Praelocutio
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/0/q/bon-sent-II-praelocutio
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### PRAELOCUTIO
#### OF SAINT BONAVENTURE
#### *PREFIXED TO THE PROEMIUM TO THE SECOND BOOK OF THE SENTENCES*

By the help of the Saviour's grace, now that we have come to the completion of the first book of the Sentences, and at the insistence of the Fathers, we must begin the second. But just as in the first book I held to the sentences and to the common opinions of the masters, and most of all of our master and father of good memory, brother Alexander, so in the books that follow I shall not depart from their footsteps. For I do not intend to set new opinions against them, but to weave together the common and approved ones. Nor let anyone suppose that I wish to be the fabricator of a new writing; for this I think and confess, that I am a poor and slender compiler. — Perhaps, however, it will seem to someone that I have turned aside from the positions of the Master of the Sentences, chiefly in two places: in this, namely, that whereas the Master, in the third distinction of the first book, in the second assigning of a trinity, which he says consists in *mind, knowledge* and *love,* says that *mind* is taken not for the soul but for the higher portion, it is found to be said by me that mind there stands for the substance of the soul. *Again,* whereas the Master says, in the seventh distinction, that the *power of generating* is common to the three persons, inasmuch as it is a name signifying the essence, I rather held to that opinion which says that the power of generating is so called on account of relation. — But if anyone look rightly, in neither of the aforesaid will he find that I have turned aside either from the Master's position or from the path of truth. For when I said that in that assigning of a trinity mind is taken for the substance of the soul by reason of its higher part, this was said for this reason: that if mind stood there for the higher portion, since that is a power of the soul, and since *to know* and *to love* do not belong to one power, as will be seen below, there would then be there not a trinity but a quaternity. *Again,* it does not properly belong to a power, but to the substance through a power; and therefore, if Augustine speaks properly and truly when he says *the mind knows* etc., *mind* there supposits for the substance of the soul. And Augustine intimates this again when afterwards, on occasion of this trinity, he shows through almost the whole tenth book *On the Trinity* that the soul knows itself. *Lastly,* since those habits of knowledge and of love are consubstantial with the soul, they do not add a new essence over the power, but by their very selves are fitted to the power, and so they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves or with the higher part of reason. And therefore the Master does not deny that mind is taken for the soul itself, but that it is not taken for the *whole* soul, that is, for the soul according to all its powers, but for the substance itself by reason of the higher portion. In this, therefore, I did not contradict the Master, but rather set forth his word according to the rule of truth, as I judge.

Likewise neither in the other matter, namely in the power of generating, did I disagree with him. That the same Master intimates, in the seventh distinction, that the power of generating is said according to *substance,* and that others say it is said according to *relation* and is a proper [attribute] — there is no controversy here; rather both are true, if one attend. For if we speak *dividedly* of the power of generating, according to what is signified by these two

names, then, since the name of power is of itself essential and the name of generative virtue is personal, it names the essence or nature as in a person. But if we speak of that which is signified through those two words, so that they run together *into the understanding of a single word,* then, since the power of generating is nothing other than the fecundity of a power, and fecundity in producing some person is said wholly according to relation, and is not common but proper, so without doubt the *power of generating* or *to be able to generate* is said according to relation. And so it is clear that each of these opinions is true, and that the one is not repugnant to the other. But I rather approved this sentence, because it reaches further to the truth of the thing, although *for the full expression of the truth both must be upheld.* — Cleaving, therefore, to these and to other words of the Master, with due reverence preserved... I both have proposed and do propose, according to the slenderness of my wit and the poverty of my knowledge, to uphold those things in which I shall be able, these only excepted in which more commonly it is not upheld, but rather the common opinion holds the contrary. And these are eight, so that in each book there are two of those positions.

For in the first book the Master says these two things which are not commonly held, namely, that charity, which is the love of God and of neighbour, is not something created but uncreated, as the Holy Spirit is. The other is that these names *threefold, trinity,* and the other numerals do not posit anything, but only remove.

Now in these two positions we believe the Master to have been deceived, the occasion being taken from the words of Hilary and of Augustine. Whence each of these was disapproved.

In the second book likewise there are two, of which one is that in the blessed Angels reward preceded merit — merit, I say, in respect of the substantial reward — which, although it seem very probable, is nevertheless not commonly held. The other is that nothing of food passes over into the truth of human nature, but the whole truth of human nature was in Adam.

In the third book likewise two opinions are found: one is that the soul separated from the body is a person; the other, that Christ during the three days was a man.

In the fourth likewise two are found: one about the baptism of John; the other about the power of baptizing or of forgiving sins, which he could have conferred upon a creature.

In these positions the Master withdrew from the common way, and, as will be treated in their proper places, turned aside to the less probable part, and therefore he is not commonly upheld by the masters. And although perhaps someone may uphold him in some of these opinions, nevertheless our father and master of good memory brother Alexander upheld him in none of them, but rather held the contrary, in whose footsteps I chiefly propose to walk.

