Dist. 7, Part 2, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/7/q/bon-sent-II-d7-p2-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning that division which Isidore lays down in three members, when he says that *demons flourish by a threefold sharpness of knowledge*. For it seems to proceed deficiently, since Augustine, on *Genesis* book two, lays down four modes, which the Master also adduces in the text. — Likewise, it seems superfluous; for the Philosopher lays down only two modes; for he says that everything which anyone knows, *he knows by learning or by discovering*.

I RESPOND: It must be said that Isidore's division is sufficient and consonant with the words of Augustine. Its sufficiency is shown thus. For everything that demons know, either they know by *innate* cognition, and thus are said to know by *the sharpness of sense*; or by *acquired* cognition. But *acquired* cognition can be in two ways: either of things which *fall under* reason, and these are learned by experience; or of things which are *above*, and this is by the revelation of higher spirits.

To the objection from Augustine, then, it must be said that the two modes are reduced to one. And *again*, Augustine assigns modes of foretelling future things rather than of knowing them. The Philosopher, however, is speaking of *acquired* cognition; or if generally of *every* [cognition], then under invention he includes *the sharpness of sense* and *the experience of times*.

#### DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *demons know certain things from the holy Angels, which they learn from almighty God, by his command revealing [them] to them*. On the contrary: Demons are enemies of God and of the Angels; if therefore secret counsels are to be hidden from enemies, then it seems that God would never have [anything] revealed to them. — Likewise, they are in the darkness of damnation: therefore, since they are not fit for grace, and revelation is a cognition of grace, not of nature, it seems that in no way is it made to demons themselves.

I RESPOND: It must be said that as true is to be held what Isidore and Augustine say, that they foreknow certain things by the revelation of higher spirits, of which revelation the *end* and *mode* must be attended to. *The end of this revelation*: The *End*, because the wondrous Wisdom through hostile beings fulfills its own will; whence, just as the revelation of the dream concerning the exaltation of Joseph, made to those plotting [against him], according to the wondrous disposition of God served toward its fulfillment, although according to their intentions it was [meant] toward its impediment: so God shows certain things through his Angels to the demons, so that, while they oppose, he may most orderly fulfill and bring forth something very fitting and proper. — And from this the first [objection] is clear, since it is not similar. For human counsel can be thwarted, but not the divine.

The *mode* also must be attended to. *The mode of revelation is twofold*: For in two ways revelation is made: sometimes by *illumination of the mind*, as was done to the holy Prophets, and this is of grace; but sometimes by *bare prediction*, as a man sometimes reveals his own will. And this is not of *grace* in any way perfecting or elevating nature, but it can be a work of *mercy*, if it be ordered to the good of him to whom it is foretold, or of *justice*, if it be ordered to the punishment of some evil, as for instance to the deceiving of deceivers; or of *both*, if at the same time toward both. And so it is almost always, because such future things are foretold to demons, and miracles are permitted to be done by them, that the good may make light of such things, in which they see themselves surpassed by the damned and miserable, and the evil and deceitful may progress into worse, erring and sending [others] into error by the hidden judgment of God, yet by a just judgment. *Note*: Hence it is very foolish to desire to perform miracles or to foreknow future things and to reckon these as great, since we see the enemies of God to abound in such things.

#### DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *Angels are not creators, because they do not operate except outwardly*. But on the contrary: this does not seem a [good] reason, since if only the Creator operates inwardly, then nature produces nothing. — Likewise, *to create* is to produce something from nothing; but if a demon by his own power were to draw forth seed from potency into act, he would not make it from nothing: therefore he would not be a creator.

I RESPOND: It must be said that there is a certain power which in the production of things operates only outwardly; a certain [power] which operates inwardly in a complete way; a certain [power] partly inwardly, partly outwardly. *The threefold operation of power*: The power of the *artisan* operates only outwardly, by removing or joining and applying one nature with another. The power of *God* operates completely inwardly, since it produces the very primordial seeds, which are innermost. But the power which is partly inwardly, partly outwardly, is the power of *nature*, which is *outward* with respect to seminal accounts, but *inward* with respect to the things to be produced from them. For nature, when it operates, sends in its power even to the innermost parts of the patient; and in that sending in, [it does] not *produce* the very *essence* of the form, which was in incomplete potency, but presupposes it as produced by God: it yet, by aiding it, *brings* it forth to perfect act. Therefore he alone can make those seminal accounts, who can create; since they are not from others, but from nothing, and from them all things are made which are produced naturally. Therefore neither is the father a creator of the son, nor the farmer of the crops; since although the father operates *inwardly*, like nature, yet he operates *outwardly* and *about* something and *from* something, not from nothing, although he does not operate so outwardly as the farmer. But the operation of demons is more similar to the operation of the farmer than to that of the father.

#### DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *As none can form our mind except God* etc. If therefore this is true; then, just as grace is from God, in no way from nature or created power, it seems that likewise every other form is from God alone: therefore a created agent induces no form.

I RESPOND: It must be said that blessed Augustine speaks very subtly and truly, if anyone soundly understands his words. He wishes therefore to say that, just as none can form our mind by justifying it except God, since grace is not from anything, but rather from *Note* nothing; so the *seminal accounts* of forms or the *first essences* of forms only God can produce. For these must either be from nothing, or go on to infinity. Augustine therefore does not understand [this] as regards the *educing* of form from potency into act, which he calls in some way an outward action, but rather as regards the *production* of that seminal account, which is the essence of the thing, otherwise disposed when it is in potency and [when] in act.

#### DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *demons can do certain things by the subtlety of nature, which they cannot do because of God's prohibition*. Against this is, that God so gave powers to things and «so administers them, that he lets them perform their proper motions», as Augustine says in the seventh [book] *On the City [of God]*; whence he does not restrain those wishing to sin, but lets them sin as they will: therefore by parity of reason he ought not to restrain the power of the angels.

I RESPOND: It must be said that God *does not restrain wills* on account of the law of liberty which he established for them, but by a just judgment permits [them] to rush from evil into worse; yet he *restrains [their] power* by an equally just judgment, since the operation of power, as frequently in those who abuse power, is for the affliction and punishment of others. Since therefore every penalty must be just; if one having power unjustly afflicts or wills to afflict, the power must be checked, not on account of him who *acts*, but on account of him who *suffers*, unless the most high judgments of God require otherwise. — As to the objection, then, that he lets things perform their proper motions; it is not understood [to mean] that he does not check power by contrary powers, but that he only lets [them] act as much as it is fitting for his justice to permit.

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