Dist. 14, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/3/d/14/q/bon-sent-III-d14-a1-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether Christ's soul, in knowing God, fixes its gaze on the eternal light itself, or on something below it.*

Thirdly it is asked whether Christ's soul, in knowing God, fixes its gaze on the eternal light itself, or on something below it. And that it does not see the fount of light itself appears as follows.

1. First to Timothy 6: *He dwells in inaccessible light, which no man has seen, nor indeed can see:* therefore Christ, according as he is man, has never seen God in his light, nor can he see him.

2. Likewise, John 1: *No one has ever seen God;* upon that passage Chrysostom says: «The Son alone has seen him, and the Holy Spirit; but he who is of a creatable nature, how can he see the uncreatable»? If therefore Christ's soul is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit, but rather a creature; it does not appear that it sees that light in itself.

3. Likewise, by as much as the finite is distant from the infinite, by so much is the creature distant from the Creator; but on account of the infinite distance no finite power can know God as *immense*: therefore by parity of reasoning, on account of the infinite distance, no created power will be able to know and see the *uncreated light* through itself.

4. Likewise, just as for the knowledge of *comprehension* a certain commensuration is required, so for the knowledge on the side of *vision* a fitting assimilation is required; but things which agree in nothing cannot be assimilated: therefore the Creator cannot be seen in himself by a creature, since they have nothing in common.

5. Likewise, the brightness of the divine light exceeds the eye of Christ's soul much more than the sun exceeds the brightness of the material eye; but our material eye cannot behold corporeal light in its *fount* on account of [its] excellence: therefore neither can the intellect of Christ.

6. Likewise, the fount of eternal light is in itself infinite and immense; but the finite cannot [reach] above the infinite: therefore since the power of Christ's soul is finite, its act will not be able to extend itself all the way to it: therefore it will not be able to know it in itself: therefore it appears that neither Christ's soul nor any other soul knows God in his brightness.

**On the contrary:**

1. Upon that text of Second Corinthians 3: *We, with unveiled face;* the Gloss: «Christ is the image of the Father, the same as him, toward whom we tend, namely that we may see him in [his] essence»: if therefore Christ's soul has [the thing] to which we strive to attain, therefore it sees God in substance and nature.

2. Likewise, it is more to be united to someone in unity of person than in a union producing knowledge; but Christ's soul is immediately united to the eternal Word in unity of person: therefore much more strongly is it united to the truth and light of the Word through knowledge of it in itself: therefore it sees God without any medium.

3. Likewise, in the knowledge of conclusions there is no rest, but only in the knowledge of principles — and the reason for this is that the soul knows conclusions through a medium, but knows principles without a medium — if therefore Christ's soul knows God through some medium, then it does not rest in the knowledge of God; and if it does not rest in God, since God is the ultimate end, it is not beatified. If therefore it is beatified, it necessarily follows that it knows the divine light in itself; and by parity of reasoning so does every beatified soul.

4. Likewise, the intellect of one who is a comprehensor is elevated as much as his affection, although it is blind in the way on account of the blindness of ignorance; but Christ was a most perfect comprehensor: since therefore he loved the supreme goodness of God in itself, every effect being set aside, by parity of reasoning he saw the light and truth in itself without a medium.

5. Likewise, either it sees *immediately,* or *through a medium.* If *immediately,* I have my proposition; if *through a medium,* either through a *proportionate* medium, or an *improportionate* one. If through an *improportionate* medium, then it is hindered rather than helped; if through a *proportionate* medium, on the contrary: either it is *created* or *uncreated;* not *uncreated,* because that is one alone; if *created:* then a creature can be proportionate to the Creator; and if this [is so], since nothing else hinders the creature from being able to see God in his substance, it remains that Christ's soul could so see him and did see him.

6. Likewise, if [it sees] through a medium, either that [medium] is *superior* to the beatified soul of Christ, or *inferior.* If *inferior;* then Christ's soul is more immediate to God than that which you call a medium: therefore, that being set aside, it will see God better. If *superior;* then there is something more excellent than the nature of the human mind in Christ. But this is impossible, because *all things are subjected under his feet*. It remains therefore that his soul saw and sees the eternal light immediately and in the fount itself. — By these reasonings too the same can be shown of any beatified soul.

