Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/11/q/bon-sent-III-d11-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether this is to be conceded: a man begins to be God.*

Third, it is asked concerning this proposition: a man begins to be God, whether it is to be conceded. And that it is so, it seems.

1. This is true: God began to be man: therefore, by simple conversion: man began to be God.

2. Likewise, this is true: God begins to be man, on account of the union; but the union is reciprocal and mutual, because, just as man is united to God, so also God to man: therefore, if the union is reciprocal, the inception too, which is founded upon the union [is reciprocal]: therefore, just as this is true: God began to be man, so also this: man began to be God.

3. Likewise, let us be at the instant in which the Son of God was incarnate: this is true: man is God, and before this: man was not God: therefore man began to be God. The premises are true: therefore the conclusion [is true], since the premises set forth the conclusion.

4. Likewise, before man existed, man was neither man nor anything else; but man began to be man, and man could not be God before he was man: therefore, if man began to be man, man began to be God.

**On the contrary:** 1. This is true: this man was from eternity God; and from this man "man" follows: therefore man was God from eternity: therefore this is false: man began to be God.

2. Likewise, if man began to be God, then either this one, or that one, and so on of the others; but there is none to be given except concerning this one, and this man was always God: therefore he did not begin to be God: therefore this is false: man began to be God.

3. Likewise, there is a communication in the idioms: therefore, if man began to be God, it seems that this is to be conceded: the Son of God began to be God. But this is false absolutely: therefore the first [proposition] also [is false].

4. Likewise, suppose that the Son of God were to lay aside the man whom he assumed, per impossibile; then I ask concerning this: this man ceases to be God; this is false, therefore by parity of reasoning this also is false: man began to be God, when he assumed [the man]. Proof of the minor: now there is a union: therefore there is a communication in the idioms: therefore, if the Son of God will always be the Son of God, the man too will always be God; it follows necessarily that this is true: this man will always be God, and this likewise: the Son of God will always be man: therefore this also is false: man ceases to be God, and this: God ceases to be man; by parity of reasoning these too are false: this man began to be God, and God began to be man.

> ### Conclusion
> *The expression "man began to be God," well understood, can be received as absolutely true.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt this is conceded: God began to be man; but concerning this: man began to be God, it is doubtful whether it is to be conceded absolutely.

For some have wished to distinguish it on the ground that this verb "begins" can be attributed to this term "man" by reason of the supposit, or by reason of the form. If it is attributed by reason of the form, then this term "man" has simple supposition, and then the sense is that God begins to be predicated of man, because now it is predicated and before it was not predicated; and thus the expression has truth. But if it regards [the man] by reason of the supposit, then they said that this is a false expression, because to the supposit it always belongs to be God. — And they assign a similar case to this, as if it were said: a white thing begins to be a shield, because the shield existed first, and afterward is whitened. For if the inception is attributed to this term "white" by reason of the form, the expression is true; if by reason of the supposit, it is false, because that which is white was previously a shield. — And if the ground of this manifold sense be asked, they say that it arises from this, that the verb of beginning includes within itself a negation, and that [negation] can be understood to precede the term, and thus it will make it have simple supposition; or to follow [it], and thus it regards it by reason of the supposit. Hence, although with respect to certain acts or words the subject term may have simple or personal supposition; nevertheless with respect to this verb "begins" it can supposit in either way; and this does not place a manifold sense in the suppositing term, but in the whole expression, by reason of the varied relation of the negation.

Now this distinction is reasonable enough, provided that simple supposition be soundly understood, namely, so that a term is said to have simple supposition under which one may not descend, as when it is said: only man runs; or to have simple supposition when the predicate, or something in the predicate, regards it by reason of the form. But although the aforesaid distinction is not to be rejected, nevertheless it does not fully dissolve the ambiguity of the proposed expression, since, if it regards [the man] by reason of the supposit, the expression still has truth. For if this is true: this man begins to be, in some sense, as was proved before, without doubt it is true that he begins to be God.

And on account of this it is to be understood that the aforesaid expression still has truth insofar as the verb of beginning regards only the subject by reason of the supposit. Hence it is to be attended to that this term "man," with respect to Christ, partly has the nature of an accidental term, partly the nature of a substantial term: the nature, I say, of an accidental term with respect to the person, which preexists; the nature of a substantial term with respect to the singular of the man, which begins together with him; whereby this term "man" supposits for the singular of the man by itself, but for the person of the Word only by reason of the union. And since the expression has truth for the supposit of the singular man, which indeed is Jesus, although it does not have [truth] for the supposit which is the person of Christ; hence it is that the aforesaid expression can be received as absolutely true. — And the reasons in favor of this are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that this is true: this man was from eternity God; it must be said that if "this one" points out the person, it is true; and in that sense it is false: this man began to be God; but if it regards the supposit of the man, it can still be true through the union or the communication of idioms. But nevertheless from this it does not follow that this is false: this man began to be God, by the property of his nature. For it happens, as was said before, that one may call this man mortal and immortal without contradiction.

2. And through this the following objection is made clear, that if man begins to be God, [it is] either this one, or that one. It can be said: this one; but "this one" there does not point out the person, but the singular of the man, as was said before. Hence it is not similar, if it be said: a white thing begins to be a shield, because "white" has only the nature of an accidental term and has no supposit for which it could render the expression true except the shield itself; but it is not so in man with respect to Christ.

3. To that which is objected concerning the communication of idioms, it must be said that in the communication of idioms this rule is to be attended to, namely, that all things are communicated, with these alone excepted, which express the union itself, or which include a repugnance of understandings, by reason of which they approach error. — And the ground of this is that the communication of idioms is founded upon the union itself and is ordered to the expression of the catholic faith. And therefore those things are not communicated which imply the union; whence, although this is true: the Son of God is incarnate, this is false: man is incarnate. Similarly it is to be understood concerning those things which imply a repugnance of understandings, such as to be a creature and to be predestined and the like. And since, when it is said: man began to be God, the union is implied; therefore there is no communication of such an idiom.

4. To that which is asked, if per impossibile man were released by God, whether this would be true: man ceases to be God; it must be said that yes; nor does this hold: man will always be God, therefore he does not cease to be God. For just as was touched on before, these two are simultaneously true: man ceases to be God, and man will always be God, because through the communication of idioms this is true: man will always be God; and it will be true as long as the union will last. But if tomorrow the union be dissolved, then neither through the communication of idioms nor in any other way is it true to say that man is God. And if you object that to cease implies not-being, and these cannot be conceded together concerning Christ — that he will be and will not be — it must be said that, as was said, an explicit negation negates more than an implicit one; on account of this the following is conceded as true: this man is immortal, Christ being pointed out in the state of possibility, although it not be conceded: this man is not mortal. — And thus those things which are asked in this part are made clear, and how the idioms are communicated.

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