Dist. 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/1/q/bon-sent-III-d1-a2-q2
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### Question II. *What was the principal reason for the incarnation.*

Secondly it is asked, what was the principal reason for the incarnation. And that it was the redemption of the human race is shown as follows:

**Arguments.**

1. To the Galatians, fourth chapter, where it is said: *But when the fullness of time came, God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the Law, that he might redeem those who were under the Law.* If, therefore, the Apostle assigns the principal reason for the mission of the Son of God into the flesh, it seems that our redemption is its principal reason. If you say that the Apostle does not say this as the principal cause; against this is objected what the same Apostle says to the Hebrews, second chapter, where, speaking of Christ: *He likewise partook of the same, that through death he might destroy* him, etc.; and afterward: *For nowhere does he take hold of the angels;* the Gloss: « He partook, that he might sanctify and free men; and this cause is rightly assigned, because, if he were not going to free them, he would not have partaken with them, which appears in the angels, since nowhere does he take hold of the angels ». But that, with the positing of which something is posited, and with the removal of which it is removed, is assigned as the principal and chief cause: therefore it seems that the incarnation was principally brought about for the reparation of the human race.

2. Likewise, in the Psalm: *I am stuck fast in the mire of the deep;* the Gloss of Augustine: « Would that man had remained in that which God made; for if he had remained in that which God made, he would not have been stuck fast in the mire which God begot »: therefore, if man had stood firm, the incarnation would not have been brought about: therefore the principal reason for the incarnation seems to be man's reparation.

3. Likewise, Augustine on John, treating that passage of John, eleventh chapter: *Behold, he whom you love is sick:* « If the Lord did not love sinners, he would not have descended from heaven to earth »: therefore it seems that the principal reason for the incarnation was the freeing of the sinner.

4. Likewise, if God assumed human nature, either this was on account of human dignity, or on account of necessity. If on account of dignity, since the angelic nature is more worthy than the human, he ought rather to have assumed the angelic. If on account of necessity, and the necessity of need exists only on account of sin; it seems that the principal reason was that he assumed man, the redemption of the human race.

5. Likewise, the work of the incarnation was of the greatest grace, for which man is most bound to thanksgiving; but man is more bound to be grateful to God, and the grace becomes greater for him, when some benefit is bestowed upon him of which he is unworthy, in the state in which he is unworthy, and for his liberation, than if it were to be bestowed upon him otherwise: therefore if fallen man is most indebted to God for the benefit of the incarnation, it seems that if he had not fallen, he would not have been incarnated, nor would such a benefit have been bestowed upon him.

Therefore the principal reason for the incarnation seems to be the redemption of the human race.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the Spirit and the Soul*: « He assumed the whole man, that he might beatify the whole »; but man was to be wholly beatified, and so fully beatified, had he not fallen, just as if he had fallen: therefore if man had not fallen, God would have been incarnated: therefore it does not seem that the principal reason for the incarnation is the freeing of the human race.

2. Likewise, on that passage to the Hebrews, second chapter: *Nowhere does he take hold of the angels;* the Gloss: « It was not given to the angelic nature that a divine person should be united to it ». If, therefore, this dignity was given to human nature, and to human nature nothing is given in vain: therefore if it had not sinned, such a dignity would not have remained void: therefore it would still be united with the divine nature: therefore the freeing of the human race is not the principal reason.

3. Likewise, it was as fitting for God to manifest his infinity and perfection and liberality, had man stood firm, as if he had fallen: therefore if he does all these things in the work of the incarnation, it seems that the incarnation would have been, even if man had not fallen; and so the same as before.

4. Likewise, it is of as great nobility and difficulty to vindicate or to acquire for oneself an infinite good, as to make satisfaction for an offense which is against an infinite good: if, therefore, man could not make satisfaction for himself for the offense by which he had offended God, so neither can he of himself merit to have God. Therefore, just as it was fitting that the Son of God be incarnated, when man had fallen, that he might make satisfaction for man, so it seems that it was fitting that the Son of God be incarnated, with man standing firm, that man might be able to merit through him.

