Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/9/q/bon-sent-II-d9-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *Whether the distinction of the Angels is from nature or from grace.*

Secondly it is asked what is the principal cause of the distinction of the orders — namely, whether it is from nature or from grace. And that it is from nature seems [to be the case]:

*To the opposite.* 1. Through that which the Master says in the text: «The superior [Angels] are those who are by nature more subtle and in intelligence more perspicacious»: therefore, if order is attended to according to *below* and *above*, it seems that the order of the Angels is from nature.

2. Likewise, above, in distinction three: «At the outset of their condition some were established superior, others inferior, by the wisdom of God»; but what they had had from the outset of their condition is natural to them: therefore the distinction of the orders is in them from nature.

3. Likewise, whatever God makes from the primary [act of] founding, He makes in measure, species, and order, so that these are natural to each thing: therefore the noblest creature, namely the angelic, He ought to have made — from the beginning of its condition — in a perfect measure, species, and order. If, therefore, that which was implanted in them from the beginning is from nature, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, it belongs to sanctifying grace to unite and to assimilate: if, therefore, that which is the principle of uniting is not the principle of distinguishing order, it seems that the distinction of the orders is not from grace; and it is [either] from grace or from nature: therefore etc.

*Foundations.* **Against** this it is objected: 1. Through the definition of order which the Master sets down in the text: «An order is a multitude of celestial spirits who are likened to one another by some gift of grace»: therefore it seems that without a gift of grace there is no order in the Angels.

2. Likewise, the supreme of all the orders is the order of the Seraphim; but the order of the Seraphim is from the eminence of love and charity: therefore the first and chief order is from grace. If, therefore, all the others depend on it, it seems that no order in the Angels is without a gift of grace.

3. Likewise, the Thrones are [so] called, as Gregory says, because «they are filled with so great a grace of divinity that God sits in them»: if, therefore, God is not said to sit or to indwell except through sanctifying grace, then the order of the Thrones is only from grace: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [so] concerning the others.

4. Likewise, God does not prefer one man to another on account of natural [endowments], but on account of merits: therefore, if the distinction of the orders is according to divine acceptance, it is not according to natural [endowments], but according to gratuitous [gifts].

### Conclusion

> The distinction of the angelic orders is principally from grace, [and] from nature only as from a preambular disposition.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as is clear from the definition of order set down above, *Conclusion.* an order is both from nature and from grace; but from nature as from a preambular disposition, [and] from grace as from a completive perfection. This I say of those orders according to which the distinction of the hierarchies is attended to in the supreme spirits, as manifestly appears from the office and action and nomination of those orders — among which the chief order is the order of the Seraphim, which is named from the ardor of love, [a love] which is not consummated and perfected in the Angels except through grace. And therefore I concede that the principal distinction of the orders cannot be from nature.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].* 1, 2. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary from the twofold authority of the Master — that by nature some are superior to others — it must be said that this does not conclude that the orders are from nature as from a completive cause; because not every superiority and inferiority makes a complete order, but only that [superiority and inferiority] in which consists the completion of orderable things as to office and status.

3. To that which is objected — that measure and species and order are from nature — it must be said that there is an equivocation in [the word] *order*; for he [the objector] is speaking there of the order by which a creature is said to be ordered by its relation to [its] *end*; but the order of the Angels is attended to according to the precellence of the orderable things themselves *among one another* — and this [precellence] is not complete among Angels alike in nature except through gratuitous gifts, which complete the capacity of nature.

4. To that which is objected — that grace unites, therefore it does not distinguish, or perfect, the orders — it must be said that one may speak of grace as to *habit* and as to *use* and as to *status*. Even if sanctifying grace *unites* and conforms as to *habit* — since all gratuitous habits are in all [the Angels];

it nevertheless distinguishes as to *use* and orders as to *status*, inasmuch as use is diversified in diverse [subjects], and the status of one [Angel] in grace is more excellent than the status of another. And this is what it effects in those having a like grace, order, and grade. And it is to be understood that it is in this manner in the Angels.

---