Dist. 10, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/10/q/bon-sent-III-d10-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the comparison of Christ as man to the condition of personality.*

### Question I. *Whether this is to be admitted: that Christ, as man, is God.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether this is to be admitted: that Christ, as man, is God. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. *(On the affirmative side.)* In Philippians 2: *He gave him a name* etc.; the Gloss: « Inasmuch as a man he assumed the name of God not by usurpation, but truly »; but what one truly assumed one truly has: therefore if, as man, he assumed the name of God, then, as man, he is truly God.

2. Likewise, Christ was *predestined to be Son of God in power*, as is said in Romans 1; but Christ is, as man, that to which he was predestined, as man: if therefore he was predestined to be Son of God, as man, then Christ is God and Son of God, as man.

3. Likewise, Christ according to the grace of union is God and man; but the grace of union and any grace whatever belongs to Christ himself according to his human nature: therefore if according to the grace of union he is God, and as man he has the grace of union, then as man he is God.

4. Likewise, Christ, insofar as he was forgiving sins, is God: but as man he was forgiving sins: therefore as man he is God. The *major* is manifest; the *minor* is proved through that which is said in Matthew 9: *But that you may know that the Son of man has power on earth to forgive sins* etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. *(The foundations.)* Everything that belongs to anything, insofar as it is that thing, is either a *per se accident*, or a *definition*, or *part of a definition*; but God is not related in this way to man or to human nature: therefore etc. The *first* is manifest through demonstrative doctrine; the *second* is manifest through itself.

2. Likewise, things that are disparate are not predicated of the same thing and according to the same respect; but to be an animal and to be God are disparate predicates: if therefore to be an animal belongs to Christ himself, as man, then to be God does not belong to the same according to his humanity.

3. Likewise, Christ, as God, lacks a beginning: if therefore he is God, as man; it follows that God, as man, lacks a beginning. But as man he has a beginning: therefore insofar as he has a beginning, he lacks a beginning: therefore the opposite is the ground of its opposite; which is absurd.

4. Likewise, if some predicate belongs to a subject according to something, then with that removed, it does not belong to it: therefore if Christ is God, as man, then if Christ were not man, he would not be God. But he was not man except in time: therefore Christ is God only in time. But it is established that this is false: therefore it is false that Christ, as man, is God.

### Conclusion.

> That Christ is God, as man, ought not to be admitted, unless it be taken improperly, namely according to the indivision of concomitance.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as the Master says in the text, this word *secundum* (insofar as) admits of multiple understandings. *(The word "secundum" is understood in two ways.)* For it can import the relation of a cause, or the indivision or unity of concomitance. If it states the relation of a cause, *(first conclusion)* then without doubt the locution is false, because the condition appended is in no way the cause of the predicate, nor the ground according to which nor through which such a predicate is in that subject. — But if it states the indivision of concomitance, *(second conclusion)* then it can hold truth. For then to say that Christ is God, as man, is nothing other than to say that to be God belongs to the person of Christ existing in a human nature, in such a way that divinity and humanity accompany one another inseparably about the same person.

But this way of taking this word *secundum* is not so common and proper, as *(third conclusion)* the preceding one, although it is found sometimes. — And thus it is clear that the aforesaid statement, namely that Christ, as man, is God, according to the diverse understanding of this preposition *secundum*, can in one way be conceded, in another way denied. For it ought to be denied, insofar as it states a cause or formal ground; and along this path proceed the reasons for the second part; and because they conclude truly along that path, therefore they are to be conceded.

*(The resolution of the opposed arguments.)* 1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that he assumed the name of God, as man; it can be answered that *secundum* there states a concomitance through the indivision of the union; for because that union made the man God, therefore he is said to have assumed the supreme name, as man. — *(Another solution.)* Otherwise it can be said that when I say "to assume the name of God," I say two things, namely the loftiness of the name itself and the acquisition of that name. When therefore he says that he assumed the name of God, as man, that reduplication does not state the ground of the *name*, but of the *acquisition*. For Christ according to his divine nature has the name which is above every name, by generation, not by acquisition or assumption; and therefore from this it is not licit to infer: therefore he is God, as man, taking the *secundum quod* (insofar as) according to the same acceptation; rather it is an *accident* in that process.

2. To that which is objected, that he was predestined to be Son of God, as man; the response is now clear by the same point that has just been said, because this word *secundum* states rather a concomitance according to the expression of the condition of the nature, than that it states the relation of a cause. — *(Another solution.)* Or it can be said that that statement states the ground of *antecedence*, which is imported in the word "predestination," which, I say, is not with respect to Christ according to his divine nature, but only according to his human. But it is not so concerning that which is to be God; and therefore there is a like defect in this reason, as in the preceding.

3. To that which is objected concerning the grace of union, it must be said that "Christ" signifies the person in two natures; and that person is God by nature, not by the grace of union; nevertheless it is said at the same time that he is God and man by the grace of union. *(Note.)* Yet granted that this is to be conceded: that this man is God according to the grace of union; from this it is not had that he is God, as man; because the grace of union does not belong to that man, as man *simply*, but as man *united*, or according to his assumption by the Word.

4. To that which is objected last, that he was forgiving sins, as man; if we speak properly of the forgiveness of sin, it is false, unless this word *secundum* be taken as it imports concomitance. *(Note.)* Nor can it be inferred from that authority: *the Son of man has the power of forgiving sins*; for this power, even if he had it in himself *in* the form of a man, he nevertheless did not have *according to* the form of a man and inasmuch as man, but inasmuch as he had the form of God. But if the forgiveness of sins were attributed to someone as regards *merit*, then it could be conceded that it would belong to Christ, as man; but from this it does not follow that he is God inasmuch as man, because this is not proper to God.