### Conclusion

> Christ's soul and the other beatified souls see the fount of light itself.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that God will not be seen, nor is seen, by any creature in his *essence*

or *nature,* but will be seen in his *brightness,* since the splendor of the immensity of his light is so great that no creaturely eye can attain to the beholding of that substance. — Gregory in the Morals dispels this error, treating that text of Job 28: *It is hidden from the eyes of all the living,* where he speaks thus: «There were those who said that in that region of beatitude God is beheld in his *brightness* and is not seen in his *nature;* but brightness is not one thing and nature another, but the very *nature* is brightness, and the very *brightness* is nature». And so this error is not very reasonable, because it understands the eternal light badly, in which the *essence* of light and the very *act* of shining do not differ.

And so there were others more modern who said that the eternal light cannot be beheld by any creature in the *fount* of its brightness, but [only] in certain *condescensions* and theophanies, and this on account of the disproportion of the eye to that supreme light, which would oppress rather than delight the creaturely eye, which is related to it as the eye of an owl; and therefore it was necessary that God should temper himself to the soul, as the sun is tempered to the eye through the medium of a cloud. — But this manner of speaking deviates from the truth no less than the preceding. Hence master Hugo too refutes it, on the Angelic Hierarchy: «What is it, he says, for God to be seen in theophanies and not to be seen outside them, except never to be truly seen? For if only the image is always seen, the truth is never seen. Let them therefore put away their phantasms, by which they strive to darken the light of our minds, and let them not fence God our own from us by the images of their exterminations; because for us, just as nothing besides him can satisfy, so nothing short of him can bring us to a stand».

And so, these two manners having been cast aside as erroneous, it must be said in a third manner, truly and catholically, that the most beatified soul of Christ and the other beatified souls see the fount of light itself, in which they are refreshed, rest, are delighted, and in a certain way are absorbed by the brightness of that light, so that God is beheld by them on every side and is seen even in [the souls] themselves; and this is most especially true in the soul of Christ. — And therefore the authorities and reasons adduced for this side must be granted.

But for an understanding of the authorities adduced to the contrary, and of similar ones, it must be noted that in five ways the authorities of the Saints can be expounded, which seem to say that God cannot be seen in his substance. In the first way thus: he cannot be seen, namely *by our own powers,* yet he can [be seen] *by the gift of God.* Hence upon that text of First Timothy 6: *He dwells in inaccessible light;* the Gloss: «It is inaccessible to our powers, accessible to his gifts». — In the second way thus: the substance cannot be seen, namely *in the way.* Hence upon that text of First Timothy 6: *Whom no man can see;* the Gloss: «Yet he will be able [to be seen] at some time». And thus that text of Exodus 33: *Man shall not see me and live.* — In the third way thus: the substance cannot be seen, that is, *fully comprehended.* Hence upon that text of Job 11: *Wilt thou perhaps comprehend the traces of God?* the Gloss: «His essence will be seen fully by none», *fully,* namely by circumscribing. — In the fourth way thus: the substance cannot be seen, that is, the *account* of the substance. Hence to the Romans 1: *That which is known of God;* the Gloss: «The account of his substance lies hidden from every creature»; and in this way it can be said «that the Trinity is known to itself alone». — In the fifth way thus: no one knows the substance of God, or anything of the sort, «because he does not *make [it] known*». Matthew 24: *But of that day and hour no one knows, not even an Angel* etc., just as a pit is called *blind*

because it does not manifest what it has in itself. And thus Chrysostom says that the Angels do not see what God is.

**To the opposing arguments:**

*To 1, 2.* And thus the two authorities are clear, because the first runs according to the first way, and the second according to the fourth way, or the fifth.

