Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/12/q/bon-sent-III-d12-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the fittingness of the assumed nature with respect to its kind.*
### Question I. *Whether it was fitting that the Son of God should assume human nature from the mass of perdition.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether it was fitting that the Son of God should assume human nature from the mass of perdition, that is, from the kind of Adam. And it seems that it was not.

1. Disease and medicine ought to be of another quality and nature: therefore, if Christ by reason of the assumed nature was the medicine of the human race, it seems then that his flesh ought not to have been formed from the corrupt mass.

2. Likewise, to a noble form noble matter ought to be fitted: therefore, if Christ's soul was most pure and free from all sin, it seems that Christ's flesh ought to have been alien from all corruption: therefore not from the corrupt mass, and on account of this neither from the kind of Adam.

3. Likewise, the reproach of parents redounds upon the offspring, according to what the Wise Man says; but Christ ought to have been entirely free from every reproach of sin: therefore he ought not to have been of the kind of the first man.

4. Likewise, the debt of parents is imputed to the offspring; but the mediator ought to have been without any debt, so that his payment might be entirely accepted by God, as Anselm says: therefore he ought not to have come forth from the kind of Adam.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Hebrews, chapter two: *He that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one;* but Christ is he who sanctifies, while those who are sanctified are the sons of Adam: it seems therefore that, just as the others are of the kind of Adam, so also Christ was and ought to have been.

2. Likewise, for man's fault none is fitting to make satisfaction except man; therefore for the fault of all the sons of Adam and of Adam himself none ought to make satisfaction except one who is a son of Adam; but Christ made satisfaction for our fault: therefore he ought to have been of our kind and of our mass.

3. Likewise, if man had stood firm, he would have been subject to no other kind of creature, inasmuch as he would have his *standing* through himself: therefore if man is recalled through Christ to his pristine dignity, it seems that he ought to have been subject to no other kind of creature, as though he should *rise again* through it. But he rose again through Christ: therefore it seems that Christ according to the flesh ought to have been of the kind of vitiated flesh.

4. Likewise, the mediator is the more fitting the nearer he is to both kinds: if therefore Christ was the most fitting mediator between sinful men and God: therefore he ought to have been of the kind of sinful men.

### Conclusion.

> It was more fitting that the Son of God should assume flesh from the kind of Adam than from elsewhere, although God could have arranged it otherwise.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the Son of God could have assumed flesh from elsewhere than from the corrupt mass, that is, from elsewhere than from those who proceeded from the kind of Adam; yet it was more fitting that he should assume flesh from the kind of Adam. And although there are many fittingnesses which lie hidden from us, according to the manifold character of God's wisdom, nevertheless according to the words and sayings of the Saints four grounds of fittingness can be assigned.

The first is for the sake of preserving the *rectitude of justice,* namely so that the one making satisfaction and the transgressor should be of the same kind. For if he were of another kind, the satisfaction would not be attributed to the same kind to which the offense also belongs; and on account of this the rectitude of justice would not be rightly preserved, which requires amends from that kind in which it finds the preceding offense.

The second is for the sake of manifesting the *sweetness of mercy,* namely so that the Lord himself, who had been despised by man as by an adversary and enemy, the very same should be united to the human kind in Christ into a unity of person; in which is manifested God's wondrous condescension in this, that he willed to join to himself the human kind, which was hostile to him, in an indissoluble bond, according to that which is said to the Romans, chapter five: *But God commendeth his charity* etc.

The third ground is for declaring the *ordering of wisdom,* which ordering indeed can be infringed by no vice. For God had decreed and ordained that the whole human kind should be multiplied and disseminated from one, for the sake of representing that universal principle which God is; nor ought this to have been infringed through sin: and therefore Christ, *the mediator of God and men*, a true man, ought to have been formed not from elsewhere, but from the mass of the whole human kind.

The fourth ground is for the sake of preserving the *loftiness of human nature,* which God had established in such great dignity that it should be subject to no other kind of creature, but to God alone. If therefore it is in no small measure subject to the Redeemer, it is fitting that the Redeemer should either be God alone, or, if he had in himself a kind of created nature, this should be of the kind of that mass which takes its origin from the loins of Adam.

On account of these four grounds of fittingness, therefore, which appear manifestly and have their firmness from the words of the Saints, it must be conceded that not only was it fitting that Christ should assume flesh from our kind for the repair of human nature, but also that this was more fitting than that he should do it in another way, although he could do it in another way. — Hence the grounds proving this are to be conceded.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that disease and medicine ought to be of another nature; it must be said that this is true for the time in which a thing can be called medicine — of another kind, I say, not with respect to *nature,* but with respect to *curative power;* and so it was in Christ, since he was not infected by the corruption of concupiscence, but had in himself the fullness of grace. Hence the Apostle also says that *the first man was of the earth, earthy; the second from heaven, heavenly,* not on account of a diversity of *nature* or matter, but on account of a difference with respect to the *quality* of virtue and vice, of grace and fault. — But if one wishes to insist that disease and medicine are simply of diverse natures; it must be said that this has its place in a medicine whose operation is through the power of nature, not through an act of deliberative will.

2. To that which is objected, that noble matter ought to correspond to a noble form; it must be said that it is true of matter disposed by an *ultimate* disposition, which is necessity; but of *remote* matter it does not hold, since all nobility arises from the form superadded to the matter itself. And since the mass of the human kind is not the *proximate* matter with respect to Christ's soul, it does not follow that Christ's body was not of that mass; but the flesh, organized and fitted by a perfect complexion, was its matter; and of this it is well permitted to infer that it was very noble, since it was fitted to a most noble soul; whence it was excellently complexioned and alien from all corruption and the foulness of concupiscence. Yet from this it is not permitted to infer that it was not taken from that mass of corruption; for so pure was that flesh through the power of the working Spirit, as if it had been taken from a heavenly substance.

3. To that which is objected, that the reproach of parents redounds upon the son; it must be said that it is true when the son is an imitator of the crimes of the father; but when he is contrary and opposed to him with respect to morals, it ought not justly to redound upon him, unless the son himself by his own mere kindness wishes to bear and sustain the reproach of the father. And so it is to be understood to have been in the case at hand. Hence Christ sustained the reproach of Adam not from merit or necessity, but from his own mere kindness, so that, while he himself sustained for another what he did not merit of himself, the other might be freed from the reproach which he had merited by his own fault.

4. To that which is objected, that the debt of parents is imputed to the offspring; it must be said that this is true when the offspring succeeds the parents in the inheritance; and since Christ did not inherit concupiscence from his parents, through which man is bound to punishment; hence it is that he was debtor to no punishment, but a liberal and voluntary payer.

### Scholion.

**I.** The two questions of this article continue the disputation on the fittingness of the incarnation on the part of the thing assumed, which was begun above at d. 2, a. I, q. 1–4. Since all the works of God are most fitting, regard being had to their end, there can be no doubt about the conclusions themselves, nor about the principal grounds of fittingness.

On Question I: Alexander of Hales, *Summa,* p. III, q. 2, m. 8. — Scotus touches the matter in both *Scripta,* d. 20, q. unica. — St. Thomas, III *Sent.,* d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2; *Summa* III, q. 4, a. 6. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, II *Sent.,* d. 2, q. I, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. I. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

On the following (2nd) question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 9. — St. Thomas, *Commentary,* loc. cit. quaestiuncula 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise touches the matter loc. cit. ad 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. I, q. 2.

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