5. Likewise, the things which were introduced only on the occasion of sin proceeded from God not principally, but occasionally: therefore if the incarnation was brought about principally for the expiation of sin, the soul

of Christ was made not by a principal intention, but as it were by a certain occasion. If, therefore, it is unfitting that the noblest creature be introduced occasionally, since an agent principally intends the nobler works, it seems that it is unfitting to say that the incarnation was brought about on account of man's reparation.

6. Likewise, in the incarnation of the Son of God human nature is greatly exalted: if, therefore, God is incarnated from this, that human nature sinned; it seems that man derives advantage from wickedness. Therefore if this does not befit the divine rewarder, it is plain, etc.

7. Likewise, Christ is the head of the Church not only according to his divine nature, but also the human, as Augustine shows on John: but if man had not sinned, there would still be the body of the Church: therefore either the Son of God would be incarnated, or the body of the Church would remain headless. Therefore if that is impossible, it remains that God would be incarnated, had man not sinned: therefore the same as before.

8. Likewise, if man had not fallen, there would nonetheless have been the Sacrament of matrimony: if, therefore, the Sacrament of matrimony in the joining of the sexes states or signifies the joining of Christ and the Church as to the union of the natures, on account of the inseparability, as is said to the Ephesians, fifth chapter: *This is a great Sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church:* therefore if man had stood firm, either the Sacrament of matrimony would be false, or the Son of God would be incarnated. But the first is impossible: therefore it remains, etc.

9. Likewise, there is a fourfold mode of bringing man into being. « For it happens that man is brought forth from a man and a woman; it happens that he is brought forth without a man and a woman; it happens that he is brought forth from a man without a woman; and from a woman without a man »; but three of these modes would have been, had man stood firm, as is plain: therefore it seems that the fourth too would have been, by which he was brought forth from a woman alone. But this fourth is in the incarnation: therefore if man had stood firm, the incarnation would have been; or if not, then one mode of the production of men would be lacking, and so the universe would not be perfect; and this is a very great absurdity. For Augustine says that the universe has such perfection that no one can reasonably find anything imperfect in it nor reasonably add anything, just as he himself says in the book *On Free Will:* that our intellect can understand nothing which would escape that supreme art.

### Conclusion.

> The principal reason for the incarnation seems to have been the redemption of the human race, although many other reasons of fittingness are annexed to this reason.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this there is a twofold opinion of the masters.

For some have wished to say that one may speak of the incarnation in two ways. For the incarnation is the assumption of flesh: but concerning the assumed flesh one may speak in two ways: either as to its substance, or as to the defect of passibility. If discourse is made of it as to the defect of passibility and mortality, they say that the principal reason for the incarnation was the redemption of the human race. For unless man had sinned and fallen and were to be redeemed, Christ would not have assumed mortal flesh. — But if we speak of the incarnation, according as it states the assumption of human nature, speaking absolutely; thus they have said that the principal reason for the incarnation is not the freeing of the human race, because, even if man had not sinned, Christ would have been incarnated; but the reason for this is the manifold perfection arising from the dignity of that work. For the incarnation contributes to the perfection of man — and consequently to the perfection of the whole universe — in this, that it completes and gives completion to the human race, according to that which regards nature, and according to that which regards grace, and according to that which regards glory. According to that which regards nature, because in the incarnation there is the consummation of the modes of bringing man into being. There is also a consummation in comparison to the perfection of the agent in this, that in the incarnation man, who is the last, is joined to his principle by a union than which there is none greater under God. — It also contributes to the perfection of man, as to that which re-