*To 3, 4.* To that which is objected, that the finite is so far distant from the infinite, etc.; it must be said that *distance* is spoken of as opposed to *agreement;* but *agreement* is found in a threefold difference, so far as suffices for the present. For there is the agreement of *commensuration* or adequation, the agreement of *participation* of something common, and the agreement of *order.* I say therefore that if *distance* be spoken of through the privation of the agreement of *adequation* and *participation,* the distance of the created to the uncreated is infinite, as of the infinite to the finite. But if *distance* be spoken of through the privation of the agreement of *order;* it must be said that this is false, because creatures are immediately ordered to God as to a principle and as to an end, most of all the rational creature. But for a *simple beholding* it suffices that there be the agreement of *order,* whereas for the *knowledge of comprehension* the agreement according to a certain *equality* or adequation is required. And therefore it does not follow that, if the created soul cannot *comprehend* the infinity, it cannot *behold* the fount of light. — And through this the next [argument] is clear. For as to what it says, that for knowledge assimilation is required; it must be said that it is not necessary that [there be] *assimilation in a third nature,* but it suffices that the one be a *likeness of the other,* as was determined in the first book, distinction one, three, and thirty-five.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that that light exceeds the eye; it must be said that there is an excellence that *preserves,* and an excellence that *corrupts.* The *preserving* excellence is in spiritual things, but the *corrupting* in corporeal objects; and the reason for this was given in the first book, both on the side of the *object* and on the side of the *mode* of comprehending: and therefore it is not the same case.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the finite cannot [reach] above the infinite; it must be said that the soul, in knowing God, is more in a state of *receiving* than of *acting,* indeed every power of the soul, with respect to God, is in the character of *passive* — not even the cognitive power [is] *actively* [so], which by its own nature implies in some manner a passion, as the Philosopher and Priscian say. — And therefore, when it understands God, the soul does not act upon God, but God flows into the soul, in which influx God condescends through grace, and the soul is elevated and made deiform. And this very deiformity is the *disposition* rendering the eye of the soul apt for seeing God, not because it makes a proportionate *quantity,* since that light always exceeds [it] to infinity, but because it makes a proportionate *quality,* since something is given to the soul itself, namely a likeness, which, making the soul itself and the intellect of the soul like to God, renders it understanding. — And if you object that, although vision and knowledge begin from *passion,* they are nevertheless completed in *action,* since for vision two things concur: *reception* and *judgment*; but no creature can *act upon* that fount of light, since it can *suffer* nothing from anyone; likewise concerning that fount of light and supreme truth no one can *judge,* as Augustine says in *On True Religion*, and reason itself dictates [it], since the one judging in some way presides over the thing judged; in no way does it seem able to be maintained that Christ's soul, or any other beatified soul, should judge the fount of the supernal light itself: to this it must be responded that, although for the action of knowledge there concurs in some manner not only *passion* but also *action;* nevertheless there does not concur an *action* which indeed is made through some *influx* or impression of the knower into the knowable, but only through a certain *protension.* Just as it lies hidden also in *love,* when I love someone, the soul in loving in some manner acts, yet flows nothing into the beloved, nor does the beloved suffer or receive anything from the lover: so it is to be understood in knowledge. — Likewise, when we say that vision or knowledge is completed in *judgment;* it must be said that this is true; but in order that we may see God, it is not necessary that we judge concerning him in himself, but it suffices for clear vision to be illuminated by the light of light itself and for the illuminated eye to *extend* itself into him by beholding, and to judge concerning him by beholding, since it cannot attain to this, that

it should judge concerning *the supreme truth itself,* but *according to it* the soul judges concerning itself and concerning its own knowledge. Yet nothing prevents — taking judgment in some manner, according as it is required for vision — its being conceded that the beatified soul most certainly judges that that which it beholds is the supreme light, as was held in the first book. And the word of Augustine does not contradict this. For however much *beholding* or *judgment* may seem in itself to have the nature of action; nevertheless with respect to God or the divine light, by which it is caused, it is a *passion* and an *effect.* Hence that the soul sees God in himself is not because the soul can [be] above God, but rather because God can [be] above it, so that the soul, through the divine power and influx, is elevated above itself. — But these things which have been said of the soul of Christ generally hold good for the question concerning the vision of God, and likewise those which follow.