Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/11/q/bon-sent-III-d11-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether in Christ's predestination there is a true account of causality in relation to ours.*

Thirdly it is asked whether in Christ's predestination there is a true account of causality in relation to ours. And that it is so, it seems.

1. To the Ephesians, chapter one: *He predestined us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ*; but [this is] only through Christ as predestined: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory says that predestination is aided by the prayers of the Saints: therefore if the merits of Christ have disproportionately more efficacy concerning us than [the merits] of any of the Saints, it remains that our predestination is not only aided by Christ's predestination, but is even caused [by it]; for to aid is in some way to cause.

3. Likewise, as Christ's resurrection stands to our resurrection, so predestination stands to predestination; but Christ's resurrection is the cause of ours, as is said in the Gloss, on the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen: therefore Christ's predestination too is the cause of our predestination.

4. Likewise, we are predestined through him through whom we are saved; but we are saved through Christ, to Titus, chapter three: *According to his mercy he saved us by the laver of regeneration and renovation of the Holy Spirit, whom he poured forth upon us through Jesus Christ*; and to the Ephesians, chapter four, it is said that *he ascended, that he might fill all things*: it remains therefore that we are predestined through Christ. But Christ would not be, unless his predestination had preceded: therefore Christ's predestination is the cause of ours.

**On the contrary:** 1. Nothing eternal has a cause; the predestination of any man is eternal: therefore it is caused by nothing: therefore Christ's predestination cannot be the cause of our predestination. If you should say that this is by reason of the temporal connoted; on the contrary: nothing posterior is the cause of something prior; but the effect of Christ's predestination is posterior to the effect of the predestination of the Fathers: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it does not belong to Christ to be predestined except according to his human nature; but according to his human nature he does not have causality over us: therefore Christ's predestination cannot be the cause of our predestination.

3. Likewise, if Christ's predestination is the cause of ours, [it is so] either by reason of the principal signified, or by reason of the connoted; that it is not by reason of the principal signified, this is established: therefore by reason of the connoted. But on the contrary: grace and glory are from God alone as from a cause: therefore not from Christ's predestination.

4. Likewise, the contingent is not the cause of the necessary; but before Christ's coming it was necessary that some had been predestined, namely those who died in grace; but it was possible that Christ should not be incarnate or born, and thus not be predestined either: therefore his predestination could not be the cause of others.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's predestination, by reason of the connoted, can be called a dispositive cause of our predestination through merit, and an excitative [cause] through example, but not properly an effective [cause].

**I respond:** It must be said that if we speak of the predestination of Christ and ours by reason of the principal signified, neither is the cause of the other, since each is eternal, and all are one in substance. — But if we speak by reason of the connoted, then it must be distinguished that there is a cause in the genus of efficient [cause], which is properly called a cause, of which we now speak; and this is found in a threefold difference, namely dispositive, excitative, and effective. For everything that effects by disposing either disposes, or rouses the one disposing, or [rouses] the one effecting, can in some way be said to effect and to cause.

If therefore we speak of an effective cause properly, then Christ's predestination by reason of the connoted cannot be the cause of ours, since the effect of predestination is from God alone as from an effective principle; for *the Lord will give grace and glory*. But if we speak according to the other two modes, namely

of a dispositive cause through the ground of merit and an excitative [cause] according to the efficacy of example; Christ's predestination as regards the connoted is the cause of ours. For Christ by his grace merited grace and glory for us. Christ also, by the manifest eminence of his grace and glory, roused us to run to the supernal homeland, to which we have been preordained according to the eternal election. — And by this route proceed the arguments which show that Christ's predestination is the cause of our predestination; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected first on the contrary, that our predestination is eternal etc.; it must be said that this is true by reason of the principal signified, not however by reason of the connoted. And if it be objected that the effect of the predestination of some precedes Christ's predestination; the response must be as in the preceding problem, that although it precedes as to the effect of grace, it does not however [precede] as to the effect of glory. Again, although it precedes in actuality, it does not however [precede] in merit and belief. For Christ's merit extends not only to those present, or future, but also by reason of faith to those past; which will better be made manifest below in its place.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that Christ according to his human nature is not the cause of grace, or of glory; it must be said that although he is not an effective cause, he is nevertheless a dispositive and excitative [cause]; and in this way it has been said that Christ's predestination is the cause of our predestination. — And through this is evident the next [point] that is objected, that grace and glory are from God as from a cause. It is true, if it be said of the effective [cause]; but in the other modes it does not hold the truth.

4. To that which is objected, that the contingent is not the cause of the necessary; it must be said that it is true, if it be understood of an efficient and conserving cause, yet it need not be true of an excitative cause. — Yet it can also be said otherwise, that "necessary" is twofold: in one way that which is necessary *per se* and absolutely; in another way that which is necessary on account of this, that it passes into the past, as my having written today; and that is of its own nature contingent, and on account of this nothing prevents it from having a contingent cause. — One can also distinguish within the contingent, that one kind is contingent which depends on the changeableness of the human will and of a created cause; another [is contingent] on account of the freedom and indifference of the divine will, which can act and not act. And although the first contingent cannot be the cause of the necessary, nothing nevertheless prevents [it] in regard to the second.

But the middle way of speaking seems more reasonable. And if you object that it does not solve [the difficulty], because, granted that Christ were not incarnate, still another mode was possible to God, by which the human race might be liberated: therefore, Christ's predestination being removed, our predestination would still be safe: therefore it is not the cause; it must be said that this does not compel [the conclusion] that it is not a cause, but [only] that it is not the whole cause and [a cause] in every mode of causing, it is nevertheless [a cause] in some mode; just as God does some good through some man, and if that man were not, he would nonetheless do it; and yet it does not follow on account of this that that [man] is not a cause. For this mode of arguing does not hold in voluntary matters. — And let these things suffice concerning Christ's predestination on the side of the reality. For above, in distinction seven, it was inquired concerning it on the side of expression.