Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/11/q/bon-sent-III-d11-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether this is to be conceded: this man began to be, Christ being pointed out.*

Second it is asked whether this is to be conceded: this man began to be, Christ being pointed out. And that it is so seems [the case].

1. Augustine *on John*, [Tractate] 4: "Before the world was made, neither were we, nor the mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus": if therefore he was not before the foundation of the world, therefore he began to be.

2. Likewise, to be born and to be begotten is to be changed according to substance and to be produced from non-being into being; but to be produced into being and to begin to be are wholly the same: since therefore this is true: this man is born, and this: this man is produced into being; this will be true: this man begins to be.

3. Likewise, before the foundation of the world this is true: no man is, and this is false: some man is: therefore this also is false: this man is, Christ being pointed out; and this is now true: therefore the predicate now belongs to the subject; and before it did not belong: therefore it begins to belong: therefore this is true: this man begins to be.

4. Likewise, it follows well: this man is, therefore this is a man, on the ground that from a proposition in which an implication is enclosed it is permitted to infer that very implication — for it follows: a white man runs, therefore a man is white — therefore it follows: this man is or was from eternity, therefore this was a man from eternity. But this is false: this one, Christ being pointed out, was a man from eternity: therefore this also: this man is or was from eternity; and [yet] now it is true: it remains therefore that it begins to be true: therefore this is true: this man begins to be.

**On the contrary:** 1. In John, chapter eight: *Before Abraham was made, I am*, and by parity of reason also, before heaven was made: therefore if the same thing is pointed out by this pronoun *I* and by this pronoun *this*, it seems

that this is true: this man was before the foundation of the world: therefore this is false: this man began to be.

2. Likewise, the Master concedes this: "This boy created the stars"; but to him to whom it is truly attributed to create heaven, it is truly attributed always to be: therefore this boy always was: therefore this is false: this boy began to be. In like manner this is denied by the Master: "This man, or Christ, is a creature"; but this is for no other reason than that by the name *creature* a going-forth from non-being into being is imported: therefore by parity of reason, or by a much stronger one, this is false: this man began to be.

3. Likewise, it is proper to a pronoun to be put in place of a proper noun and to designate a determinate person: therefore when it is said: this man, this pronoun *this* points out a person. But the person of Christ always was and never began to be: therefore this is false: this man began to be. If you say that *person* is there taken broadly; it is still objected, that whatever it points out, whether a supposit or a person properly; it seems that the locution is still false: because the exposition of this verb *begins* is this: this begins to be, therefore this now is, but before was not. If therefore this is true: this man begins to be, this is true: this man now is and before was not. But in whatever way it be taken, this locution is false: this man before was not. For if [it be taken] for the person, its opposite is true: this man before was. Likewise if for the supposit, it is true: this man before was, on account of the communication of idioms. But it is not permitted to deny of anything that which is truly affirmed either through the propriety of nature, or through the union. For this is simply false: man is not God, because its opposite is true through the union. Since therefore in every way this is true: this man always was, this in every way is false: this man began to be.

4. Likewise, as was held above, this term *man*, said of Christ, in a certain manner has the nature of an *accidental* term, because in an accidental term the supposit can pre-exist the form; and so it is to be found in the matter proposed. But a rule is given, that an accidental term, standing for a verb in the past tense, can stand for present things, or for past, so that indifferently it can render the locution true for these or for those. Nor on this account is the locution distinguished as manifold, because it is not compared to those as to things signified, but as to supposits; but such a locution is said to have several causes of truth. Since therefore it is said: this man was, the sense is: this one who is a man, was, or: this one who was a man, was. But this is simply true: this one who is a man, was from eternity, therefore this also: this man was from eternity, therefore this is simply false: this man begins to be, and in no way to be distinguished.

> ### Conclusion
> *The locution "this man, Christ being pointed out, began to be" can be admitted with a distinction, namely insofar as "this" points out the singular of the man, not the person of the Word.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of this locution the response of the Master is to be considered. For the Master responds, saying that to this locution "no response is to be given without a distinction"; he himself, however, does not distinguish, but determines that it began to be as to the nature, although not as to the person; it began to be according to the human nature, but it did not begin to be insofar as Word. — But certainly this manner of speaking does not suffice against an importunate objector.

