Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/8/q/bon-sent-II-d8-p1-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.

*On the assumption of bodies as regards the union of body and spirit.*

### QUESTION I.

*Whether the Angels have bodies naturally united to themselves.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the Angels have bodies naturally united to themselves:

1. First, by *authority*. Augustine, [book] eight, *On the City of God*, where, defining the demons, he says: «Demons are, by genus, animals; in mind, rational; in soul, passive; in body, aerial; in duration, eternal»: if therefore the nature of the good spirits and of the evil is the same, it is plain etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the homily *On the Epiphany*: «To the Jews, as using reason, a rational animal — that is, an Angel — had to announce [the news]»; but every animal has a body naturally united to itself: if therefore an Angel is an animal, therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Bernard *On the Canticle*, homily three: «It is clear that every created spirit altogether needs a corporeal solace»; but the Angel has all that of which he naturally has need: since therefore he is a created spirit, he has a body naturally united to himself.

4. Likewise, for this there is a *reason*. The nobler a substance is, the more manifold it is in [its] potencies; but the Angel is a nobler substance than the soul: therefore if the soul is fitted by nature to give life to a body, much more so the Angel. But he has that naturally united to himself, to which by his nature he is born apt to give life: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that which lives and infuses life lives in a nobler mode than that which does not infuse [life]; for an infusion is a sign of perfection and of completeness: therefore if the Angel is a living thing so noble as the soul, and the soul can give life to something, therefore so can the Angel. But he cannot give life save to a body naturally united to himself: therefore etc.

**On the opposite side:** 1. [John] Damascene, defining an Angel, says that «an Angel is an intellectual, incorporeal substance»: therefore the Angel does not have a body united to himself, because, if he had a body naturally united to himself, just as a man is said to be corporeal, so also [would be] the Angel.

2. Likewise, Dionysius in many places says that the Angels are «divine minds and spiritual lights, immaterial and incorporeal».

3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by *reasonings* thus. A substance is so much the nobler, by how much the more it is like to God; but God altogether lacks a body: therefore a spiritual substance altogether lacking a body is the noblest among created substances: therefore either it must be posited in the universe, or in the universe the noblest creature will be wanting; and then the universe would be *headless* [acephalum], which is unfitting.

4. Likewise, if anything is composed out of diverse natures, and one of them is to be found *per se*, it likewise befalls [one] to find *per se* the other; but man is composed out of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: since therefore there is to be found a purely corporeal substance, *per se* there is to be found a purely spiritual substance; and this we call an Angel: therefore the Angel does not have a body.

5. Likewise, since man is composed of body and soul, when he sinned he became passible and mortal: therefore if an Angel had a body united to himself, like a man, it would seem at least that the Angels who sinned are mortal; and since this is plainly false, it is manifest etc.

### Conclusion.

> *The good and evil Angels have bodies neither naturally united to themselves nor inseparably bound [to themselves].*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that concerning this question great doctors once had their doubts — namely whether the Angels have bodies naturally united to themselves; whence on this point both Augustine and Bernard speak doubtfully. But now it is held with sufficient certainty — and Richard [of St Victor] affirms [it] — that the Angels are naturally incorporeal, and do not have bodies naturally united to themselves. — Yet on this many still doubt, whether the demons have bodies inseparably bound to themselves, in which they are tormented. — But it is plain enough that just as the good Angels do not have bodies save those voluntarily assumed, so also [is it] with the evil. And a sign of this is, as Richard says, that a body of small quantity is sometimes besieged by a vast multitude of demons, as is read in Mark, [chapter] five, of him who said: *Legion is my name.* «For a Legion, as the same Richard says, contains six thousand six hundred and sixty-six»; whence, if the demons had bodies, they could in no way enter into so small a body with their own bodies.

For which [reason] it can be said with sufficient probability that not only do they not have bodies naturally united to themselves, but also neither the good nor the evil have [bodies] inseparably bound [to themselves], so far as it pertains to the common law. Nor does their torment stand in the way, because, as will be shown in book four, a spirit without a body can, according to the order of divine justice, be punished by material fire. — The arguments for this side must therefore be conceded.

**To the arguments:** 1. To that [text] of Augustine which is adduced, *On the City of God*, [book] eight; it must be said that Augustine there speaks according to the opinion of Apuleius; and frequently in this matter he speaks more according to the opinion of others than according to his own judgment.

2. To that of Gregory — that the Angel is an animal — it must be said that for something to be an animal can be said in two ways: either by reason of *form*, or by reason of an *operation* due to an animal. There [in Gregory] the Angel is called an animal not by reason of form, but rather by reason of an operation which follows. — Or otherwise: to be an animal can be said in two ways: either according to *truth*, or according to *manifestation* or appearance. Now Gregory is speaking in the second way, because the Angel appears to be an animal when he assumes a body. But [the objection] objects according to the first way of taking [the term] *animal*.

3. To that which is objected from Bernard, that every created spirit needs a corporeal solace; it must be said that to need a body can be in two ways: either on account of itself, or on account of others. A spirit needing [a body] on account of itself is the brutal or the human spirit; and of this [kind] it is true that it has a body naturally united to itself. But a spirit needing [a body] on account of others is the angelic spirit; and this [spirit] does not have a body naturally united to itself, but [a body] voluntarily assumed, to minister to others. Whence Bernard: «The angelic spirits, for receiving those things which make the creature good, are in no way aided by their bodies». And so they do not have them joined [to themselves] for the sake of supplying a need in themselves, but in us; and because they supply this [need] for a time only, they do not have them united simply, but for a time.

4. To that which is objected — that the substance is nobler which is the more manifold in [its] potencies — it must be said that this is true of those potencies which simply attest to perfection. But the potency of giving life to a body, although in some way it is of perfection, nevertheless has a certain need and imperfection conjoined [to it], and is therefore alien to that substance which is the most perfect among creatures; but this [most perfect substance] is the angelic substance, nor does the aforesaid reasoning conclude [anything] concerning [the angelic substance] from this potency.

5. To that which is objected — that what infuses life and has life is nobler than what only has [life] — it must be said that to communicate or to give life to another can [be done] in two ways: either by way of an *efficient* [cause], and this is simply of perfection, and so belongs to God alone; or by way of an *informing* [cause], and this is not simply of perfection, but rather a perfection joined with imperfection. And so neither [of these] befits the Angel, because his perfection is greater than is the perfection of one who gives life by way of *form*, and lesser than is the perfection of one who gives life by way of a *cause*. And I speak of the life which befits a rational substance.