Perhaps, however, it will seem to someone that I deviated from his sentence when the discourse was about the eternal generation, in the first book, the twenty-seventh distinction. For since it is written in the *Summa* that he generates for this reason, that he is *father,* I was rather seen to hold to that opinion which says that the Father generates for this reason, that he is *unbegotten God.* And since again it is written by the same that there is some *saying* in divine things to which no word answers, I rather held to that opinion which says that there is no *saying* without a word, and by this to have withdrawn from his footstep. — But if anyone understand rightly, I did not disagree with him either in the first or in the second, because the true is not contrary to the true.

But I judge it to be true both that the Father generates because he is *unbegotten,* and that he generates because he is *God the Father;* and this appears thus. For it is plain, and true according to every opinion, that the power of the Father generates for this reason, that it is *fruitful.* That, therefore, is rightly said to be the ground of generating which imports the fecundity of the Father's power. Now fecundity is imported both by the name of *unbegottenness* and by the name of *paternity,* but otherwise and otherwise. For *paternity* imports fecundity as it were by *presupposing* and pre-understanding it, although it is principally imposed from a *respect.* For paternity is said to be the respect of the Father to the Son. But *unbegottenness* imports fecundity *by a consequent understanding:* for by the first understanding it imports the *privation of a respect* to something prior; but from that privation alone there could not be a property, since it is consequent upon the essence. And therefore the Father is called unbegotten not only because he does not *receive being* from another, but because he does not receive being from another, and because *he has whence he may give being to another.*

He, therefore, who understands superficially, attending or looking to that from which the name is first imposed, will deny both, saying that the Father does not generate because he is *father,* nor generate because he is *unbegotten,* since neither a respect nor the privation of a respect is the ground of producing a person. And as to this he will say what is true, but not *fully.* But he who takes the *full* understanding of both, attending that fecundity is imported through each name, will say both: both that he generates because he is *unbegotten God,* and that he generates because he is *God the Father.* For it is true that the Father generates because he himself has nothing from another, but has whence he may give to another. It is true also that the Father generates because he has fecundity in producing one like to himself in all things by way of nature.

When, therefore, I said that the Father is father for this reason, that he generates, and does not generate for this reason, that he is father, I did not say this by reason of the *fecundity* which this name *paternity* imports in divine things, but by reason of the *respect,* from which the name of father is more truly imposed; and therefore I did not contradict the master, *but I there omitted to say this and now supply it,* that paternity names not only a *respect,* but also a *fecundity.* Whence, although the reasons there adduced show that he does not generate for this reason, that he is father, and although they were granted because they concluded what was *true* according as *father* is imposed from a *respect,* it ought to have been added that they do *not* conclude according as the name of father imports *fecundity.* But when I said that the Father generates because he is unbegotten God, I did not say this inasmuch as this which is *unbegotten* imports the privation of a respect — for so the master denies it — but I said this inasmuch as in the name of *unbegottenness* the power of fecundity is enclosed. And this is necessary to posit in order that unbegottenness may be a property, as was there shown in many ways. But I rather held to this position, that the Father generates because he is *unbegotten God,* not because unbegottenness is more the *ground of generating* than paternity is, or because it is as proper a ground as paternity, but because there is there rather a *stopping-place,* beyond which it does not fall to us to inquire. For if it be asked *why* the Father generates, and it be answered, because he is father, that is, fruitful with the fecundity of nature, one will still doubt and ask, why *that* power is more fruitful than *another*? And it will be answered: this is because it has being from no other. For the Father is the principle of the whole deity for this reason, that he is from none, as the Master says; and this ground being rendered, there is the stopping-place, nor is there any going further. And therefore I said that the Father generates because he is unbegotten God, not in order to assign the *proper ground* of generation, but rather for the sake of *terminating the inquiry.* For in the name *father* the ground of generation is imported as *proper,* but in the name of *unbegottenness* as *first;* in the one *antecedently,* in the other *consequently;* in the one *commonly,* in the other *specially.*

But in the second matter no one will judge that I disagreed, who knows how to distinguish between what is proper and what is taken by transumption. For just as one who says that there is no true laughter without a mouth, nor true flight without wings, does not contradict him who says that a meadow laughs without a mouth and that arrows fly without wings; so he who says that the name of speaking or of saying, taken properly, is not without a word, just as neither is generating without a son, does not contradict him who says that to speak or to say can be so transumed and, according to some transumptive signification, be said of something without a word generated.

In these things, therefore, and in all others, if anyone look diligently and piously, he will find that I have not dared to withdraw from the footsteps of the fathers and of our elders; since, according to Gregory's counsel, it is sounder to yield to another's understanding than to be a slave to contentions, for this reason, that, as the teaching of the Doctor of the Gentiles to Timothy says: *The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all, apt to teach, patient, with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth.*

These things, therefore, being set down beforehand, let the pen be taken up with the invocation of God's grace. *Exordium:* Only this I have found etc.

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