gards grace, because in the incarnation Christ assumes human nature, by reason of which he fully has being as the head of the whole Church, the members of whose body are to be united by reason of charity and grace. And together with this it contributes to the perfection of merit, because all merits depend upon and are bettered by the merit of Christ. — It also contributes to the perfection of glory in this, that man in his God finds pastures both as to the bodily part and as to the spiritual part, whether he goes in or goes out, which he would not do, were God not incarnated. — Also the appetite of the whole human nature is completed, when through the work of the incarnation the noblest aptitude, which was in human nature, according to which it was unitable to the divine, is brought to perfect act. — And by reason of this manifold perfection, which arises from the work of the incarnation, it was fitting that God be incarnated. And because this manifold perfection does not only regard the state of fallen nature, but rather also regards the state of nature well instituted; therefore, if man had not fallen, God would nonetheless have been incarnated, because it was thus fitting that man be perfect both according to nature and according to grace and according to glory, just as if he were in the fallen state, and in a certain way more so, even according to this opinion. — And those who follow this opinion concede the reasons which are adduced for this part. But the reasons to the contrary and the authorities they evade by this, that they say these are to be understood according as the incarnation is called the assumption of mortal and passible flesh. For Scripture, and the Saints, speak of the incarnation according to that mode which was after the fall, not according to that mode which would have been, with man persisting in the state of innocence.

But the opinion of others was that the principal reason for the incarnation is the reparation of the human race, although there are many other reasons of fittingness annexed to this. For this is the principal one with respect to all, because, unless the human race had fallen, the Word of God would not have been incarnated. — And the reason for this is that the incarnation of God is of a surpassing condescension; and therefore, since there is therein a certain excess, the mystery of the incarnation would not have been introduced, unless an opposite excess, to be corrected and restored through it, had preceded. Hence, unless God had lost his sheep, he would not have descended from heaven to earth.

But which of these modes of speaking is truer, he knows who deigned to be incarnated for us. And which of them is to be preferred to the other is difficult to see, for the reason that each mode is catholic and is upheld by catholic men. Each mode too rouses the soul to devotion according to diverse considerations.

But the first mode seems to accord more with the judgment of reason; the second, however, as it appears, accords more with the piety of faith: first, because it agrees more with the authorities of the Saints and of Sacred Scripture. For both the New and the Old Testament, where they speak of the descent of the Son of God, render the freeing of the human race as the reason, which is plain by going through them one by one. The Saints too say this, as is plain in the authorities set down above. And therefore, if the divine words assign the noblest and principal reason for the incarnation, and nothing is even to be said by us beyond those things which have become clear to us from the Sacred Words; it seems more consonant with the piety of faith that the principal reason for the incarnation be the freeing of the human race, than to think otherwise. And this Augustine openly says in the book *On the Words of the Apostle,* in the seventieth sermon, treating that passage of Matthew, eighteenth chapter: *For the Son of Man came to save that which had perished:* « If man had not perished, the Son of Man would not have come ». And more expressly in the same place, treating that passage of the first to Timothy, first chapter: *He came into this world to save sinners:* « For no other cause than to save sin-

ners ». And in the same place he says much pertaining to this. And in that prayer which begins: *O aromatic cell*, which is said to be Augustine's, this very thing is held most expressly. To this also agree the words of Bernard and the Gloss on the said passage of the Epistle to Timothy.

Secondly, the aforesaid mode agrees more with the piety of faith, because it honors God more than the preceding. For the preceding says that it befitted God to be incarnated for the perfection of the universe; and therefore in a certain way it encloses God within the perfection of the universe and posits a certain necessity of the incarnation upon him, when it says that his works are not otherwise brought to perfection. But this mode of speaking, when it says that the mystery of the incarnation is above all perfection, posits that Christ is above all perfection of the universe, whether as to nature, or as to grace, or as to glory. And in this it does rightly; because, as the Philosopher says in the eleventh book of the *First Philosophy,* God is to be placed above the whole order of the universe, just as a general is said to be not of the army, but above the army.

Thirdly, this mode of speaking commends the mystery of the incarnation more, when it says that this mystery is so great that it ought not to have been done except from the greatest cause, namely on account of appeasing the divine wrath and restoring all things, *whether those which are in the heavens, or those which are on earth*. And therefore they say that so great a mystery would not have been introduced, unless the fall of the noblest creature and the offense against the divine majesty had preceded.

