Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/1/q/bon-sent-III-d1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether one person can be united to human nature without another.*

Secondly it is asked whether one person can be united without another. And that it cannot, it seems thus:

1. *First*, by Damascene, who says that in the divine things "all things are one except generation, ingeneration, and procession"; but the incarnation is not any of these: therefore if to be incarnate belongs to one person, it is necessary that it belong to another.

2. Likewise, the works of the Trinity are undivided: therefore a work that belongs to one person necessarily belongs to another: therefore if the incarnation is a work of God, it is impossible that it belong to one person without another.

3. Likewise, the incarnation is a work of re-creation, just as the formation of man was a work of creation; but it is impossible for man to be formed by one person and not by another: therefore it is impossible for man to be re-formed by one person and not by another: therefore one person cannot be incarnate without another.

4. Likewise, God is in something in a more perfect way when he is so through union than when he is so through indwelling grace; but it is impossible for one person to indwell in something without another: therefore it is impossible for one person to be united to flesh and not the other be united as well.

5. Likewise, it is impossible for the Son to come into the mind without the Father and the Holy Spirit coming together with him, as is said in John, chapter fourteen: *We will come to him* etc.: therefore it is impossible for the Son to come into the flesh without the Father and the Holy Spirit coming together. If therefore *to be sent into the flesh* is to be incarnate, it seems etc.

6. Likewise, it is impossible for something absolute to belong to one which does not belong to another, for the reason that they are distinguished only by relations: therefore if *to be incarnate*, or *to be man*, is an absolute predicate; therefore it is impossible that it belong to one which does not belong to another: therefore one person cannot be incarnate without another.

**On the contrary:** 1. John, chapter one: *The Word was made flesh;* but the Word, as was established in the first [book], names a property of a person: therefore if the incarnation is attributed to the Word itself, it seems that it can belong to some person of itself.

2. Likewise, *to be incarnate* is nothing other than to be sent into the flesh; but to be sent can belong to one person without another, since the Son is sent, and "the Father is never read to have been sent": therefore so also is to be incarnate.

3. Likewise, the incarnation is a union in a person: therefore if "the person of the Father is one, that of the Son another"; it seems that, if the union is in one person, it is not necessary that it occur in another; and if the union can occur, likewise also the incarnation.

4. Likewise, although the truth of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one, nevertheless the person of the Father can be signified by a sign other than the person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, whether we speak of a vocal sign or a real one; but by the same reasoning by which a sign can be coupled to one person without the others according to signification, in the same way something created can be coupled according to a personal union: therefore if one person can be signified without another, likewise one can be incarnate without another.

### Conclusio

> One divine person can be incarnate, in such a way that another is not incarnate.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt one person can be incarnate, in such a way that another is not incarnate, as the evidence of the work makes manifest.

And the reason for this is this: that, since it happens that the *creature* is compared to the Creator in two ways, namely according to the *reception of some completion* and according to the *relationship of relation, one* comparison necessarily regards the three persons indistinctly and indivisibly, for the reason that in them there is one essential perfection. But the comparison according to the *relationship of relation* can be in respect of some person determinately and distinctly, for the reason that these persons are distinguished by relations. — Likewise *God* has to be compared to the creature in two ways, namely in the character of the *causing principle* and in the character of the *substantifying supposit*. In the *first* comparison the three persons necessarily share in common, for the reason that in God the nature is one and the operative power is one, by which God is the cause of creatures. But the *second* comparison can regard some person distinctly, for the reason that, although one person agrees with another in nature and its power, it is nevertheless distinguished from the other in supposit and personal property.

Since therefore in the union of natures, or the incarnation, the divine person becomes the supposit or hypostasis of the human nature, in such a way that the union or incarnation states not only the relationship of God to the creature in the manner of a *cause*, but indeed also in the manner of a *supposit;* likewise on the part of the creature it states a comparison not only as to the *reception of completion*, but also as to the *relationship of relation:* hence it is that the incarnation can belong to one person, in such a way that it does not belong to another. — Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To that which is first objected, that in the divine things all things are one except ingeneration etc.; it must be said that it is true. But when it is said that the incarnation is not any of these; it must be said that, even if it is not any of these, nevertheless it includes something of these. For it includes the notion of personal distinction; for the incarnation is a union of flesh to the divine nature into a distinct person. — But when it is said that the works of the Trinity are undivided; it must be said that it is true. But when it is said that the incarnation is an operation of the Trinity; it must be said that the incarnation, according to that it states an operation, is common to the three persons; but because beyond this it imports a relation, therefore it can be attributed to one person without another. And there is an example: if three maidens clothe one [maiden], the putting-on of the garment is by the three, yet the three are not clothed, but only one. Likewise the three persons have wrought the incarnation, and yet only one is said to be incarnate.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the work of creation, it must be said that it is not similar; because the formation of man states an action and operation only, not a relation to a person, and therefore is common to the three; it is not so with the incarnation.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the Son cannot be in something through indwelling grace without it being the whole Trinity; it must be said that it is not similar, because *for God to indwell* *in something* states an effect in the creature, which must be from the whole Trinity; but *to be united* states a respect to a person, and this can be to one person without another, as was shown before.

*To 5.* To that which is objected concerning the mission into the flesh and into the mind, it must be said that it is not similar; because the mission of the Son into the mind is only according to *essential operation*, not according to *personal union;* it is not so with the mission of the Son into the flesh.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that to be incarnate is an absolute predicate; it must be said that, although it is an absolute predicate *exteriorly*, it is nevertheless a relation *interiorly*, and by reason of the implied relation it can belong to some person distinctly. And this is plain, because *for the Son to be incarnate* is nothing other than *for the Son to unite flesh to himself;* *for God to be man* is nothing other than for one and the same person to be the hypostasis of the divine and the human nature.

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