Dist. 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/1/q/bon-sent-III-d1-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the incarnation of the Word as regards fittingness.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal matter, namely concerning the incarnation of the Word as regards fittingness. And about this four things are asked.

First it is asked, whether in the work of the incarnation due fittingness is preserved. — Second, what was the principal reason for the incarnation. — Third, which of the three persons was more suited to the incarnation. — Fourth it is asked, what hour of time was more fitting.

### Question I. *Whether in the work of the incarnation due fittingness is preserved on God's part.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether in the work of the incarnation due fittingness is preserved on God's part. And that it is so, seems to follow.

1. Infinite power, wisdom, and goodness ought to manifest themselves perfectly; but they cannot manifest themselves perfectly except through an effect in some way infinite; but nothing is infinite in act except God alone: therefore, in order that the infinity of the divine power, wisdom, and goodness be manifested, it was fitting that some effect be made, to which it would be attributed to be God, which is the infinite good. But this came to pass when God was united to flesh: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the most perfect agent ought to bring its action to a settled state and completion; but the settled state and completion of things is the joining of the first with the last; but the principle, *through which all things were made,* is the Word, that is, God; but the last among works is man: therefore, in order that the operation proceeding from a perfect power should be perfect, it was fitting that the divine nature be united with the human.

3. Likewise, it happens that a plurality of natures is found in one person; but that one nature should be found in several persons in no way multiplied, this pertains to the dignity of the divine nature: therefore by parity of reasoning, that one person should in no way subsist composed in three natures or substances, this pertains to the dignity of the person. But every property of dignity belongs preeminently to the divine person: therefore it is very fitting that the divine person should have in itself three natures. But this comes to pass through the sacrament of the incarnation: therefore it seems that in the incarnation due fittingness is preserved.

4. Likewise, it is fitting that the most bountiful rewarder reward those who love him perfectly; but man, who is a lover of God, is not perfectly beatified except in God himself, who is the whole reward, nor is he perfectly beatified unless he is beatified totally, both on the part of the body and on the part of the soul, and on the part of the exterior sense and on the part of the interior sense; but the exterior sense cannot be beatified except in a corporeal thing: therefore, since it befitted God to beatify man perfectly, and God beatifies man in himself, by giving himself as a reward; it befitted [man] to have a nature not only spiritual, but also corporeal. And this is from the incarnation: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, it befitted [God] to reconcile to himself man, who had sinned through weakness; but where there is a fitting reconciliation, there it is fitting that there be a reconciler and mediator; but a mediator ought to have communication with each of the extremes; but this is only through the union of the divine and human nature in the unity of the person: therefore it seems that the work of the incarnation was most fitting to the divine mercy.

**Sed contra:**

1. Nothing that pertains to contemptibility and abjection befits the supreme Majesty: but to assume flesh, which is formed from the slime, bespeaks contemptibility: therefore it seems that this in no way befits the majesty of God.

2. Likewise, just as excessive exaltation is blameworthy, so excessive abasement is blameworthy; but the abasement is as great, when God becomes man, as the exaltation is, when man desires to be God: therefore the one is as blameworthy as the other. If therefore nothing that is blameworthy befits God, it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, it in no way befits the most wise Creator to make any thing exceed the limits which he had set for it by nature: therefore, since every creature, as far as concerns the nature of creation, is always below God and within the limits of the creature; it seems that it is in no way fitting that God should make a creature to be God: therefore the work of the incarnation does not seem to befit him, by which man is said to be God.

4. Likewise, *the name which is above every name* ought to belong to one nature alone: therefore it does not seem fitting that such a name of God be communicated to a creature: therefore it does not seem fitting that he should assume man into the unity of the person.

5. Likewise, whoever adores God in a carved image does God an injury: therefore by parity of reasoning, he who believes that God has a human form does injury to the divine nature: therefore it seems that it is not fitting for the divine nature to be incarnated or made man. — In this manner the unbelievers are accustomed to argue.

