Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/13/q/bon-sent-III-d13-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether in Christ there is finite grace or immense grace.*

Secondly it is asked whether in Christ there is finite grace or immense grace. And that in Christ there was grace without measure seems [to be the case] thus:

1. John, chapter three: *God does not give the Spirit by measure*; and Augustine says that to that man the Spirit was given not by measure; but what lacks measure is immense and infinite: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text: «Indeed it can be said that he received so great a fullness of grace that God could not confer upon him a greater»; but than anything finite God can make something greater: therefore it seems that he received infinite grace.

3. Likewise, grace is as great as is the merit proceeding from it; but Christ's merit was infinite, since it can in no way be exhausted, and would have sufficed for infinite thousands of men, as Anselm says: therefore the grace by which he merited seems to have immensity.

4. Likewise, a finite thing does not exceed another finite thing infinitely within the same genus: if therefore Christ's grace is finite, then it exceeds the graces of other men proportionately: therefore if other men could continually advance, it seems that they could be made equal to Christ through grace and exceed him. But if no one ever can attain to his perfection, however much he advances, it seems that his grace is immense.

5. Likewise, the disposing grace is as great as is that to which it disposes according to right relation and proportion; but the grace of that man disposed him to this, that he should be God; the graces of other men dispose [them] to this, that they should enjoy God: if therefore to be God is an infinite good, and infinitely greater to be God than to have God, it seems that the grace of that man is infinite in itself and that it exceeds all graces infinitely.

6. Likewise, the soul of Christ either can desire a greater grace, or not. If it can desire a greater grace: then it seems that it is not perfect, since an addition can be made to it. If it cannot: since then to anything finite something greater can be desired, it seems that his grace is immense.

**On the contrary:** 1. Every created thing has a fixed weight, number, and measure, according to that which is said in Wisdom, chapter eleven; but the grace of that man, namely of Christ, is created: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, although grace does not always correspond to natural [endowments] by *equality*, it corresponds nevertheless according to due *proportion*, where there is no defect on the part of the recipient; but the natural [endowments] of Christ are not infinite nor do they exceed the natural [endowments] of any man infinitely: therefore neither do the gratuitous [ones].

3. Likewise, infinity in a creature takes away good and perfection, because what is infinite lacks end and term, therefore [lacks] goodness and completeness; but Christ's grace had these two pre-eminently: therefore it seems that the condition of finitude befits it pre-eminently.

4. Likewise, than the infinite nothing is greater: therefore if Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, were infinite; then uncreated grace would not be greater than it: therefore Creator and creature would be made equal in nobility and excellence; but if this is impossible, it remains etc.

### Conclusion.

> Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, considered in itself, is finite; yet in comparison to the graces of other men it exceeds [them] infinitely.

**I respond:** It must be said that for something to lack measure or to be immense is [so] in two ways: either absolutely in itself, or in comparison. If therefore we speak of the grace conferred on Christ, insofar as he is a singular person, in itself; thus, since it implies a *created gift*, it is necessarily finite and measured. For finitude and measurement, with respect to a creature, express completeness rather than imperfection. — But if we speak of it in comparison to the graces of other men; thus it exceeds [them] disproportionately by reason of the union to the person of the Word, to which union that grace disposed the soul of Christ. For that grace, on account of its supreme conjunction with the eternal Word, must exceed infinitely, that is, incommensurably, the graces of other men in three ways, namely as to the *habits* of the virtues, and as to their *uses*, and as to their *effects*. As to the habits: for no creature can ever advance so far as to be capable of so noble and perfect a habit as the soul conjoined to God in unity of person. — As to the uses of the virtues: because all the virtues in Christ had their uses, which pertain to perfection; and therefore *all the senses* are said to have been in him, because he had complete use of all the gifts in a more excellent mode than could ever be attained to by anyone. — As to the effect likewise the grace of Christ exceeds [other grace] disproportionately; because on account of this, that that man was the Son of God, his merit is weighed according to the dignity of that person from whom the work proceeds; and therefore the merit of his passion exceeds infinitely the merits of our passions; and on account of this, that he was God, his death was weighed by God [according to] how great was he who was dying. And therefore as to sufficiency, if infinite thousands of men were bound by the guilt of original [sin], through the effect of that passion they could have been freed.

