Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/1/q/bon-sent-III-d1-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article I. *On the incarnation as regards the possibility of union.*
### Question I. *Whether the divine nature could be united with human nature.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and asks whether the divine nature could be united with human nature. And it seems that it could not.

1. To be united is to undergo, just as to unite is to act; therefore that which is impossible to undergo is impossible to be united; but it is impossible for the divine nature to undergo: therefore it is impossible for it to be united with another nature.

2. Likewise, whatever things are united to one another are in some manner composed; therefore that which is impossible to be composed with another is impossible to be united to another; but it is impossible for the divine nature to be composed with another, since it is most simple and most perfect: therefore, and so on.

3. Likewise, everything unitable and not united is in potency to the act and completion of union, and everything in potency to the act and completion is mutable and imperfect; but in God there can be no change, no imperfection: therefore there can be no temporal union.

4. Likewise, whatever things are unitable are proportionable to one another, since there is no union between those between which no proportion falls; but between God, who is infinite, and the creature, which is finite, no proportion falls: therefore there can be no conjunction of those natures.

5. Likewise, the Creator is more distant from the creature than two opposites are distant, on account of the fact that all opposites share in some genus, whether proximate or remote, whereas God and the creature participate in no common genus: therefore it is easier to unite some opposites than it is to unite the divine nature with the human. But God cannot bring it about that the same thing be a man and an ass, or that the same thing be white and black, or indeed that the same thing both be and not be: therefore he cannot bring it about that the same thing be a man and God.

**On the contrary:** 1. God can do more than a man can say, according to that text of Luke, chapter one: *No word shall be impossible with God:* if therefore a man can believe and say that God is united to our humanity, it seems that this is not impossible with God.

2. Likewise, God can do more than we can ask, according to that text in Ephesians, chapter three: *God, who is able to do superabundantly more than we ask or understand;* but a man could ask that the Son of God be incarnate: therefore for the Word of God to be made flesh or to be incarnate was not impossible for God.

3. Likewise, when two things are so disposed that one is material in relation to the other and conformed to it, it is possible for the one to be united to the other; but the soul has more of possibility in relation to God than the body has in relation to the soul; it has also more of the character of conformity, since the soul is a spiritual substance and the image of God: therefore if God could unite the soul to the body, it seems that he could likewise unite human substance to himself.

4. Likewise, everything which is most intimate and lovable to another is unitable to it by the greatest union; but God is most intimate and most lovable to the soul: therefore it seems that the uncreated Spirit could be united perfectly to a rational substance.

5. Likewise, if the divine nature cannot unite the human to itself, this is either on account of an impediment on the part of its own nature, or on account of an impediment on the part of the creature. If on account of an impediment on the part of its own nature: then, since that work is most perfect and most noble, it seems that the divine nature is not consonant with perfection and nobility in every mode. If on account of an impediment on the part of the creature: then it seems that the creature is not in perfect obedience in respect of the Creator; but this derogates from the divine omnipotence: therefore it is impossible that, in respect of such a union, an impediment should intervene from any part. And if this is so, it remains that God could unite a rational creature to himself.

### Conclusio

> *It was possible for human nature to be united to the divine in the person of the Son.*

**Respondeo:** It must be said that without doubt it was possible for human nature to be united to the divine in the person of the Son.

Now the ground of this is the following: that all those things are to be attributed to the divine power which do not derogate from it; and such are the things which are within the power to do. But for the divine nature to be united to the human in the unity of person is nothing other than for the divine person, which from eternity was the hypostasis in respect of the divine nature, to be the hypostasis in respect of the human nature in time; and this says no imperfection, but rather dignity and nobility. — For just as, since God is good from eternity, no derogation is made to his goodness when he is the cause of created goodness in time, although created goodness is far inferior to uncreated goodness; so, since the person of the Son of God is an intellectual and spiritual and uncreated hypostasis from eternity, it in no way derogates from him if he be the hypostasis of a rational created nature in time. — And just as God becomes a creator in act from being a non-creator without any change or innovation of himself, but only by a change being made on the part of the created nature; so the person of the Son of God, who was not in act the hypostasis of human nature, has the being of its hypostasis without any change or innovation of himself, by a change being made on the part of the assumed nature alone. —

And just as God, when he is in a creature by essence, presence, and power, in no way depends on it, but rather the creature depends on him, as on a conserving and sustaining cause; so also God, when he is in a rational creature by union, does not depend on it, but rather conversely the rational nature depends on the divine hypostasis and has its being-substantified in it, just as the nature is substantified in the person.