Fourthly, it also more inflames faithful affection. For it more rouses the devotion of the faithful soul that God was incarnated to blot out one's sins than on account of consummating works already begun.

Since, therefore, this mode of speaking, even if it does not seem to be so subtle as the preceding, accords more with the piety of faith, in this that it agrees more with the authorities of the Saints, and honors God more, also commends the mystery of the incarnation more, and more ardently inflames our affection: therefore it must be conceded, as the aforesaid authorities and reasons show, that the principal reason for the incarnation was the redemption of the human race, although many other reasons of fittingness are annexed to this reason.

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that he assumed the whole man, that he might beatify the whole; it must be said that this is not the principal reason, but one annexed to the principal, for the reason that, even if God had never been incarnated, man, by the glorification of his body and the vision of God, would be perfectly and totally beatified. For the corporeal vision of Christ pertains not to the essential completion of beatitude, but to a certain accidental joy. And this is plain, because the other senses are beatified, like sight, and yet will not have objects corresponding to them, like touch, taste. — Moreover, the gaze of Christ will be no less blessed turned toward beholding other bodies, than the gaze of others turned toward beholding his body. For the glory of the exterior senses will be by a redundance of the delight coming from the higher part, from the vision of God, whose vision so refreshes, when it perfectly appears, that nothing further is necessary to the soul for its beatitude; since every other good and beautiful thing, compared to that, is as it were nothing, nor can it intend the essential joy. — Hence he seems greatly to derogate from the highest Good who says that it does not suffice, without a created good joined to it, to beatify man perfectly, unless he says this comes about on account of an imperfection of the sense, which cannot reach to it. But then many things will stand in the way, whether by reason of the other senses, which do not have their objects, like sight, and yet are perfectly beatified; or by reason of the gaze of Christ, who looks upon the other Saints; or also by reason of the perfection of beatitude, which does not make man beg anything extrinsically; or also, because the opposite could not be understood, that a glorified man could be absent from the presence of Christ without detriment to his glory.

2. To that which is objected, that in human nature there is given a fittingness or aptitude for the incarnation; it must be said that that aptitude is regarded principally on the part of man's reparability, although by reason of dignity and the other conditions it is regarded in some way; and therefore, just as man would not have been repaired, had he not fallen, although he was reparable; so he would not have been united to the Divinity, although he was unitable. Yet that potency would not have been in vain, because there are many potencies and aptitudes which are not brought to act; nor yet are they in vain, because they attest to the nobility and dignity of the nature. Nor is a potency called in vain if it is not reduced to act; but then it is in vain, when it is not reduced to act, and yet time and place demand that it be reduced to act.

3. To that which is objected, that it befits God's power and wisdom to be manifested in the state of innocence; it must be said that he manifested himself sufficiently enough through the work of creation and distinction and adornment: and therefore if those had persisted, since they were very good, it would not have been necessary to add a new mode of acting for the manifestation; just as miraculous works were done after man's fall, which it was not necessary to do before, because God's power, wisdom and goodness was known and shone forth sufficiently in his effects. But now it is fitting and becoming that God do many works miraculously for the manifestation of his power and the confirmation of our faith. So

too in the matter at hand it must be understood, as the Saints say, that because man through sin had his interior light darkened and had been turned toward sensible things and loved them; therefore the invisible God was made visible according to the flesh, that through visible things he might lead back to the knowing and loving of invisible things. And this is what Gregory says in a certain Preface: « That while we visibly know God, we may through him be caught up into love of invisible things ».

