Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/11/q/bon-sent-III-d11-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the words that seem to imply a beginning.*

Next there is inquiry about those words which seem to imply a beginning. And concerning this three points are to be examined.

First it is asked whether it is to be conceded without qualification that Christ is a creature. — Second, whether it is to be conceded that that man began to be. — Third it is asked whether the man began to be God.

### Question I. *Whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a creature.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus and asks whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a creature. And that it is so is shown by manifold authority.

1. Augustine *to Dardanus*: "As regards the Word, Christ is Creator; as regards the man, Christ is created." — Likewise, Leo

the Pope: "A new and unheard-of agreement: God, who is and who was, becomes a creature." — Damascene also expressly: "He is not scandalized at the name of creature who called himself a servant, or a worm, or a grain born of the earth." The same one likewise: "What is more wonderful than that the Creator be created and the fashioner fashioned?" — Richard of Saint Victor in a certain Sequence: "By power, not by nature, the Creator becomes a creature." — From all these authorities, as by one efficacious argument, it is concluded that Christ is a creature.

2. Likewise, by a more efficacious authority, in Galatians, chapter four: *God sent his Son, made of a woman*, and similarly to the Romans; but everything made is a creature, and the Son of God is made: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it appears by *reason*. In Christ there is the truth of a created nature and of an uncreated nature, and *Christ* names the hypostasis of each nature; but this is true by reason of the divine nature: Christ is Creator, and: that man is Creator: therefore by parity of reason this also: Christ is a creature.

4. Likewise, of whatever the inferior [term] is predicated, the superior [term] is also predicated, by necessary consequence; but *creature* is superior in respect of *man* and *animal*; but this is true without qualification: Christ is man, and this: Christ is an animal: therefore this also is necessarily true: Christ is a creature.

5. Likewise, if Christ is man, [he is] either *created* or *uncreated*; he is not *uncreated*, this is settled, because "there is opposition in the adjunct": therefore he is a *created* man. But a created man is a creature: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, just as the flesh of Christ was conceived, so the soul of Christ was created: therefore, just as by reason of the flesh this was true: Christ is the offspring of the Virgin and conceived of the Virgin; so this will be true: Christ is a creature of God, or created by God. If you *say* that it is not similar on account of the repugnance of the [two] understandings, which is in this [proposition]: Christ is a creature; *on the contrary*: the repugnance is greater when an opposite is predicated of its opposite than when "creature" [is predicated] of Christ; but this is true: Christ is impassible, is immortal, is dead: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Romans, chapter eight: *Every creature is made subject to vanity*; but Christ, since he is God, is not subject to vanity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the meaning of this name *creature* is to be from nothing; but this is repugnant to Christ, since Christ was from eternity: therefore it is not to be conceded that Christ is created.

3. Likewise, everything created begins to be; but Christ was from eternity, since he himself led the sons of Israel out of Egypt: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if Christ is a creature, either this is by reason of *nature* or by reason of *person*; it is not by reason of *nature*, because *nature* is not predicated of Christ; it is not by reason of *person*, because the *person* of Christ is not created, but co-eternal with the Father: therefore it is in no way true that Christ is a creature.

> ### Conclusion
> *The proposition "Christ, or the Son of God, is a creature" is not accepted unless it is qualified.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid statement is commonly not accepted by the doctors of theology: Christ, or the Son of God, is a creature. For they adhere to the words of the Master in the text. — But the reason why it is not accepted is that such a statement is near to error. And it approaches error both because *it was at times wrongly understood* by the Arian heretics, and also because *of itself it is ill-intelligible.* For Arius was saying that the Son of God was a creature; and since *Christ* names the person of the Son of God, he who says that Christ is a creature, without determining according to which nature he understands it, seems himself to say what

Arius impiously held. — It is also *of itself ill-intelligible* on account of the repugnance of the [two] understandings. For "creature," so far as belongs to the account of its own name, expresses a relation to the Creator; it expresses something that has *being* after *non-being*; it expresses also something that has *being* from elsewhere, proceeding through will: therefore in such a locution the understanding of the predicate seems to be repugnant to the understanding of the subject itself according to a threefold dissonance. And therefore the aforesaid statement is *ill-intelligible* and *was ill understood*, and through this it is near to error. — And because "theological speech ought to be catholic and customary, not dissonant from the understanding, and consonant with the thing of which we speak"; therefore the aforesaid statement is not accepted unless it is qualified. — Hence the arguments are to be conceded which show that the aforesaid statement is not to be admitted.