And thus it is clear that the union of the divine nature with the human in no way derogates from the divine nobility; and therefore, since all things are to be attributed to God which do not derogate from his omnipotence, it must without hesitation be laid down that the mystery of his incarnation is possible for God. On account of which the Angel said to Mary, at its beginning disclosing the mystery of the incarnation: *No word shall be impossible with God.* — Hence also the reasons which show this are to be granted.

**Ad argumenta:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected to the contrary, that to be united is to undergo; it must be said that, as Priscian says, there are certain verbs which in the active voice signify passion; and there are certain verbs which in the passive voice signify action; and in this manner it must be understood, when it is said that the divine nature is united to the human, not that the divine nature undergoes anything, but that the divine nature itself unites the human nature to itself into its own person or hypostasis. It could also be said otherwise, that just as *to generate* and *to be generated* do not signify in divine matters action or passion, but a relation; so too *to be united,* said of the divine nature or person, does not state any action, but rather a relation, which relation indeed states a dependence only in the created nature; as can be gathered from those things which were determined in the first Book, when divine names which state a respect to the creature were treated, in distinction thirtieth.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that things which are united are composed; it must be said that, if the word *to compose* be taken properly, *union* is wider than *composition.* For *union* states the conjunction of two in a third, whether they be united for the constitution of a third or not. But *composition* states the conjunction of some things in such a way that they come to the constitution of a third; and every such thing is in some manner material in relation to the other. And therefore *composition* always imports imperfection in the things composed, whereas *union* does not. And on that account it does not follow that, if the divine nature cannot be composed with another, that it cannot be united to another.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that everything unitable and not united is in potency to the completion of union; it must be said that this is true of that unitable thing which has to be brought to the act of union through something acquired in itself; but of that which is unitable only through something acquired in the other, it does not hold; and in this manner the divine nature is unitable to the human nature through a change made in the creature. And therefore from this it does not follow that there is any possibility of imperfection or change on the part of the divine nature, but only on the part of the created nature. And the ground of this is that union states a relation, and a relation has to be introduced into being through a change made in one extreme, the other remaining wholly unmoved; as is clear: if I am white, and another be generated

who is white, he straightway begins to be like me, with no change made in me, but only in him. Boethius likewise gives the example of right and left. Thus it must be understood in the case at hand. And a likeness of this can also be found in the union of a ray and a crystal. For if a crystal be set beneath a ray already illuminating a house, the crystal is said to be illuminated and to be penetrated by the ray and joined to it without any change made on the part of the ray, but only on the part of the crystal. So in its own manner, but far more spiritually, must it be understood in the assumed nature and the person of the Word.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that everything unitable is proportionable; it must be said that it is true, if it be understood of the proportion which is regarded in the agreement of order. But if it be understood of the proportion which is in the commensuration of quantity, it does not hold, on account of the fact that, if the water of the sea were infinite, a sponge could still be immersed, as it now would be immersed, and united; and therefore for union there suffices the proportion which arises from the agreement of order. And such is the agreement which is between the rational creature and God, on account of the fact that the rational nature, by the very fact that it is the image of God, is born to be ordered to him immediately, as was shown in the first and second books.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the agreement of opposites is greater than that of God to the creature, and thus that they are more unitable; it must be said that, although the agreement be greater on account of the participation of something common, yet never is the agreement such according to the possibility and order of the one to the other, because one opposite is not born to be ordered to its opposite as to a cause and completion, as the rational creature is born to be ordered to God. But agreement in the participation of something common does not make things to be unitable, unless there be some agreement according to the character of inclination and order, as is clear. For the soul is more unitable to the body than one soul is unitable to another; and just as that argument does not hold: the soul cannot be united to another soul: therefore it cannot be united to the body: so neither does that argument conclude: an opposite cannot be united to its opposite: therefore the creature cannot be united to God.