For he would seek the ground of the manifoldness, and what sense the said locution makes, so far as concerns the force of the words; and this cannot be had clearly from the words of the Master. — And therefore one must attempt to distinguish, [to see] whether in some way we can fit to the aforesaid locution a fitting mode of distinguishing.

Now the aforesaid locution seems able to be distinguished from this, that the verb of beginning can note a beginning in respect of the *truth of the whole statement*, or can import a beginning of the thing predicated in respect of the *subject*. If in the first way, then the sense is: this man began to be, that is, that locution, namely "this man is," began to be true; and this without doubt is true. But if he should say that the beginning is in respect of that which is pointed out by this pronoun *this*, since that has eternal being either through its proper nature, or through the communication of idioms; then the locution seems false. — But this manner of speaking is open to caviling, both because it does not seem that the verb of beginning should be borne upon the whole, since there is nothing that renders a supposit to it; and also because the question is not whether that statement begins to be true; but the question is whether the thing imported by what is said: this man began to be. And so this manner of speaking does not seem to be valid in itself nor even to settle the question.

And therefore there can be another mode of distinguishing, and this always on the supposition that *begins* expresses the beginning of the thing attributed or of the act in the predicate in respect of the subject. But this can be in two ways: either because it can note a beginning in respect of the thing imported by the pronoun in itself, or under the account of an implication. For the form of humanity is implied when it is said: this man, that is, this one who is a man. And if it expresses a beginning in respect of the subject or person imported by the pronoun; the speech is false, because that person does not have being after non-being. But if [it expresses a beginning] in respect of the implication, the locution is true; for the sense is that this one began to be, not because this one, but because [he is] a man, or according to the human nature. And an example can be given. If a shield first existed and afterward is whitened, this is twofold: a white shield begins to be, according to the aforesaid mode of distinguishing. — But this manner of speaking is still no less open to caviling than the preceding, on the ground that this locution: a white shield begins to be, must be expounded by these two: a white shield is, and this is not twofold; and another, which is: a white shield before was not; and this is false, because its opposite is true: a white shield was. For *white*, since it is an accidental term, can stand for present or past things by *indifference*, not by *manifoldness*. *Moreover*, if it be said: a white man begins to run, *begins* does not posit, so far as concerns the force of the word, a beginning concerning the whiteness, but concerning the running. And therefore this manner of speaking too is open to caviling not a little.

There is also a third manner of speaking, that this pronoun *this* can point out the person of the Word, or the singular of the man. And if it points out the singular of the man, then one must concede this: this man begins to be; and this: this man is from eternity: just as it is conceded that this man is dead and immortal; but the one is said through the communication of idioms, the other through the propriety of nature. For if, when Christ is born, some man is changed from non-being into being; it is necessary that some man begin to be; but it is not true of any other man than of this man. This one therefore begins to be through the propriety of nature; but yet he is said to be from eternity, because he is God, who is from eternity. If therefore this man points out the singular of the man, without doubt the aforesaid locution is true. — But if it points out the person of the Word, it is false, false, I say, as to the propriety of nature, because the person of the Word is of its nature eternal. As to the communication of idioms also it is not admitted, because such an idiom is not communicated, on account of this, that it encloses a repugnance of the [two] understandings. — And this manner of speaking is reasonable and less open to caviling than the aforesaid, and contributes more to the matter proposed and is more consonant with the words of the Master, who gives the *sense* of the aforesaid distinction, although he does not posit the *words*, lest he should desert the theological manner. But the more modern [doctors] must explain it more fully, on account of the importunity of those who inquire. For the Master determines that this man began to be, *insofar as he is man*, but not *insofar as he is Word*. But what else is this to say, except that by that pronoun there can be pointed out the *singular of the man*, or the *person of the Son of God*? — According to this distinction, therefore, the aforesaid locution is neither wholly to be conceded nor wholly to be denied; for it can be conceded according to one sense and denied according to another. — And therefore the arguments which prove that the aforesaid locution is true in some sense, and the others which prove that it is false in some sense, can be passed over, because they are resolved by this distinction. For according to the diverse members both conclude what is true, as are the first two arguments for the first part and the first two for the second part. But to those which show that the locution is true *simply*, or false *simply*, a response must be made.

