Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/1/q/bon-sent-III-d1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether one person could be united together with another simultaneously, by assuming one and the same nature in number.*

Thirdly it is asked whether one person could be united together with another simultaneously, by assuming one and the same nature in number. And it seems that it could not.

1. Anselm in the book *Cur Deus homo,* chapter nine: « Several persons cannot assume one and the same man; wherefore it is necessary that it come to be in one person only ».

2. Likewise, if several persons were united to one and the same nature, then either in unity of essence, or in unity of supposit. Not in unity of essence, since it is impossible that the Creator and the creature come together in one essence. Not in unity of person, since the three persons do not come together in a person, but are distinguished personally: therefore it seems that in no way could several persons take up one man.

3. Likewise, the union of the divine nature to the human brings it about that they communicate to one another their proper idioms: therefore if three persons were to assume one man, that man would be Father and Son and Holy Spirit; and from this it would follow, on account of the communication of idioms, that the Father would be the Son and the Holy Spirit, and conversely; and if this is so, then the personal distinction would perish.

4. Likewise, if three persons were to assume one and the same man, then either by a single union, or by several. If by a single one: then, since the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit communicate only in essence, that union would be in something essential, which is impossible. If by several: then there would be several incarnations. But on the contrary: it is impossible that there be several incarnations with respect to one flesh, since the incarnation has its inception only by reason of the flesh, therefore by like reasoning it can be numbered only by reason of the flesh: therefore neither by several incarnations nor by a single one could several persons assume one and the same nature.

**On the contrary:** 1. Human nature has the aptitude to be assumed by a person, insofar as it is an image; but one and the same soul is the image of the three persons simultaneously and at once: therefore it seems that it could be assumed by three persons simultaneously and at once.

2. Likewise, one person can assume several natures, and nothing prevents the Son of God from being able to assume one other man, since he was not constrained to that singular nature which he assumed: therefore by like reasoning it seems that several persons could assume one and the same nature, since several persons can stand over one nature, just as one person can stand over several natures.

3. Likewise, grace has to be conformed to nature; but the several divine persons communicate through nature in one substance and essence simply one: therefore by like reasoning they can communicate in one nature through a gratuitous union: therefore several persons can assume one and the same nature.

4. Likewise, either one nature, which is assumed by one person, can be assumed by another, or not. If so, I have my point. If not, I ask, what prevents it? Since there is nothing there but a created nature and a divine person, then either there will be an impediment on the part of the created nature, or on the part of the divine person. But on the part of the created nature it cannot be, since that lies wholly subject to the power of the divine person. On the part of the divine person it cannot be, since among the divine persons there is no resistance, no repugnance, since the one mutually indwells the other, and the one is with the other: therefore if there is no impediment, it seems simply that several persons could assume one man.

### Conclusio

> Several persons cannot assume one and the same nature in number.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that, as Anselm says, « several persons cannot assume one and the same man », not on account of a defect of power, but on account of the repugnance of an implicit contradiction. — For if several persons were to assume one man unto such a unity as would bring about the communication of idioms: then either they would assume unto a unity, which indeed would be a unity holding on the side of the assuming, or of the assumed. If unto a unity which indeed would hold on the side of the assuming, since on the side of the assuming there is nothing to be found but personal unity and essential unity; then several persons would assume one nature unto unity of essence, or unity of person; but each of these is simply impossible. For several divine persons cannot come together in one person, nor can a created and an uncreated nature pass over into one nature. — But if they were to assume unto a unity which indeed holds on the side of the assumed, since that is an individual unity, they would then assume unto unity of an individual; but that too is impossible, since the one assuming is not drawn to the unity of the assumed, but rather draws the assumed to its own unity. For to assume is to take to oneself.

And thus it is plain that, if it be said that three persons assume one and the same man, in every way a contradiction is implied, whether it be understood that the assumption comes to be unto unity of nature, or unto unity of person. For if such an assumption comes to be unto unity of nature, then out of the divine nature and the human one nature is constituted: therefore there is no distinction of the assuming from the assumed: therefore neither is the assumption true. But if the assumption comes to be unto unity of person, then several persons communicate in one person: therefore several persons are not several persons. But if the assumption comes to be unto unity of an individual; since that unity does not hold on the side of the assuming, but of the assumed, the one assuming does not assume the other nature unto its own unity: therefore it does not assume to itself, but to another; and if it does not assume to itself, it does not assume: the assumption therefore unto unity of an individual is not to assume truly and properly, as we now speak of assumption. — On account therefore of the implicit contradiction, for several persons to assume one and the same nature is neither possible nor intelligible. — Therefore the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**

*To 1.* To the first which is objected to the contrary, that one soul is the image of the three; it must be said that an image, by its very account, bespeaks an express representation, not according to the whole of that in which the image is, but according to something of it. But the union which indeed is in the incarnation makes the whole human nature in its individual atom and according to its whole be united to the divine person, so that the whole is given subsistence in the one as in one proper hypostasis. But it is not unfitting that something represent several persons according to differing properties and powers; it is, however, unfitting that one and the same thing be united to several persons unto unity of person; and therefore it does not follow that, if one soul can be the image of the three, it could be united to the three persons simultaneously and at once.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that one person can assume several natures, therefore likewise several persons one nature; it must be said that it is not alike, since, because that union of the incarnation comes to be unto unity of person, not unto unity of nature, a plurality of natures is not repugnant to the union of the incarnation in the way that a plurality of persons is.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that several persons can communicate in the same essence through nature, etc.; it must be said that it is not alike, since the unity of the persons in one substance bespeaks a coming-together in nature; but a coming-together in nature is not repugnant to a distinction in person, just as conversely a diversity in nature is not repugnant to a unity in person. But a gratuitous union does not bespeak a coming-together in nature, but in person; and therefore a plurality of persons is repugnant to the unity of the union. And on this account the aforesaid reasoning does not hold, since it is not alike on the one side and the other.

*To 4.* To that which is asked, what prevents it: it must be said that neither does the person prevent it of itself, nor the human nature of itself, but the mode of union. For because the divine nature is united to the human in a union of person, it is incompossible that in that union there be unity on the part of the extremes and plurality on the part of the middle, in which that union is regarded. Hence just as it is incompossible
that several persons be one person, not on account of the repugnance of the persons, but on account of the inclusion of two opposites; so it is to be understood in the case proposed.

Now these things have been said concerning the incarnation itself according to that mode according to which it brings about the communication of idioms, by which mode the Son of God was made man. And in this mode it is impossible to understand that several persons assume one and the same man, as Anselm shows, and as the foregoing reasons show. In this, however, every other mode of assumption is not excluded, since, because God can do many things which our intellect cannot grasp, who will dare to assert that three persons could not assume one and the same man? For nothing seems to prevent the three persons from being able through grace to effect this, that they be persons of one singular nature in time, since that nature is possible, and wholly obedient with respect to any person whatever in the Trinity. — And to this extent some wished to say, not unreasonably, that the three persons could assume one man in unity of an individual; and if this be understood reasonably, it can be sustained reasonably enough. Nor does the word of Anselm stand against it, nor do those things which have been predetermined. For they do not wish to say that that assumption would be terminated at individual unity on the part of the assuming, but that the three persons, if they were to assume one man, would be one man, so that in those three persons there would be a common unity of the assumed singular nature, not a unity of person. — But whatever there be of this, this is to be held as beyond doubt, that by the predetermined mode of assuming it is impossible that several persons assume one and the same man, on account of the implication of an implicit contradiction; since it would follow that the Son would be the Father.