Dist. 14, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/14/q/bon-sent-III-d14-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether Christ's soul, in knowing, comprehends the Word itself united to it.*

Secondly it is asked whether Christ's soul comprehends the Word itself united to it. And that it does, it seems:

**Arguments for the affirmative.**

1. First, by the authority of the Apostle to the Colossians, chapter two: *In whom dwells bodily the fullness of the Godhead*, he speaks of Christ; but Christ's soul knows the Word united to it in the same way as it dwells in it: therefore it knows the whole fullness of it; and this is nothing other than to comprehend: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Damascene says this very thing: «In the incarnation of God the Word we say that the whole nature of the Godhead was incarnate in one of his hypostases», therefore the whole Word of God was united to the human nature in Christ; but it was capable of being known by Christ's soul in the same way as it was able to be united: therefore if the whole was able to be united, it seems that it can be known as a whole. But this is to be comprehended: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Isidore *On the Trinity*: «The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man»; therefore either he speaks of the cognition of *some sort* of vision, or of *perfect* comprehension. If he speaks in the first way, it is false, since the Trinity is known to many Angels and men: therefore he speaks of the cognition of *comprehension:* therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the simple, when it is attained, is attained as a whole, since it does not have part and part: if therefore the uncreated Word is most simple, it seems that it is attained wholly and totally by Christ's soul, if it is attained in any way. But it is attained in some way: therefore it is comprehended. *If you say* that this does not hold, because it is infinite, and therefore incomprehensible; *on the contrary:* just as it is truly infinite, so that eternal Word is truly simple: therefore just as it is posited incomprehensible by reason of its immensity, so it ought to be comprehended by reason of its simplicity.

5. Likewise, Christ's soul knows the Word itself; therefore either there is *something* of its clarity and truth and beauty which it does not know, or *nothing.* If *something:* then in God there is something known by Christ, and something unknown: therefore something and something, and so part and part; which is not intelligible. If there is *nothing* at all which it does not know, since the whole is identical there; it seems that it encloses God totally within its cognition. And this is to comprehend God: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if Christ's soul does not know the Word itself in its whole fullness, it still falls short of knowing something knowable of the Word: therefore it is capable of advancing in that cognition: therefore, since it desires to know God perfectly, it seems that the desire of Christ's soul is not fulfilled, and that it has not arrived at the perfect state of beatitude.

7. Likewise, he alone is blessed who comprehends what we believe and hope for; but we believe the immensity itself of the Word: if therefore Christ is and was blessed, it seems that he comprehends the immensity itself of the Word.

**On the contrary:** 1. Damascene: «This alone is understood concerning God, that he is incomprehensible»; but if Christ's soul comprehended him, it would understand him as not incomprehensible, but comprehensible: if therefore *this* can be understood by no one, the uncreated Word cannot be comprehended by Christ's soul.

2. Likewise, Augustine *On Seeing God*: «That is comprehended whose bounds can be circumscribed»; but the bounds of the divine immensity can be circumscribed by no one: therefore God can be comprehended by no soul.

3. Likewise, everything that is comprehended is finite to the one comprehending, therefore what is comprehended by a finite [intellect] is finite to it, and nothing is finite to the finite except what is finite simply; but God is infinite simply; Christ's soul, since it is a creature, is finite: therefore it cannot comprehend the immensity of the Word united to it.

4. Likewise, what comprehends another is greater than it, or at least equal to it, otherwise it could not enclose it within itself; but it is impossible that a creature, neither by union nor by any other mode, be equated to the Creator: therefore it is impossible that it comprehend the Creator: therefore Christ's soul does not comprehend the Word united to it. — By these same reasons it can be shown that no soul [comprehends it]. *(Note.)*

5. Likewise, the uncreated Word is so united to Christ's soul that it could be united to another; it so dwells in it that [it dwells] in many others: therefore it is so in the soul united to it that it is also outside, since it is everywhere: therefore it always exceeds the assumed soul itself: therefore if it is as much or more outside than inside, it seems that Christ's soul does not include it, and through this does not comprehend it.

6. Likewise, if Christ's soul could comprehend the uncreated Word, it could consequently think of something greater — for to everything whose bounds we know, we can understand something added — but

«God is that than which nothing greater can be thought», as Anselm says: therefore the Word united to Christ's soul, if it were comprehended by it, would not be God. But it is God: therefore it is not comprehended.

