Dist. 11, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/11/q/bon-sent-III-d11-dubia
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### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that word of Augustine: *It plainly appears that he, through whom all things were made, was not himself made.* For this authority seems to be false in itself and to be of no avail for the purpose [at hand]: since we say that *from him and through him are all things*: therefore if all things are through him, he himself is nothing; it is established that this does not follow: therefore by parity of reasoning it does not follow: all things were made through him, therefore he himself was not made. — Likewise, it seems that it is of no avail for the purpose: for Augustine is speaking of the Son of God according to the divine nature; but when it is asked whether Christ is a creature, this is according to the assumed nature: therefore it seems that that authority and the others following are adduced very improperly.

**I respond:** It must be said that the authority is both true in itself and avails for the purpose. It is indeed true in itself, because the cause of the predicate is enclosed in the subject. For if he himself is the principle of all created things, it is impossible that he himself be anything of the created things, both by reason of the power of creating, which cannot belong to a creature; and by reason of the generality of being a principle, which cannot belong to a created thing. Nor does this objection avail: *From him are all things* etc., that is, all things made; because *all things* is distributed for the totality of things, and *God* is not part of the universe, but above the universe. And therefore it does not follow that he is nothing.

To that which is objected, that it does not *avail for the purpose*; it must be said that Christ names the person of the Word as in two natures; and since the name is imposed on the person of the Son of God, [therefore] what is repugnant to the Son of God is repugnant also to Christ. And therefore the authority adduced and the others following do indeed make for the purpose, but this is *per accidens.* — In yet another way they make for the purpose, because the authorities adduced are in the text, which are against the Arian error; and since the aforesaid utterance, set forth absolutely and without qualification, is close to the utterance of Arius; therefore as it were *by consequence* the authorities adduced go against the aforesaid utterance. And on that account they avail both in themselves and for the purpose.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Although Christ according to the man is a creature, nevertheless he is not to be predicated absolutely* etc. **On the contrary:** what is truly predicated of another with a non-diminishing qualification is truly predicated of it *absolutely*; but *man* does not diminish from the account of Christ: therefore if anything is said of Christ according to the man, it seems that it is said of him *absolutely.* — Likewise, when something is apt to be present only according to the body, it is truly said of the whole *absolutely*, if it is said as to the body: therefore by parity of reasoning, if something is apt to be present in Christ according to the human nature; it seems that the consequence is necessary, that it belongs to him *absolutely* and unqualifiedly.

**I respond:** It must be said that when something is said of something *absolutely* and with a *qualification*, this can be twofold: either in such a way that the term said *absolutely does not posit* its meaning more widely than when it is posited with the qualification, and then it is permitted to infer; or in such a way that it *posits* its meaning *more widely*, so far as concerns the sense which the words present, and then the consequence can be denied: just as it does not follow, if one infers: this man is white according to his foot, therefore this man is white; in this way it does not follow: because *to be a creature* according to the man is attributed to Christ by reason of *the assumed nature*, but when set forth *absolutely* it seems to belong to him altogether; for it is customary that by the name of creature there be understood those things which have been brought altogether from *non-being* into being. And thus the response to both arguments is clear. — Or let it be said, as was said above in the *seventh* distinction concerning the predestination of Christ, that it does not follow: he is predestined according to the man, therefore he is predestined absolutely; not because *man* diminishes, but because the attribution of the predicate is varied, as when it is first attributed to *the human nature*, afterwards attributed to *the divine person.* And therefore such a manner of proceeding introduces *the accident* [fallacy] in certain predicates, which by their extraneousness are neither communicated nor able to be inferred.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says: *Striving to prove that Christ is something not divine.* For it seems that the Master holds that as something unfitting; but this seems no unfitting thing, because since Christ is *lord*, this is not admitted: Christ is a lordly man: therefore by parity of reasoning, since Christ is *God*, this does not seem to be admitted: Christ is something divine: therefore its opposite is true, namely Christ is something not divine. — Likewise, it seems that that argumentation is necessary: if Christ is some *substance* not divine, that Christ is *something* not divine: for to *being a substance* there necessarily follows *being something*. As therefore it follows: he is a white man, therefore a white animal; so it seems necessarily to follow: he is a *substance* not divine, therefore *something* not divine.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is true: Christ is *something divine*; and this is false: Christ is *something not divine.* Nor is it alike with this name *divine* and with this name *lordly.* For although each is possessive, nevertheless *lordly* imports, concerning that of which it is said, possession by way of *passion* — for one is called *lordly* as held or possessed by a lord — but *divine* [imports it] not only by way of *passion*, but also by way of *action*; because *divine* is said of that which has divinity, in which way a divine person is wont to be called. And on account of this, this is conceded as true: Christ is something divine, because he is a divine person. And therefore the Master denies this: Christ is something not divine; and he says that this consequence does not hold: Christ, insofar as a creature, is something not divine, therefore Christ is something not divine; because in the first [proposition] the negation removes divinity from the created nature, but in the conclusion it removes it from the eternal person.

