Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/13/q/bon-sent-III-d13-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the grace of Christ as a singular person.*
### Question I. *Whether in Christ the grace of his singular person is created or uncreated.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked whether in Christ the grace of his singular person is a created grace or an uncreated one. And that it is created seems to be the case.

1. In no one does the Holy Spirit begin to dwell except through some effect of grace which is newly given to the soul; but in the soul of Christ the Holy Spirit dwelt, and this not always, but from a [point in] time: therefore the soul of Christ had in itself an effect of grace, through which or according to which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell. But that gift is called the grace of his singular person and is a created gift: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, no soul is pleasing to God unless it be conformed and made like to God through a grace informing it and making it deiform; but a grace informing the soul and conforming it to God can only be a created grace: therefore no soul is pleasing to God unless it have a created grace in itself. But the soul of Christ was pleasing to God through that grace which we call the grace of his singular person: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, merit denotes an ordering toward something greater by means of something which renders [one] acceptable to God; but that which renders [one] acceptable cannot exist without grace, while that which is ordered toward something greater can only be created: therefore merit exists only through a gift of created grace. But there was merit in Christ: therefore he had a created grace, through which he merited; and that is the grace of his singular person: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, Christ had two wills, as will appear below, namely a created and an uncreated one, and it is agreed that each was perfect; but the perfection of the created will is through created grace, which, I say, is called the grace of his singular person: therefore in Christ one must posit not only an uncreated grace but also a created one.

**On the contrary:** 1. A created grace exists only in a created substance: therefore, since the grace of a singular person is in a person, the grace of a singular person, [if] created, does not and cannot exist except in a created person; but the person of Christ is not created, but uncreated: therefore in Christ there is no created grace to be found which, I say, would be the grace of his singular person.

2. Likewise, since Christ is a natural son, he cannot be a son through the grace of adoption on the side of the assumed nature: therefore, since Christ is loved by the Father as a coeternal person, it seems that no created grace is to be posited in him, through which he would be made accepted as a singular person.

3. Likewise, the grace of a singular person is given to us for this, that through it we may be made like to God; but he is not only like to God, but rather is even God: therefore it seems that he has no need of a gift of created grace.

4. Likewise, the uncreated Word, united to the soul of Christ and to its powers, can most efficaciously govern them and elevate them to the accomplishing of good things; but that which can be done sufficiently and perfectly through fewer [things] ought not to be done through more: it seems therefore that no created grace is to be posited in Christ.

> **Conclusion.** In Christ there is to be posited a gift of grace which is called [the grace] of his singular person, and which is a created gift.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt in Christ a gift of grace is to be posited, which grace indeed is called the grace of his singular person; and this gift indeed is created. — And the reason of this is: because such a gift of grace makes the soul like to God and renders it apt, by elevating it, for good and meritorious operations. Since therefore the soul of Christ was deiform and apt for acting well — otherwise it would not have been fit either for the union or for the perfection of merit — therefore it was necessary that in the soul of Christ a gift of such grace be found. — And from the same cause it was necessary that it [the gift] be created, so that it might inform the soul, just as a perfection has [the property] of informing its perfectible, and so that it might render the powers apt, just as a quality has [the property] of qualifying its subject. — And therefore the reasons demonstrating this are to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the grace of a singular person, [being] created, is in a created person; it must be said that the grace of a singular person is not said to be in the person according to the formal character of personality, insofar as [it is] a person, but because it is in it by reason of some part; yet in such a way that the grace so called regards the proper merits of that person. Now although in Christ there is an uncreated personality, nevertheless that person has a created nature, namely a soul and flesh; and nothing prevents a created grace from being able to be in Christ according to his soul, which is created, and which is his part by reason of his human nature. But he objects as if such a grace were in the person not by reason of some part, but by reason of personality.

2. To that which is objected, that the sonship of adoption cannot stand together with sonship by nature etc.; it must be said that it is not similar, because sonship is a property which regards the person itself; and again adoption implies a certain extraneousness and imperfection; and so it is not so with the grace of a singular person, which regards the soul itself, and implies not imperfection and extraneousness, but rather completion and deiformity. And therefore it has no opposition at all to that eternal acceptation, as adoption does with respect to natural sonship. And therefore it is not similar.

3. To that which is objected, that since Christ is God, he has no need to be made like to God; it must be said that he would not be God unless his body and soul were assumed by the Word; nor would the soul be fit to be assumed by the Word unless it were deiform and made perfectly like to God through grace: and therefore the fact that this man is God does not exclude the deiformity of grace and glory, but rather presupposes it. And if you object concerning the flesh, for which no gratuitous disposition is required in order that it be united to the Word; to this it was answered above, that the flesh has a congruity to the union from its ordering toward the soul. Therefore it is not necessary that the congruity of disposition be found first in the flesh, but it suffices that it be on the side of the soul.

4. To that which is objected concerning the united Word, that it can govern; it must be said that it is true, as far as concerns the united Word itself, but the defect is on the side of the free will, which needs a due disposition in order that it may be able to conform itself to the governance of the Word itself; it also needs a due disposition in order that it may be able to be united to the Word itself in one person. Hence without doubt that soul is more deiform through the abundance of grace given to it than is any other creature, with respect to its being fit for the union. — And for understanding these matters, those things avail which were determined in the first book concerning charity, and in the second concerning grace, where it was shown what is the necessity or usefulness of positing a created grace.