### Conclusion.

> God is not comprehended *totally* by Christ's soul nor by any finite intellect, although he is known *as a whole.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some wished to say that the uncreated Word and God himself can be comprehended not only by Christ's soul, but also by other blessed souls, and is in some way incomprehensible. *(Opinion 1.)* For he can be comprehended as to *essence*, as they said, which is finite, and therefore finite because in itself simple and perfect; but he is called and is incomprehensible as to *power*, which regards infinite things; for it can never [reach] so many that not [reach] more. And by this they wished to resolve the authorities of the Saints and of Scripture which seem to be mutually at odds. For sometimes it is said that God is *incomprehensible;* sometimes it is said that the Blessed have the cognition of *comprehension* and are *comprehensors.* — But this manner of speaking was disproved in the first book, *(Disproved.)* because it is impossible that *power* exceed *essence.* Hence it is impossible that *power* be simply infinite, while *substance* and essence exist as finite. And there it is shown in many ways that the divine *being* has immensity not only in relation to *us*, but also *in itself.* And therefore this manner of speaking cannot stand; and he who first said this afterward retracted it.

But others wished to say that Christ's soul, even though it is finite, is nevertheless raised by the grace of the union to something infinite; *(Opinion 2.)* for it has something which is above every grade of a creature, and than which nothing more excellent can be thought; and from that side it can comprehend the Word united to it; and this also is proper to it alone. And to this extent they say that Isidore said «The Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man». — But neither can that stand, *(Disproved.)* because, although the grace of the union expresses something infinite by reason of the other extreme, nevertheless by reason of the united soul it always expresses something finite and a thing of finite power; since Christ's soul remains within the bounds of a creature. And if it is of finite power, how can it comprehend the immensity of a thing altogether infinite and exceeding it infinitely?

And therefore there is a third mode, more common, more probable and more certain, *(Opinion 3 and conclusion 1.)* that neither Christ's soul nor any creature can comprehend the immensity of the uncreated Word or of God himself, and yet knows it *as a whole.* — And these two can stand together; indeed, *(Reason.)* it is necessary to posit [both], although it is difficult for our intellect to grasp. For if we truly posit God as *simple* — indeed, since it is necessary so to believe and posit — if he is known, then he is not known according to part and part, but is known *as a whole.* *Again*, if we posit God as *immense*, since we believe and confess this; it is necessary to posit that he is never comprehended *totally* by a finite intellect; and thus God is known *as a whole* by any creature knowing him, but nevertheless not *totally.* *(Conclusion 2.)*

But if it is asked how that could be understood; it must be said that it is most difficult to understand, *(Note on the explanation.)* because in creatures more dissimilitude is found than similitude. — Let us nevertheless understand, by way of example, some eye *(Example 1.)* whose gaze is not altogether clear; and let us understand some small white object, yet intense in its luminosity and brightness of color: that eye will see the whole of that white object, yet it does not comprehend the eminence of that whiteness; so in its own way it must be understood in the case at hand. But the dissimilitude here is not slight, because in that white object *quality* differs from *brightness*, whereas in God it is altogether the same. — And therefore another example is wont to be set down in a point, *(Example 2.)* which by reason of its simplicity is attained *wholly* by

a single line, yet is not comprehended, because it can terminate infinite lines. But not even that is similar yet, because in a point one thing is *power*, another is *essence;* it is not so in God, in whom it is altogether the same. — And therefore a third example must be set down in a spiritual substance *(Example 3.)* which is the image of God: because it is *wholly* in one part of the body, and yet *is not bounded* in it, because by reason of its simplicity it is so *wholly in it* that it is *wholly outside it* in another part; so too God is *in* one creature wholly and wholly *outside.* In this manner too it is necessary to understand concerning the *intellective power.* *(Explained by reasoning.)* — But this is better understood by reasoning than by the supposition of examples. For if anyone sees that in God *simplicity* is not opposed to *infinity*, he can see how God can be known *as a whole*, and yet *not comprehended.*

On account of which note that *the infinite* is taken according to quantity, as the Philosopher says; *(The infinite is taken in two ways.)* but Augustine says that there is «*quantity of mass* and *quantity of power*». And thus according to each the *infinite* can be taken, but differently. *(A notable difference.)* For since *quantity of mass* is divisible and founded upon the divisible; therefore *the infinite* according to this *quantity* has opposition to *the simple*, and it is impossible that anything one and the same according to the same be *simple* and *infinite.* But since quantity of *power* is found in simple things — indeed, the more simple a thing is, the more powerful — hence it is that *the infinite* according to this is not repugnant to *the simple*, but indeed necessarily follows: that if something is *most simple*, then something is *most infinite.* Clearly therefore it can be seen that in God according to the same there can be supreme *simplicity* and supreme *infinity.* And therefore the aforesaid position is true, that God is seen *as a whole*, but nevertheless *is not comprehended* by any creature, neither united nor separate. — And the reasons for this side are to be conceded.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments.** *(Solution of the opposing arguments.)*

