Dist. 10, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/10/q/bon-sent-III-d10-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first there is inquiry concerning that distinction which the Master lays down: *Secundum* (according to) sometimes expresses a condition of nature, sometimes a unity of person, sometimes a habit, sometimes a cause. For this distinction seems to be *unmethodical* and *superfluous* and *defective*. It is *unmethodical*, because these members seem to have no coherence. It seems *superfluous*,
because by the same force by which it signifies a property of nature it signifies the unity and property of the person. The distinction also seems *defective*, because, just as it can signify a *habit*, so likewise it can signify the *nine genera of accidents*: therefore it seems that to these members eight members ought to have been added. — Likewise it is asked where it is taken so diversely, since it does not seem to have so many senses.

**I respond:** It must be said that this distinction (*Note*), although it may seem crude, is nevertheless quite reasonable, and this if one attends to that upon which it is founded. For (*Distinction*) by the first division this preposition *secundum* can signify *concomitance* or *cause*. If it signifies cause, then it is a fourth member; if concomitance, then (*Subdistinction*) it can signify it in three ways: either according to *inherence*, or according to *union*, or according to *adjacency* or assistance. If according to *inherence*, then it signifies a property of nature; for a property inheres in that of which it is the property. If according to *union*, then it signifies a property of the person. If according to *assistance* or adjacency, then it states a habit. — But the fourth member, which is of the principal division, the Master does not subdivide. It can nevertheless be divided according to the four genera of causes. — For in all these ways this word *secundum* is wont to be taken, as (*Examples*) can be shown by examples. For if it be said: Christ, as man, was passible; thus it signifies a *condition of nature*. If it be said: Christ, as man, created the stars; thus it signifies *unity of person*. If it be said: Christ, as man, was clothed and shod and *found as a man*; thus it signifies a habit. If it be said: Christ, as God, created the world, and as man preached the divine word; thus it signifies *efficient cause*. If it be said: Christ, as God, is the supposit of the divine nature, and as man is a rational animal; thus it signifies *formal cause*. If it be said: Christ, as God and man, is our reward; thus it signifies *final cause*. — But many fitting examples of this kind can be found. But concerning *material cause* according to the *divine* nature it does not happen that one finds [an example]; according to the *human*, however, it does happen, as if it be said: Christ, as man, was conceived of the most pure blood of the Virgin.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says, that *we are called adopted sons, because, having been born sons of wrath, we are made through grace sons of God*. For if this is true, then the blessed Angels and man in the state of innocence would not have been adopted sons: therefore neither would they have had a right in the inheritance of the kingdom; which is absurd.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master speaks of adoption according to its full meaning; and thus he posits an *estrangement* which is according to act, which estrangement indeed is an alienation and a being-set-apart from God through fault; and in this way the account of sonship would not belong to the Angels. Yet taking estrangement *more broadly*, whether as regards the fault which is present, or because it could have been present, it extends to all adopted sons. And in this way the Angels can be called sons.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which he says, that *Christ is the son of the Virgin naturally and through grace*. For it seems that these two are not compossible. For if this is *natural*, then it is no longer *gratuitous*, and conversely.

**I respond:** It must be said that the grace of union is not repugnant to, nor incompossible with, the natural property, but rather causes it to be communicated. And the Master speaks here of the grace of union. — Or it can be said (*Otherwise*) that *grace* and *nature* can well be said of the same thing by comparison to diverse things; and so it is in the case at hand. For Christ, insofar as he is man, is the natural son of the Virgin; insofar as he is God, however, he is the son of the Virgin, not by nature nor by adoption, but by the grace of union.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this which Hilary says, that he, namely Christ, is *son by origin, not by adoption; by truth, not by appellation*, etc. For it seems that there is here a *piling-up of words*. For to be a son by origin and by birth is the same. — Likewise it seems that there is *superfluity*. For all sonship is either natural or gratuitous: therefore by *origin* or by *adoption*: hence the other members are superfluous. — Likewise, what is it for someone to be called a son by *appellation*? For either the appellation is *true* or *false*; if true: then either by adoption or by generation; if false: then it ought not to be placed among the aforesaid members. — Likewise, if on account of creation they are called sons, since then asses are created by God, they will be sons of God, which is absurd.