It must therefore be granted that Christ's grace, insofar as he is man, is finite and measured, because it was created in number, weight, and measure. And the reasonings for this side must be granted.

1. To that, however, which is objected first, that the Spirit was given to Christ not by measure; it must be said that if it be understood of the *eternal* giving, or of the giving by the *communication of idioms*, then measure is denied [to it] *simply*. But if by *the Spirit given* we understand the very donation of *the gifts of the Holy Spirit*, thus measure is not denied there *simply*, but [denied is] commensuration *with respect to us*, to whom the Holy Spirit is given for the uses of certain gifts determinately according to the distribution of the Spirit, as is said in First Corinthians, chapter twelve: *To one is given through the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge*, etc. But to Christ all those gifts were given without any restriction; and to that extent he is said to have given him the Spirit without measure.

2. To that which is objected, that God could not give more fully; it must be said that God's not being able to make something greater can be understood from a threefold cause: namely, either it is by reason on the part of God *operating*, or on the part of the *thing produced*, or indeed on account of the *limitation of the recipient*. When therefore it is said that he could not confer more fully, this must not be understood on account of the *immensity of the thing conferred*, or [on account of] the *finitude of the divine power*, but on account of the *limitation of the receptive power*, because, since it is created, it is of finite capacity and cannot receive [anything] but the finite. And *if you object* that he could have given a greater capacity; it must be said that it is necessary that a creature, by the very fact that it is a *creature*, have a finite capacity; and again, because the creature is *in such a species* or genus, it has a limitation, beyond which that genus or species cannot extend itself. And thus it must be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that Christ's merit is infinite; it must be said that the infinity of the merit arises from the union of that soul to the divine person — by reason of which union not only man, but also God is said to die — on account of which that merit is infinite, not by reason of the *created grace in itself*, but by reason of the infinite *dignity of the person*. Whence Anselm too means to say this, when he says that it behooved him who could make satisfaction to be God and man.

4. To that which is objected, that a finite thing does not exceed another finite thing except finitely; it must be said that that holds true when they are altogether of the same genus; for if they are not of the same proximate genus, it holds falsehood, as is plain, that a line exceeds a point infinitely, and a surface a line. But Christ's grace not only disposes to *fruition*, as do other graces, but also to *union*. And hence it is, that since *to be united with the deity* is a new and singular mode of divine existence and indwelling in a creature, as regards this an excess without measure can be observed.

5. To that which is objected, that grace is as great as that to which it disposes; it must be said that this can hold true if it dispose by way of *necessity* or condignity, as merit [disposes] to reward; but the grace of a singular person disposes to union by a disposition of *congruity*. For that union was not only *gratuitous*, but among all graces, as Augustine says, it held pre-eminently the character of *grace*, as was held above in distinction four, because no sufficient merits could anticipate it. On account of this it is not necessary, even if *to be God* be simply an infinite good, that the grace preparing for this be infinite. — It could also be said otherwise, that *to be God* is said of something in two ways: either by predication through *essence*, or through *union*. If by predication through *essence*, then the predicate predicates an infinite good *in rectitude*. If through *union*, then it predicates an infinite good not concerning that *of which* it is predicated, but concerning that *which* is predicated. Whence when it is said: *this man is God*, or: *this man is an infinite good*, it is the same as if it were said: *this man is united to the immense God in unity of person*; and yet the man remains in his finitude, and God in his immensity. For although human nature is exalted, nevertheless it does not cease to be a creature.

6. To that which is asked, whether the soul of Christ can desire a greater grace; it must be said, no, because through that grace it is so united to God

that all its appetite is quieted in that immense good itself and terminated by a perfect quieting. — As to what it then objects, that than anything finite something greater can be desired: it must be said that this is true of the finite *in itself*, but of that finite which *orders* and *unites* to the infinite good by a perfect joining and ordering, it does not hold true, because it can quiet and stabilize by reason of that *from which* and *to which*. Whence just as grace, although it be a vanity, insofar as it is a creature, has nevertheless [the power] to stabilize the soul by reason of that good from which it proceeds and from which it is not separated nor recedes, so also it can quiet by reason of that to which it immediately and inseparably conjoins [it].