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is objected, that the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Christ, and concerning Damascene, that the whole is incarnate; it must be said that the Apostle by that word wishes to show the personal union, which is in Christ and in no other, because the full and perfect divine person was united not only to the soul, but also to the body of Christ. And Damascene wishes to say this very thing: by saying *whole*, he understands the divine nature as perfect. From this, however, the cognition of comprehension cannot be inferred, because, as has been touched on, in that fullness there is *simplicity*, by reason of which it can dwell in and be united to a finite thing; nonetheless there is also *infinity*, by reason of which it necessarily exceeds, and it is impossible for it to be comprehended. And thus it is plain that that [objection] proceeds from an insufficient [ground]; for *comprehension* expresses more than *cognition of fullness* or of perfection. For over and above *cognition* it adds *inclusion* or co-termination or co-measuring in a certain manner of speaking. *(Note.)*

*To 3.* To that which is objected from Isidore, that the Trinity is known to itself alone and to the assumed man; it must be said that he does not wish to exclude all cognition, *(Note.)* but to attribute the perfect cognition of God to the Trinity itself and to the assumed nature. For to the Trinity itself he attributes perfect cognition *simply*, but to the assumed man within the *genus of a creature.* For that created soul knows most clearly among other creatures, and so perfectly as it was ever able to grasp. Hence on account of the most intimate cognition which that soul has among creatures, Isidore says that to it alone the Trinity is known, speaking more by way of *authority* than by *precision.*

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the simple is attained as a whole; it must be said that it is true, *as a whole*, that is not according to part and part; for in the simple there is no [way] of saying *whole* except by the privation of the composition of parts. But from this it does not follow that it is comprehended, because, as has been said, together with *simplicity* there stands *infinity*, which does not allow anything of God to be seen altogether perfectly by a creature. — Nor does it avail that he objects that it ought thus to be called comprehensible on account of *simplicity*, just as incomprehensible on account of *immensity.* For from *immensity* by necessity follows *incomprehensibility* by the primary meaning of the name itself, [but] from *simplicity* not. For so great can simplicity be that, far from making [the thing] comprehended, it rather, on account of its excellence, renders it incomprehensible.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that something of God lies hidden, etc.; it must be said that this is not to be understood in God as it is understood in some composite thing, of which one part does not appear, and another is manifested; since in the divine essence there is not *something and something*, but there is *some one thing*, which is equivalent to infinite things. Hence whatever it is that the soul sees of God, it so sees it that it nevertheless cannot comprehend it; *(Note.)* whence the same thing both *lies hidden* and *is plain:* it is plain indeed for gazing upon, but lies hidden for comprehending. Just as if it be asked: since God is in a stone, is there something of God *outside* the stone, and something *inside?* it must be said that there is not according to *something of him* outside, and according to *something of him* inside, but he is *wholly* inside and *wholly* outside; so too in the case at hand it must be understood.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that if it does not comprehend, it can still advance in the cognition of God; it must be said that this does not follow, since the *halt* in the advance of cognition is *(The cause of the halt is twofold.)* sometimes on the part of the *thing comprehended*, which cannot be better known, sometimes on the part of the one *comprehending*, who is not capable of knowing better; and thus there is a halt in Christ and in the other Blessed. But otherwise in Christ than in the others: because Christ knows so perfectly as he was ever able to receive, but the other Saints so perfectly as they were disposed through the merits of grace; nor can they advance further, because they are not in the state of meriting, nor [can they] further desire to have more than they have, on account of the sufficiency of that supreme Good and an affection ordered according to the rule and balance of supreme justice; but they rest in perfect rest, because they hold him whom they desired.

*To 7.* To that which is lastly objected concerning comprehension; it must be said that *to comprehend* is said in three ways: *(To comprehend is said in three ways.)* in one way the same as *to adhere by charity;* and so Bernard takes it *to Eugenius*: «If you are holy, you have comprehended». In another way it is the same as *to see clearly* and *to love perfectly*, as to the Philippians, chapter three: *If by any means I may comprehend, in which I have also been comprehended.* In the third way *to comprehend* is the same as *to enclose the bounds of a thing;* thus God is incomprehensible. When therefore it is said that the Saints are *comprehensors* in the fatherland, and that Christ was a *comprehensor;* it must be said that it is taken in the middle way, and so it has truth; for Christ sees the immensity of God and does not hold this by faith, but by most certain cognition, that is, he knows God to be immense. *(An incidental question is resolved.)* — And if you ask whether *positively* or *privatively;* it must be said that in a certain way *positively*, in a certain way *privatively:* positively, as far as the capacity of his intelligence extends; privatively thereafter. For he marvels at that supreme depth of the divine immensity, as the Prophet says: *Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me, it is high, and I cannot reach to it.* And thus the whole is plain.