4. To that which is objected, that it is as difficult to merit eternal life as to make satisfaction for an offense; it must be said that this is false, because for the merit of eternal life the complacency on the part of the one meriting suffices, and for this complacency the divine grace suffices. And because man could have divine grace through the mission of the Holy Spirit and of the Son into the mind without the mission of the Son into the flesh; hence it is that for the perfection of the merit of eternal life it was not necessary that the incarnation intervene. — But for making satisfaction it is required not only that the one satisfying be pleasing, but that he be able to recompense the harm and restore to God the honor taken away, as will be seen better below; and therefore there was not so great a necessity of the incarnation on account of the necessity of meriting, as on account of the necessity of making satisfaction. And that this is true is plain in the angels, whose nature is not united to the Word, and yet they merited eternal life. — Moreover, granted that it be of such great difficulty, yet it is not necessary that on account of this an incarnation be necessary, for the reason that the Holy Spirit himself, who through charity moves the soul, makes it worthy of everlasting glory. Hence neither comes about without the mission of some person; but for making satisfaction the mission into the flesh is necessary, because, as will be plain below, the most fitting mode of making satisfaction was through death and passion, just as the most fitting mode is for meriting through charity and love.

5. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ ought to have been brought forth by a principal intention; it must be said that God — because from eternity he foreknew the fall of the human race — therefore did it, because he knew he would recover it, and therefore the reparation of the fallen was more principally in his intention than its condition possible-to-fall. And on account of this it does not follow that God did not predestine Christ principally, just as also the others, indeed much more principally. For this would hold, if God in the condition of the human race had not foreknown their fall; for then it would have followed as it were beside intention.

6. To that which is objected, that human nature is exalted on account of the incarnation; it must be said that it is without doubt true; but from this it does not follow that it derived advantage from wickedness, because this came about not from its wickedness, but from the highest divine benignity and wisdom. For because God's wisdom overcomes wickedness, hence it is that he does not allow any evil to exist from which he does not draw forth a good, and even a greater good; otherwise he would not perfectly overcome wickedness. And therefore against the transgression of Adam, who slew the whole human race, he established the rectitude of the second Adam, who could make satisfaction for the whole human race, and whose obedience would please him much more than the disobedience of the first Adam could displease. — Likewise this came about from the divine goodness, by which God is full of love and mercy. And therefore for those who love him, whom he called Saints according to his purpose, he makes all things work unto good for them; hence our wickedness did not cause the Son of God to be incarnated, but God's exceeding charity and mercy, according to what was said in the authority set down before: *But God, who is rich in mercy, on account of his exceeding charity* etc.

7. To that which is objected, that Christ is the head of the Church according to his human nature; it must be said that there is a twofold property of the head: one, which is regarded according to conformity to the members; the other, which is regarded according to the inflowing of gratuitous gifts. By reason of the first property Christ is the head insofar as he is man; by reason of the second Christ is the head insofar as he is God, and by reason of this he principally holds the account of head. And therefore, granted that he were not incarnated, the Church would still not lack a head; because the head of the man would be God, and so the Church of men would have God as head, just as the Church of the angels has. And therefore it does not follow that the body of the Church would be headless, although it would not have a head according to every property which it has now; for it would then have God as head, just as now the Church of the angels has.

8. To that which is objected, that matrimony signifies the joining of the natures; it must be said that matrimony has a twofold signification. For it signifies the joining of God to the Church according to charity, and it also signifies the joining according to the union in the unity of the person; and it has both of these significations according to the state of the fall, but it would have had the other, had man stood firm; and therefore it would not be a false sign. For just as matrimony is now for *duty* and *remedy,* but then would have been only for *duty;* so matrimony now has a twofold signification, but then would have had one.

9. To that which is objected, that there is a fourfold mode of the production of men; it must be said that that fourth mode of producing man is not *of* the perfection of the universe, but *above* the perfection of the universe. And therefore Jeremiah calls it new, when he says: *The Lord will make a new thing upon the earth;* but this new thing the Lord would not have done, unless some oldness had preceded. And therefore it does not follow that, if man had stood firm, such a mode of producing man would even be. Nor from this does it follow that the universe would lack its perfection; just as also no imperfection of the universe can be argued as to the raising of the dead, which God would not have done, had man persisted. — It could also be said that from that mode of production the truth of the incarnation cannot be argued, because God could produce a man from a woman without a man, who nonetheless would not be God.

Now all these things are said without prejudice; for I do not wish to constrain the goodness of God, but to commend the excess of his charity toward fallen man, that our affections may be roused to loving him, while we attend to the excess of his exceeding love.