Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/9/q/bon-sent-II-d9-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether according to a greater capacity of natural endowments greater gratuitous gifts are given by God.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the orders themselves as to the preambular disposition; and since this [disposition] is the capacity and precellence of natural endowments, the question is whether, according to a greater capacity of natural endowments, greater gratuitous gifts are given by God. And that it is so seems [to be the case]:

*To the opposite.* 1. Through that which is said in Matthew twenty-five: *He gave to each according to his own ability* (*virtus*); it is settled that He there speaks of a gift superadded to nature: therefore, if He gave according to the ability of nature, it seems that according to better natural endowments there are also greater gratuitous gifts.

2. Likewise, the Master above, in distinction three: «Those who were created by nature more subtle and in wisdom more perspicacious, these were endowed with greater gifts of grace»; and he says this very thing in the text: therefore it seems that greater grace is given according to greater natural endowments.

3. Likewise, there seems to be a reason for this: to matter disposed to a form, according as it is more worthily and better disposed, God gives a nobler form: therefore, since natural endowments are like certain dispositions to gratuitous [gifts], the more one has better natural endowments, the more God will give him greater gratuitous gifts.

4. Likewise, the reason why God does not give grace to a man is that the man does not receive: therefore, since He Himself is always prompt and ready most liberally to pour in His gifts, and His liberality exceeds all capacity, it seems that He leaves nothing of the capacity of nature empty, when one fully converts himself to Him. And if this [is so], it remains that he who has greater natural endowments, since he is capable of greater grace, will also have greater grace. And this seems to echo the word of Plato, saying that «He gave to each as much of beatitude as he was capable of».

5. Likewise, just as grace is a disposition to glory, so a good nature is a disposition to grace; but God gives to him who has fuller grace fuller glory: therefore to him who has better natural endowments He gives greater gratuitous [gifts]. If you say that it is not similar, because grace merits glory, [whereas] nature does not thus [merit] grace — it is then objected that, whatever be the comparison of the disposition, this nevertheless is true: that glory perfectly completes nature, so that no incomplete appetite remains in it. If, therefore, glory fills the capacity of nature, either a nature more capable will have more of glory, or it will not be glorified: if, therefore, according to a greater capacity of nature there is a greater magnitude of glory, and the quantity of glory corresponds to the quantity of grace, then according to a greater capacity of natural endowments a greater magnitude of grace will be attended to.

6. Likewise, the end imposes necessity on those things which are for the end; but nature was made for the sake of glory, not conversely: if, therefore, God, foreknowing and predestining, makes a soul for this — that He may glorify it — He will give it as much capacity of natural endowments as He knows He will give it of glory; or if He bestows beyond [that], He will do something in vain. But if this is false, it remains that the capacity of nature and the quantity of glory are commensurate: therefore the same returns as before.

*Foundations.* **On the contrary:** 1. Ecclesiasticus, chapter one: *According to His gift He bestows it on those who love Him*: therefore it seems that the distribution of wisdom and grace is not weighed on the side of the one receiving, but on the side of God conferring.

2. Likewise, it is possible that he who has better natural endowments should have nothing of grace and for the whole time of his life lack grace, while he who has lesser natural endowments should abound in grace: but if this is true, then the dispensation of grace is not according to the measure of natural endowments.

3. Likewise, God gives grace to a man according as he prepares himself: therefore, if one having lesser natural endowments frequently prepares himself better than one having greater, then it seems that he receives greater gratuitous gifts, although he has lesser natural endowments.

4. Likewise, he who has better natural endowments frequently remains in a state of imperfection, while he who has lesser frequently assumes the state of perfection, or of religious life: therefore, if grace is greater in the perfect, it is clear etc.

5. Likewise, grace in us regards no power so principally as the freedom of choice; but the freedom of choice is equally in all: if, therefore, grace is greater in one than in another, it is not from nature, but rather from the divine distribution.

6. Likewise, the distribution of God's grace proceeds from the bowels of [His] mercy and pity; but it belongs to mercy to have more compassion on him who is more wretched — other things being equal — and who is more in need. If, therefore, he who has lesser natural endowments is more in need of being sustained by grace than he who has better: then, where no merits or demerits precede, God ought to give greater grace to him who has lesser natural endowments: therefore the distribution of grace is not precisely according to the greater capacity of nature, but according to the good pleasure of the divine pity.

