to the composite *principally for the sake of form*.

*To 5.* To the objection whether *from something* or *from nothing*: it must be said that according to the third position forms are produced *from something*, but not from something *materially* or *constitutively*, but from something *originally*. Or according to the fourth opinion they come about *from something*: not that *from* signifies a *part*, but signifies *consubstantiality*, as a rose from a bud, because the bud becomes a rose.

*To 6.* And by this is plain the *last point*. For I concede that natural forms are in matter as to potency both *in which*, and *out of which*, and *by which*, according to the aforesaid mode. And if you object that matter does not act or constitute: it must be said that the *essence* of matter only holds itself *after the manner of the receptive*; but the implanted *seedbed* holds itself in some way after the manner of the *active*, in some way after the manner of the *passive*, because it cooperates with the agent, and nevertheless is itself varied from one disposition into another, as has been said. — This therefore is the sum of the position: that the created agent produces *no quiddity* at all, neither *substantial* nor *accidental*, but makes that which is under one disposition to be under another.