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary concerning the authorities of the Saints, it must be said that the Saints at times speak very *expressly*, more than common usage admits, in order to express something; and such statements ought not to be extended, but rather to be expounded. And so it is in the aforesaid statement, when they say that Christ is a creature; but they say this according to his *human* nature, and they speak truly; nevertheless the statement ought not to be drawn into common usage.

2. To that which is objected from the word of the Apostle, by which it is said: *Made of a woman*; it must be said that the determination itself *of a woman*, and the other determination, which says, to the Romans: *Who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh*, draw this word *made* to standing for or positing its thing about the *assumed* nature. And therefore it does not follow on this account that such locutions are to be conceded without qualification.

3. To that which is objected, that this is conceded without qualification: Christ is Creator; it must be said that it is not similar; since *Christ* names the person of the Word, which is uncreated and of an uncreated nature by its own essence and proper nature. Therefore the word *creature* is not so fittingly attributed to him as *Creator*, because there is not such a dissonance of understandings. *Moreover*, that statement does not so approach the poison of error as does the statement proposed; and so it is clear that it is not to be rejected.

4. To that which is objected, that of whatever the inferior is predicated, the superior is also; it must be said that it is true, so far as concerns the force of *inference.* Hence if this is true: Peter is man, without doubt it is true: Peter is animal; so too it can be conceded that if he is truly *man*, he is truly *creature.* Nevertheless it is not necessary that, if some locution is to be used with the *inferior*, it must be used with the *superior*, on account of the diverse modes of signifying, in one of which the understanding finds consonance, in the other repugnance. And because the doctors reject the aforesaid locution rather on this account, that it can be a way into falsity or error through a wrong mode of understanding, than because it is of itself false or erroneous; therefore the reason is clear.

5. And through this is clear the response to the following objection. For although this be admitted and conceded: Christ is a *created man*; nevertheless it is not to be conceded without qualification that he is *created*, lest it be understood that such a predicate is attributed to him simply and totally, that is, by reason of both natures.

6. To that which is objected, that he is conceived by reason of the flesh, and so likewise created by reason of the soul; it must be said that it is not similar, because, although *conception* expresses the going-forth of a thing into *being*, nevertheless the understanding of that word is not so repugnant to the person of Christ as the understanding of the verb *to create.* — And the reason for this is that *conception* presupposes something; and it concerns a determinate nature; nor is it said in respect of God, but in respect of the woman or mother; it expresses also a natural going-forth; but not so *creation* or *creature.* For *creation* expresses an act which extends to the whole substance of the thing, whence what is created *simply* begins to be; it also concerns no determinate nature; it is said also in respect of the one creating, and it imports a voluntary going-forth: hence it is that the word *to create* is far more repugnant to the person of Christ than *to conceive.* — But if you object that it is no more repugnant than if it be said: an immortal is mortal; it must be said that, although it be no more repugnant as to the *outer account*; nevertheless it is more repugnant by a repugnance *leading into error.* For when it is said:

an immortal is mortal, because *mortal* presupposes a living creature and is predicated by reason of it; therefore it is not so repugnant. And *moreover*, that statement, when uttered, shows that it ought not to be understood except through the union. But when it is said: Christ is a creature, it neither presupposes [a union], nor does the statement seem to be understood through the union; rather the predicate seems to express the whole *being* of the subject, and on account of the nature of such an act, which is wont to be [extended] to the whole. And so it is clear that it is not similar, and that the Master very reasonably says that the aforesaid statement is not to be drawn into [common] usage, although it cannot easily be convinced that it is simply and absolutely false. For the arguments to the contrary are more difficult and more efficacious.