### Conclusion

> A greater capacity of natural endowments, with respect to the grace to be given, has neither the efficacy of causality nor the disposition of necessity, but only — in some measure and fallibly — the disposition of congruity.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that to give grace according to a greater *Distinction.* capacity of natural endowments can be understood in three ways: *Conclusion 1.* either thus, that the [word] *according-to* states an *efficacy of causality* — and so, according to all, it is false, since natural endowments are not the cause of grace; *Conclusion 2.* or thus, that it states a *disposition of congruity* — and so, where there is no obstacle, according to all it is true, since a good nature congruently disposes to grace; *Conclusion 3.* or thus, that it states a *disposition of necessity* — and so, according to the common opinion, it is false and reproved by the doctors. — *Another opinion.* Yet according to the opinion of some it was at one time posited as true.

*The reason of this opinion.* Now the reason of this position was this. For they posited that grace was nothing other than God; and that charity was nothing other than the Holy Spirit; and that the intensification of grace or charity was nothing but [a function of] the greater purification of the soul and the remission of concupiscence, which stands in the way lest the soul be able to be perfectly united to God; and therefore, concupiscence being entirely extinguished, the soul is united to God as much as its nature can be elevated, and it is said to have that much grace. And therefore they posited that, finally, the soul which had better natural endowments would have greater grace. — *The foundation is false.* But the foundation of this position was disproved in the first book, distinction seventeen, and will be further disproved below in distinction twenty-six. *Likewise the position itself.* And the position itself is in itself improbable and seems to be against good morals, since it grants as much to him who labors little and serves God little as to him who [serves] more — indeed, more, if he has greater natural endowments and perseveres in grace; which is altogether absurd and disproved by the preceding reasons. — And therefore the arguments which show this are to be conceded. *To the 6th foundation.* The last argument, however, does not compel, because in the distribution of graces neither the capacity of nature nor its need is principally weighed, but the disposition and measure of the divine predestination, according to which God apportions *the measure of faith*, as the Apostle says, according as in His predestination He has measured it out to him.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].* 1. To that, then, which is objected to the contrary — that *He gave to each according to his own ability* — it must be said that *according-to* there states only a disposing cause of congruity. And again, *ability* (*virtus*) is there called the effort of the heart, which states not only capacity but also actual preparation; and therefore that authority does not compel.

2. To that which is objected from the authority of the Master, it must likewise be said that he there speaks of a disposition of congruity, and he speaks of a more congruent disposition concerning the Angels than concerning men, of whom the Master is speaking. *It does not hold for men.* For the good [Angels], who were converted to God, prepared themselves the more according as they had the better natural endowments, since each one was moved into God according to the whole effort of [his] heart, having nothing to retard him. But it is not so in men; and therefore that authority ought to be expounded, [and] ought not to be extended.

3. To that which is objected — that God imprints a nobler form on better-disposed matter — it must be said that it is not similar, because matter is disposed to a natural form by a disposition which is a necessity; *Note.* but a greater capacity of natural endowments does not dispose to a greater grace by a disposition of necessity, but only of congruity. And because a disposition of congruity can be impeded in many ways — whether by something opposed, or by a greater congruity which can supervene in another from some accident — therefore that argument does not conclude.

4. To that which is objected — that man does not have grace because he does not receive — it must be said *Note.* that this is true; but from this it does not follow that «he therefore *has* grace because he *receives*», as Anselm says, because in privatives and contradictorily opposed [terms] the consequence does not hold *in the thing itself*, but *conversely*; and therefore, just as it is not conceded that he has greater grace because he receives, so it is not to be conceded that he has greater grace from a *greater capacity*.

5. To that which is objected — that nature disposes to grace — it must be said, as was said, that it is not similar, because nature does not merit grace in the way that grace [merits] glory. But to that which is added — that glory perfects the whole capacity of nature — it must be said that *Note.* just as a *form* perfects the capacity of matter not absolutely, but as the superinduced disposition requires, so *glory* perfects nature not absolutely, but according as the grace required [it] which had earlier been given to free choice. And when it is thus perfected, it is sufficiently perfected, because the rectitude of justice limits the appetite of nature, so that it does not desire beyond what grace has merited — especially since what God renders to it fully suffices.

6. To that which is objected last — that the capacity of nature is ordered to glory finally — it must be said that it is so ordered by God, yet so that a disposition on the side of our will is presupposed. Hence, just as a man who was capable of beatitude and made for the sake of beatitude is, through the disordering of [his] will, assigned to eternal punishments and loses glory; so a man who was capable of greater beatitude, because he does not dispose himself to grace with all his powers, attains a lesser glory than another of lesser capacity attains who disposes himself more to grace. — Nor does it follow that anything is there in vain, because by this God shows how much grace can [do] above nature. Nevertheless this has no instance in the good Angels; for since they disposed themselves to grace with all their powers, according as they had better natural endowments, greater gratuitous [gifts] were given to them.