But if it be asked whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a divine man; it must be said that [it is] not. For when it is so said, *divine* cannot signify divinity by way of *informing*, nor possession by way of *action*, but only by way of *passion*, in which way Dionysius says: most divine Paul, or most divine John. Whence such expressions about Christ are improper. And on that account the Master concedes their opposites, when he says: « Christ according to the man is some substance not divine », that is, not informed by divinity, because it is a created substance. Therefore he soundly concedes the premises and denies the conclusion, saying that there is a fault in such an inference.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about this which he says, that *from tropical expressions there is no correct procedure of argumentation.* For first it seems that that word does nothing for the purpose, because none of the aforesaid expressions is *tropical*; for there is no transference there, but rather they are said according to the propriety of speech. — Likewise, it seems to be false that from tropical expressions there is no correct procedure of argumentation, because [the expressions] are either true or false; if true, from true things it is possible to infer the true: therefore a correct argumentation can be made from such expressions; if false; but from false things the false can be correctly inferred, and even the true: therefore it seems that what the Master says is nothing said. — This manner of solving also seems unheard-of, because it is neither by *destruction* nor by *division*; for there is no *sophistical place*, neither in *speech* nor *outside* it, whose dissolution runs according to this way.

**I respond:** It must be said that *tropical* speech can be said in two ways: for in one way that speech is called *tropical* in which there is some fault excused by some trope. For a *trope* is a figure, and a *figure* is a fault excused by reason. In another way any speech is called *tropical speech* which has some impropriety, but is nevertheless excused by some qualification. When therefore the Master says that this utterance: Christ is a creature according to the man, is tropical; he says this because it has some impropriety arising from the repugnance of the understandings, which is removed by the qualification adjoined. And to this extent the Master calls the aforesaid expressions *tropical.* — It could also be said that he calls them *tropical* by taking trope for *figure.* For such expressions can be called *synecdochic*, because what belongs to the part is attributed to the whole, and *part* and *whole* are taken in a *broad* sense, so that the human nature may be said in a certain way to be a *part* with respect to Christ, although not properly. And thus it can be said that such expressions are *tropical* and that they are figurative by *synecdoche*, according as *synecdoche* is a figure of speech. For as those skilled in grammar say, *synecdoche* is sometimes a figure of speech, sometimes a figure of construction.

Truly therefore the Master says, in saying that the aforesaid expressions are *tropical*; truly also he says that from tropical [expressions] there is no correct procedure of argumentation. And the reason for this is that sometimes some expression is denied on account of *impropriety*; and when some utterance is excused under one form, if a procedure be made to an utterance under another form, in which it does not find excuse, one proceeds from an expression which is excused to one which has no excuse; and thus such a procedure is impeded, just as if one were to proceed from the true to the false. Whence that argument does not avail: this man is white according to his foot, therefore he is colored according to his foot. For although to *being white* there follows *being colored*, nevertheless the aforesaid procedure does not avail, because *color* is not apt to be present in the body according to a part, as *whiteness* [is].

And this is what the Master means to say in the matter at hand; and this is what is otherwise wont to be said, that improper expressions are not to be extended nor drawn into consequence, but rather are to be upheld and expounded and restricted, lest from a lesser impropriety one come to a greater.