**I respond:** It must be said that in the aforesaid word (*Differences*) Hilary intimates to us four differences of sonship, the sufficiency of which can be had thus. For one is called the son of someone who is from him and is conformed to him; and this can be in two ways: either by natural emanation and in unity of essence, and thus is the (*Note*) only-begotten Son of the Father, whom Hilary says to be a son by *origin*, against Photinus; by *truth*, against Sabellius; by *birth*, against Arius. And this was expounded in the first book. Or it can be from another in diversity of substance; and this can be in three ways according to the threefold mode of conformity. For either he is conformed as regards the account of the natural image, and thus is a son by creation; or as regards the account of the image and likeness, which is regarded in grace and gratuitous gifts, and thus is a son by adoption; or he is conformed in the nature of the image, but is at variance through the disorder of the will, like a sinful man, and thus is a son by appellation.

From these the differences of sonship are clear; the words of the aforesaid distinction are likewise clear, that they are not piled up, but are said very reasonably. The response to the objections is also clear. For not without cause are those three words used; and although *origin* and *birth* can be taken for the same thing, nevertheless one is not set down with the other in vain; for this is for the sake of beating down heresies.

To that which is objected, that every son is either a son by nature or by grace; it must be said that this is false, unless the name of *nature* and of *grace* be extended to that which is from the mere *benevolence* of God, and to that which someone has *from his origin*. And in this way sonship by creation can be said in one way to be by *nature*, in another way by *grace*; but it does not follow on this account that such a one is an adopted son, or a natural son.

To that which is asked concerning sonship by appellation, it must be said that one is called a son in this way who has *conformity* through the nature of the image, but *deformity* through fault; and in this way, I say, that *appellation* has truth in one way, in another way not, because in one way he is a son, in another way an adversary. And therefore he is called a son by appellation alone, just as Abraham said to the damned rich man: *Remember, son*, etc.

To that which is objected last, that if he is a father by creation, he ought to be called the father of beasts; it must be said that it does not follow: because not every creation makes someone be called a son, but that creation in which is conferred the mark of the divine image, by which man is configured to God and made fit for this, that he be an adopted son.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of Ambrose in the text: *By adoption we are sons, but he by the truth of nature*. For since the *made* by truth and the *said* by likeness are not univocal but equivocal, like a painted man and a true man in [the term] man; then sonship belongs to us and to Christ equivocally. And this very thing seems to be confirmed by that which is said in John, chapter twenty: *I ascend to my Father and your Father*; Gregory there: « *Mine* in one way, and *yours* in another way ». But *against this* is the fact that Christ is called *our brother*; but he would not on this account be called *brother*, if we were sons equivocally: therefore, etc. — Likewise, when it is said: God is the *Father of Christ* and *our Father*, [it is] either by the *same* paternity or by *another*. If by the *same*: then if paternity is said uniformly, by parity of reasoning so also sonship. If by *another*: then in the person of the Father there are two paternities, which is simply absurd.

**I respond:** It must be said that we and Christ (*Note*) are called sons of God, neither altogether *equivocally* nor altogether *univocally*; not *univocally*, because one sonship is temporal and gratuitous, the other natural and eternal; not *equivocally*, because by the mediation of that sonship and through conformation to it we are made adopted sons. For just as from the Father *all paternity in heaven and on earth is named*, so from the Son [comes] all sonship. — Likewise, if it be asked whether God is called our Father and the Son's uniformly; it must be said that [it is] neither altogether *uniformly* nor altogether *differently*, because he is called father
of the Son by an eternal and personal paternity, but our father from time and essentially. And just as essence does not enter into number with person, so that there are two things; so neither does one paternity with another, so that there are two paternities. And thus the reasons and objections on either side are clear. For that objection concerning the painted and the true man is not valid; for a painted man has nothing of the truth of [being a] man, whereas an adopted son has something of the truth of [being a] son, although he is not a natural son.

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