3. To that which is objected, that before the foundation of the world this is true: no man is; it must be said that it is true; but nevertheless it is not necessary that this now be true: no man was. And the reason for this is on account of the variation of the *supposition* of the term; for, as was touched on, this term *man* in Christ has the mode of standing of an accidental term. But that argument is not valid: this was false: "white disputes," therefore this is false: "white disputed"; for the *mode of standing* of the term itself is varied. For in the first it had a single supposition, in the second a twofold one. Hence although this be false: this man is before the foundation of the world, nevertheless it is now true: this man was; because the sense can be such: this one who now is a man, was before the foundation of the world; therefore that argument is not valid.

4. To that which is objected, that the implication follows upon the proposition in which it is implied; it must be said that it is true according to that difference of time according to which it is implied. Hence it follows well: if a white man runs, a man is white. But when this implication is in respect of a verb in the past tense, then it has a twofold supposition, because it stands for present and for past things. And therefore it does not follow: this man was from eternity, therefore from eternity there was a man; just as it does not follow: this white thing was, therefore this was white; because the rule is, that a term added to a verb is restricted according to the consignificate of the verb, to whatever time it be added to the verb; but it is not so with a term on the side of the subject. And therefore that argument errs from a *change of supposition*.

But to the two arguments to the contrary there is no need to respond, because they proceed according to the other sense, namely as *this* points out the person. *Moreover*, they do not conclude that the aforesaid locution is false; because these can stand together, that he always was and that he began to be according to diverse natures.

3. But to that which objects in the third place, that the pronoun points out the person; it must be said that *person* is taken *broadly* for everything that renders a determinate supposit to the verb — for one can say: this whiteness — and so it can well point out the singular supposit of the man, that is, the atom of human nature, which is assumed by the Word, or the hypostasis itself, the pointing-out being made not to the sense, but to the understanding. — And if he should object that in either sense it is false, because in either sense this is true: this man always was; it must be said that in such cases negation removes more than the opposite affirmation posits. For these stand together, namely that Christ is mortal and immortal; but these two locutions do not stand together: Christ is mortal, Christ is not mortal; because negation negates and removes the signification of that which is *mortal* more than [it does that of] *immortal* opposed to it. By this mode also it is to be understood, that more is denied in this: this man was not, than in this: this man begins to be, which is affirmative, although it encloses a negation. For these can be true together: this man is eternal, and: this man begins to be; but these two never: this man is eternal, this man is not eternal, for the reason that has been stated. And therefore it cannot be concluded that the aforesaid locution is false *simply*.

4. To that which is objected, that *man* in Christ has the mode of standing of an accidental term; it must be said that this can be conceded in comparison to the *person* of Christ, which is the supposit of the humanity, infinitely preceding the form of the humanity; but in comparison to the *singular of the man* it has no truth. Hence when *this man* points out the singular of the man, the supposit imported by the pronoun and the form imported by the noun are necessarily referred to the same time. And therefore this is false: this man was from eternity, unless it be understood through the communication of idioms. For through the propriety of nature it is true to say that this man went forth from non-being into being through generation. — And so the response to the whole is clear.

The whole sum of this response, therefore, consists in these three things: that it be understood how the pronoun *this* can point out in two ways, namely the *person of the Word*, or the *singular of the man*. — Let it nonetheless be understood how an *accidental* and a *substantial* term have a different *mode of standing* in respect of a verb in the past tense, although on the side of the predicate there is no difference. — Let it also be understood that it is possible for two opposites to be *affirmed* of the same [subject] in Christ, in such a way that the one is said through the *union*, the other through the *propriety of nature*, whether of God or of the man; yet neither of these can truly be *denied*. For negation removes more than affirmation posits, as is said elsewhere, and could easily be shown.