Dist. 12, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/12/q/bon-sent-III-d12-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the condition of the assumed nature with respect to free choice.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the condition of the assumed nature with respect to free choice. And concerning this two matters of doubt arise.

First it is asked, whether that man could sin.

Second, whether he had or assumed a power of sinning.

### Question I. *Whether Christ could sin.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether Christ could sin. And that he could, it seems:

1. In Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirty-one, it is said in praise of the just man: *He that could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed*; but every praise befits Christ which befits any member of his: therefore it seems that this could be said in praise of Christ: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine: « God judged

men to be better, if they served him freely », and he calls it *to serve freely* if, though they could offend him, they were unwilling to: therefore if he made Christ the best and judged him the best, it seems that Christ could sin.

3. Likewise, Bernard: « He descended as far as he was able to descend »; but he is of a lower grade who can sin than he who cannot: therefore it seems that Christ was in that state. *If you say* that this is understood with respect to the flesh; *on the contrary*: the disposition of the flesh corresponds to the disposition of free choice, as is evident in Adam and in us: therefore just as Christ assumed the passibility of the flesh, so it seems that he assumed the changeableness of free choice.

4. Likewise, Christ was in the state of a wayfarer: therefore since to be able to sin pertains to the state of a wayfarer, just as to be unable to sin pertains to the state of a comprehensor; it seems that Christ could sin.

5. Likewise, no one is praised in those things which he does of necessity; but Christ was praiseworthy in his works: therefore he did not do them necessarily: therefore he could cease from good and due works; and this is to omit: therefore he could sin.

6. Likewise, Christ could utter some negative and true statement; but he who can utter a negative locution can utter the affirmative opposed to it; but that one is false: therefore Christ could utter a false locution. But this is to lie, in one who knows the locution *to be false*: therefore it seems that Christ could lie: therefore he could sin, since to lie can in no way be done well.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Hebrews, chapter two: *Him who was made a little lower* etc.; the Gloss: « The nature of the human mind, which God assumed, and which could be depraved by no sin, God alone is greater »: therefore in no way could the soul of Christ be infected by any stain of sin.

2. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception was a comprehensor and blessed; but it belongs to the essence of beatitude that it be a good that cannot be lost: therefore Christ could never lose that beatitude: therefore neither could his soul sin.

3. Likewise, Christ from the instant of his conception received so great a grace that he could not have a greater than it, therefore from the instant of his conception he had the grace of confirmation; but no one can sin who has that grace: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if Christ could sin, let it be posited — since « when a possible is posited, nothing impossible follows » — but, supposing that Christ or that man had sinned, it is posited by this that he was worthy of eternal damnation: therefore either God would be damned, or the man would be separated from the Word. But both are altogether impossible: therefore it was impossible that that man should sin.

### Conclusion

> *The soul of Christ could in no way sin, for a threefold reason.*

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt the soul of Christ could not be depraved by any fault. — And the reason for this is threefold, namely *the fullness of grace*, *the consummation of glory*, and *the union of the divine and human nature*. The fullness of grace brings it about that Christ himself, according to his human nature, had the grace of confirmation; but that grace so confirms free choice that it can in no way be weakened by fault. — This same thing the *consummation of glory* brings about, which indeed was in Christ from the very beginning of his conception; for at once he was blessed and a comprehensor; and just as one who is blessed cannot be damned, so neither can he prevaricate, and through this there could be in Christ no stain of sin according to his soul. — Lastly, this the *union of the divine and human nature* into the unity of person brings about most efficaciously, which union brings it about that the idioms are communicated, and it itself cannot be broken. If therefore God cannot be a sinner and cannot not be man; it is plain that that union in no way allows that Christ, according to his human nature, could have sinned. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

**To the arguments** to the contrary:

*To 1.* To that, then, which is first objected concerning the praise of the just man, it must be said that that praise, by reason of *one* part, expresses perfection, namely in this, that he did not transgress; from the *other* part it expresses a certain defectibility. When therefore it is said that every praise is to be attributed to Christ; it must be said that, although this has some truth concerning the perfect praise, that is, by reason of that condition with respect to which perfection is regarded; nevertheless it is not necessary that it be so by reason of that condition with respect to which there is imperfection. — It could also be said otherwise, that, as the Master says, this praise is of the head in the members, so that perfection befits the head itself in itself, but what is of defectibility there befits it by reason of the members.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that God judged men to be better etc.; it must be said that this is true of the whole human race according to a certain betterment, which is regarded in the order of the universe. For thus it was fitting that man be constituted in the universe, so that in his first constitution he should have changeableness of choice according to the common law. But Christ had something above man; therefore it was fitting that some special privilege should be made for him, that there should be in him a generosity of compliance without changeableness of choice, just as also in the divine will we see that it generously bestows and does good things to us, yet there is no changeableness to be posited in it. And on account of this that word of Augustine, according to which *freely* names changeableness toward the contrary, does not extend to the betterment which is regarded according to a special privilege, but according to the common law. — But if anyone should wish to say that there *freely* is understood, that is, *voluntarily*, the following text and the reason for proposing the word stands against him, because Augustine utters this word in order to render the reason why God made such a man, that he could do evil.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning Bernard, that he descended as far as he was able to descend; it must be said that it is understood of *ordained* power, which presupposes fittingness. Now it was fitting for God to condescend to *misery*, but in no way was it fitting to descend to *fault*. For although *misery* does not befit the Son of God in itself, nevertheless it befits him as it is *ordained to the end* of our redemption. But *fault*, or an ordering to fault in act, or in habit, in no manner of ways befits him; and therefore he could not fittingly humble himself so far that God should incline himself to the state of sin according to act or habit. — Nor does what he objects concerning passibility hold, that it corresponds to the changeableness of the soul; for it must be said that this is true according to the common justice, but Christ assumed the passibilities of the flesh by dispensation, as will appear below.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that Christ was in the state of a wayfarer; it must be said that, although he was in the state of a wayfarer, not however *altogether*; for he had something of the state of a comprehensor. Whence Boethius says, « that Christ assumed something of every state: from the state *before* sin he assumed innocence, from the state *after* sin he assumed punishment, from the state *of a comprehensor* the impossibility of sinning ». Since therefore Christ was not a pure wayfarer; therefore it does not follow that he could sin, as the other wayfarers can.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that no one is praised in those things which he does necessarily; it must be said that necessity is twofold: that which *repels* the will, such as the necessity *of coercion*, which comes from without; and there is a necessity which *underlies* the will, and this is the necessity which comes from the *immutability* of the will. When therefore it is said that praise is not in works of necessity; it must be said that it is true of necessity spoken of in the *first* way, but not in the *second*.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that he could knowingly utter a false locution; it must be said that *to say* is twofold: in one way it is the same as *to utter aloud*; and in this way without doubt he could utter a false locution, because such an utterance is a matter of perfection. In another way *to say* is the same as *to assert* or *to affirm*; and in this way he could not, because truth could not decline to falsity; and this because it was not a matter of impotence, but rather of power.