Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/8/q/bon-sent-II-d8-p1-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II.
### *On the formation of the body assumed.*

Consequently the second article is taken up, namely, the formation of the body assumed. Concerning which two things are asked:

First, it is asked about the assumed body itself with regard to its formal principle.

Second, with regard to its material principle.

### Question I.
### *Whether the body assumed has the true form of a human body.*

It is asked, then, first, whether that body has the true form of a human body. And that it does, it seems:

1. Because, since it appears to be a human body, either it is true, or there is error and deception in it; but error and deception do not befit the holy Angels: therefore when they assume bodies which appear to be human, they truly have a human form.

2. Likewise, for a human body nothing more is required than an equal complexion and proper organization, as the natural philosophers say; but the body which an Angel assumes has the proper organization: if then organization presupposes complexion, it seems that it has the whole of what belongs to the truth of a human body.

3. Likewise, that an Angel can truly form a human body, it seems. «The human body, as Augustine says, is in the seminal reasons, as are other bodies»; but because the forms of certain animals — such as serpents and the like — have their seminal reasons dispersed throughout things, Augustine therefore says «that by the ministry of demons they are truly brought forth»: therefore by parity of reasoning, as it seems, also the bodies of men. And if you say that this does not hold, because a greater disposition is required for producing a human body — this does not solve it, because what can dispose from afar at the beginning of an operation, by continuing the action, since the distance is not infinite, will be able to come to immediate disposition: therefore if Angels can by swift operation produce the bodies of less perfect animals, then by parity of reasoning also the bodies of more perfect animals: therefore also a human body.

4. Likewise, if some agent is indifferently disposed to producing various things, by the same reasoning by which it can produce the one, it can produce the other; but Angels do not have greater fittingness with the bodies of serpents than with the bodies of men — rather the contrary: therefore if they can with the aid of nature produce true bodies of serpents, they can with the aid of nature produce true bodies of men, and therefore also assume them.

5. Likewise, what can do the greater can do the lesser; «but the soul, however small its nobility, exceeds the nobility of any body whatsoever», as is said in book VIII of *On the City of God* and in many other passages: therefore since by the ministry of Angels the vegetable and sensitive souls of certain animals can be and are brought forth, much more can they produce true human bodies.

*On the opposite side* — *Fundamenta*: 1. To form a body and to inform it belongs to the same created power, because the formative power proceeds from the informative or perfective; but no angelic spirit can perfect a human body: therefore neither can it form one.

2. Likewise, Angels can do nothing concerning creatures except by the aid of nature; but no nature can generate a human body except one which is similar in species: therefore an Angel cannot form a true human body except through the mediation of a man. But a man cannot bring forth a human body except by generation: therefore neither can an Angel form true human bodies except by the generation of a man. But when they assume bodies, they do not need human aid: therefore they never assume true human bodies.

3. Likewise, if they can form a body anew, then by parity of reasoning they can also repair a corrupted one: therefore they can raise the dead, which is proper to God alone.

4. Likewise, if bodies assumed by Angels were true human bodies, they would have an appetite for a rational soul; but God fulfills the appetite of nature: therefore a rational soul would immediately be infused into them.

5. Likewise, if they were to assume true human bodies, this would be either according to the state of *glory* or according to the state of *the way*. Not according to the state of *glory*: this is clear, because then that body would no longer be corruptible nor separable from the Angel. If therefore they do assume them, this is according to the state of *the way*; but human bodies according to the state of the way are heavy and weighty, whether in the state of corrupted nature or in the state of innocence: therefore they would not be fit for motion nor for swift ministry: therefore, if they do not assume bodies except for ministry, then they do not assume true human bodies.

### Conclusion.

> Bodies assumed by Angels do not have the true form and complexion of human bodies, nor complete organization.

**I respond:** It must be said that — *Conclusion.* — bodies assumed by Angels do not have the true form and complexion of human bodies, nor even complete organization, but only an outward appearance.

*The reason is twofold.* And the reason for this is twofold: one, that such a body does not befit Angels for ministry, as has just now

been shown in the last place; the other reason is that an Angel cannot bring forth a natural form into being unless aided by the power of nature, as was held in the preceding distinction. *The threefold mode of producing bodies.* Now within the power of nature lies the production of the bodies of all animals, yet in differing ways. For the bringing-forth of some, the universal cause suffices without the aid of a particular agent similar in species in nature — such are the animals which are generated by putrefaction. There are others, however, for which it does not suffice unless it is aided by an agent of similar species, such as the bodies of animals which are produced only by propagation; and this is plain to the senses.