### Conclusio

> It was fitting and it befitted God to be incarnated.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that without doubt it was fitting and it befitted God to be incarnated; and this on account of the eminent manifestation of his power, wisdom, and goodness, which indeed came to pass in the assumption of the human race. — It was also fitting on account of the excellent consummation of the divine works, which indeed came to pass when the last was joined to the first. For there is the consummation of perfection, as appears in a circle, which is the most perfect of figures, which also terminates at the same point from which it began. — It was also fitting on account of the superabundant payment of the price for the liberation of captive man, since it was the divine person alone that outweighed the whole human race. — Lastly it was fitting on account of the superoverflowing glorification of man, that man should find in God not only pasture within, but even pasture without.

And thus it is clear that the work of the incarnation befitted God greatly in every way, both as regards his infinity and as regards his perfection and as regards his mercy and as regards his liberality: as regards infinity in himself, as regards perfection in operating, as regards mercy in liberating, and as regards liberality in rewarding. — The arguments showing that the sacrament of the incarnation befits God are therefore to be conceded.

*Ad 1.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that it does not befit the divine majesty to be humbled; it must be said that *God being humbled* can be understood in two ways: either *in himself,* or *by reason of that which is united to him.* In himself indeed, since he is altogether invariable, he can neither be humbled nor be exalted. But by reason of that which is united to him he can be humbled unto the greater manifestation of his loftiness, just as he can be made weak unto the greater manifestation of his strength. For in this, that God assumed humble and weak flesh, he cast down the most proud devil and exalted humble man; he shattered the mightiest adversary, he established weak man. And in this the manifestation of power and wisdom was eminently made. For if *the weakness of God is more powerful than all men, and the foolishness of God is wiser than all men* and even than the demons; it is plain that his power and wisdom infinitely surpass all things.

And therefore, even though the work of the incarnation does not in itself seem to make for the honor of the divine manifestation, yet if it is considered in relation to that for which it is, it does so most elegantly. And therefore the sacrament of the incarnation is veiled from heretics and blind unbelievers, who say that the work of the incarnation makes for the ignominy of the divine majesty, when on the contrary it makes for the most excellent glory.

*Ad 2.* To that which is objected, that the humiliation there was excessive; it can be answered, as has been said, that the divine nature was not humbled by any abasement; but when the creature desired to be God, it was puffed up by a certain exaltation; and therefore the excess on this side does not sound as a vice, as it does on that side. — Moreover, in another respect the likeness fails, because the self-emptying which came to pass in the assumption of human nature was from an excess of charity and love; but the elevation by which man wished to liken himself to God was from an excess of presumption. And because the excess of presumption and exaltation is blameworthy, and the excess of love in the supreme God is praiseworthy; hence it is that the self-emptying of Christ was not blameworthy, but praiseworthy, just as the exaltation of the first parent was blameworthy; for it proceeded from the exceeding charity, of which it was treated above in the authority: *God, on account of the exceeding charity with which he loved us,* etc.

*Ad 3.* To that which is objected, that he ought not to draw a creature beyond its limits; it must be said that the creature in Christ remains within the limits of the creature, yet by reason of the person, in which it is substantified, it has a communication of idioms and participates in the divine name, for the reason that that union effects a communication of idioms, with the properties of the assuming and the assumed preserved.

*Ad 4.* And through this the reply to what follows is clear, which is objected concerning the communication of the most excellent name; for God communicates neither his name nor his glory to another. For one and the same, who is Christ, is man and God; whence, when the name of the divinity is attributed to the man, this is by reason of the divine hypostasis. Likewise it is to be understood concerning the honor of latria, as will appear below.

*Ad 5.* To that which is objected, that he does an injury to God who believes that he has a [bodily] form; it must be said that this is true when one believes that he has a form in his own nature; because such a one believes that he is something corporeal, when he is the most noble spirit. But the incarnation does not effect that he has a form in himself, but that he is united to one who has a form, the spirituality and nobility of God being nonetheless preserved. Whoever therefore so holds God to be incarnated, since nothing is detracted from his nobility and perfection, and much of exaltation and dignity is added to the human race, not only does not derogate from God, but even greatly commends the goodness of God; and on the contrary, he who denies this diminishes the goodness of God, as far as in him lies.