*First reason.* If the reason for this be asked: the first is the divine institution, according to which there is a limitation in the powers and natures of things; and this according to the law which He laid upon them from the beginning. Hence as He said: *Let the earth bring forth the green herb*, He did not say that it should bring forth man; but to man He said that he should multiply himself. So the earth brings forth the herb, and man generates man. — *Second reason. Twofold imperfection of certain animals.* This law or institution is not without reason, because some animals are *imperfect* both in *organization* and in *duration*, while others are *perfect* in both modes. Because some bodies of animals are imperfect both in organization and in complexion, they did not need an agent of such great power, but their productive power could be given to the earth as a mother and to the sun as a father, with the aid of other simple bodies, both elementary and celestial. And because they are imperfect in duration and at times perish, it was fitting that this be communicated to an agent of another nature; for to this end the generative power was given to things, as the Philosopher says, «that they might be perpetuated in being». — *Animals perfect in both modes.* The contrary holds of animals perfect in both modes; and so their productive power requires a greater actuality, and the seminal reason is brought forth into act with greater difficulty; therefore it needs greater aid. — *Corollary.* Those animals, therefore, or their bodies, which belong to the first kind, can be brought forth by Angels — with the aid of nature mediating — *swiftly* and as it were suddenly, yet *truly*, because by the power of nature. But the animals and their bodies which belong to the second kind cannot be brought forth *truly* except with the aid of nature and with length of time. And since the assumption of bodies by Angels is *swift* and as it were sudden, therefore they do not assume true human bodies, because they cannot form them by themselves *truly*; and with the aid of another they cannot bring it about that those bodies come into being *swiftly*. — *Further reasons.* And granted that they were brought forth, still they would not be fitting, as has been touched on in the objections, both on account of the *appetite* they would have for a rational soul and on account of *heaviness*; which two things are repugnant to the end of that body. For if it had a rational soul, it would not be a suitable *sign* for appearance; if it had heaviness, it would not be a suitable *instrument* for operating, especially for motion; nor would it be a suitable *dwelling* for inhabiting. — Therefore the arguments must be conceded which prove that Angels do not assume true human bodies, whether good or evil.

*Solution of the opposed arguments.* 1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that there is error and deception there: it must be said that this is false, because they do not assume those bodies in order to show themselves to be men and true *men*, but in order to show themselves to be *rational*; and since those bodies signify them to be rational, and were finally formed for this end, therefore they are true, although they are not *truly human* — just as was said in the first book concerning fire and the dove.

2. To that which is objected, that there is organization and equal complexion there: it must be said that this is false. For there is not truly the organization there which belongs to a human body — which indeed comes from the formative power conveyed in seeds — but rather a certain drawing of lineaments according to a likeness of that [body]; and this does not presuppose equality of complexion, because such a drawing can be made by a craftsman in wood and stone. Nor is just any quality of mixture that which makes for the truth of a human body, but rather that which has a specified power, completive and directive of man.

*Seminal reasons.* 3. To that which is objected, that the human body is in the *seminal reasons*: the answer is already plain, because although it is there, it is never brought forth unless the power of an external agent concurs, which resides in the loins of the man and in the womb of the woman; and therefore without these the seminal reason can never be brought forth into perfect act. — And if one objects that it can dispose by *remote disposition*, etc.: it must be said that this holds where the remote disposition becomes a necessity by intensification alone; for then a continuation and intensification of active power suffices; but not when a new form, or the operation of another form according to species, is required; and so it stands in the case proposed.

4. To that which is objected, that the Angel is indifferently disposed to all animal bodies: it must be said that, even if this is true of the Angel in himself, it is not true of the power of nature by whose aid the Angel operates. And therefore, just as the Angel by himself cannot bring forth a human body,

so neither the body of any animal; and just as some nature can do this easily and another with greater difficulty, as was seen before, so also the Angel aided by its power.

5. To that which is objected, that it can [extend] to what is *more noble*: it must be said that this does not always hold true, because a man can generate a man — who is more noble — and cannot generate a donkey; and it fails most of all when the more noble thing is of easier production, as frequently happens. And so it is in the case proposed; for the vegetable or sensitive soul of an animal is more easily brought forth from a thing brought into being by putrefaction than the true body of a man is brought forth and organized.